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As a result of new information technology and globalization, there has never been a time before 
when people have had better access to information than nowadays. The potential overload of 
information builds the basis for the research questions of this cumulative dissertation, which 
relates to the extensively discussed “disclosure overload problem”. Special focus is put on de-
cision-useful information in voluntary reporting of capital market-oriented companies. In this 
context the first manuscript investigates the quality of information in voluntary strategy re-
porting and formulates qualitative principles. Based thereon, the second manuscript examines 
determinants influencing the quality of strategy reporting. The third manuscript is focusing on 
Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) reporting and investigates the relation of transparency in 
CSR reports and external assurance. The prior discussed topics as well as financial reporting and 
new reporting concepts, like integrated reporting, are put into context in the fourth manuscript. 
In this educational case study special emphasis is placed on the determination of material infor-
mation, which is of high importance for future-decision leaders.
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 Introduction to the Research Context 
As a result of new information technology and increasing globalization, there has 
never been a time in history when people have had better access to information about 
themselves and their environment than nowadays, in the 21st century. On the one hand, 
this poses a major challenge for companies to transfer relevant information to their 
stakeholders and investors at the right moment and at the same time overcome the 
problem of disclosure overload. On the other hand, this offers companies the 
opportunity to position themselves as transparent and trustworthy institutions that 
understand the information needs of their stakeholders and investors. Especially in 
times of high uncertainty, given by the financial crisis and ongoing world-wide trade 
disputes, it seems crucial for companies to disclose decision-useful information and 
thus increase transparency towards their stakeholders. 
Changes in the society and in the reporting environment lead to the situation that 
also other information, which is not part of financial reporting, gains more interest of 
corporate reporting addressees and investors. Technological progress, new political 
conditions and civil society initiatives are revolutionizing the way companies 
communicate internally and externally. This has changed the standards for corporate 
reporting. Various reporting requirements and regulations make the preparation 
process of corporate reporting more complex. Furthermore, the information needs of 
investors and corporate reporting addressees are also increasing by the fast-changing 
environment. New regulations like the EU-Directive 2014/95/EU and the resulting 
‘CSR-Richtlinie-Umsetzungsgesetz’ in Germany which is applicable since 2017 as 
well as new reporting trends like integrated reporting according to ‘The International 
<IR> Framework’ have changed the perspective of information in corporate 
reporting. 
This dissertation relates to the extensively discussed ”disclosure overload 
problem”. Special focus is put on decision-useful information in the context of 
voluntary reporting. Since this work is a cumulative dissertation, the research problem 
will be discussed in four different manuscripts. The result of the manuscripts will 
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enhance the understanding of decision-useful information in voluntary reporting and 
give an indication of the quality of disclosure. 
This dissertation is structured as follows. In chapter I, an overview about the 
research problem and research questions of the dissertation is given. The discussion 
focuses on the disclosure problem and decision-usefulness of information. This builds 
the frame for the manuscripts of the dissertation. In chapter II, manuscript A is 
presented. The quality of voluntary strategy disclosure is analyzed and qualitative 
principles for high quality strategy reporting are formulated. In chapter III, 
manuscript B is presented. Based on a self-constructed scoring model to measure 
strategy disclosure quality, the determinants influencing the quality of information in 
strategy reporting are examined. In chapter IV, manuscript C is presented. The 
assurance of voluntary Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) reporting is in focus. 
Based on statistical analyses, the correlation of transparency in CSR reports and 
external assurance is examined. Finally, in chapter V, manuscript D is presented. The 
prior discussed topics as well as financial reporting and new reporting concepts like 
integrated reporting, are put into context in an educational case study. Special 
emphasis is placed on the materiality of information, which is of high importance for 
future-decision leaders. 
1.1 Disclosure Overload Problem 
In a first step the research problem of the dissertation is formulated. The term 
“disclosure overload” is related to the overload of information (Beerbaum, 2016) in 
financial reporting and the aim to present information in a true and fair view. 
Regulators and standard-setting bodies have identified that the increasing regulations 
in accounting lead to a disclosure overload problem. The “disclosure overload 
problem” is a challenge for both, preparers of corporate reporting as well as for their 
addressees. On the one side, the preparers are overwhelmed with new reporting 
regulations to fulfill and corporate reporting’s increasing complexity. On the other 
side, the addressees of corporate reporting have difficulties to identify relevant 
information from the vast pool of data made available to them (Beerbaum, 2016). The 
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financial reporting addresses and investors have extensive information needs, but they 
are overloaded with information – “blinded by the light” (Paredes, 2003). 
In particular, disclosure overload is a problem of corporate reporting. Several 
standard setting bodies have set up projects in the past to overcome this issue and help 
preparers of financial reporting and their addressees to identify decision-useful 
information. Regarding financial reporting the International Accounting Standards 
Board (IASB) started several initiatives. In conjunction with the IASB forum on 
disclosure overload on January 28, 2013, the members of the IASB launched a survey 
on financial reporting disclosure to gain a clearer picture on the perceived ‘disclosure 
problem’ (IASB, 2013). The survey focused on three potential areas of the disclosure 
problem (IASB, 2013, p. 35): 
▪ not enough relevant information; 
▪ too much irrelevant information; and 
▪ poor communication of disclosures. 
The results showed that over 80% of the 233 persons, which were preparers, users 
and other survey participants, confirm the view that there is a disclosure problem 
(IASB, 2013, p. 34). The most survey participants are of the opinion that the problem 
is evenly spread throughout the annual report including the financial statement section 
and the problem is connected to too much irrelevant information (IASB, 2013). On 
the basis of these findings, the IASB commenced the Disclosure Initiative with further 
initiatives, like short-term research projects. These included the narrow scope 
amendments to International Accounting Standard (IAS) 1, the development of an 
application guidance of the principle of materiality and a revised research project on 
financial statement presentation. 
1.2 Decision-Useful Information  
To overcome the disclosure overload problem, the determination of decision-useful 
information seems relevant. Decision usefulness is identified from the IASB and the 
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Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB) as the objective of financial reporting 
(Gassen & Schwedler, 2010). According to the conceptual framework of the IASB: 
“(…) the objective of financial statements is to provide information about the 
financial position, performance and changes in financial position of an 
enterprise that is useful to a wide range of users in making economic decisions.“ 
(IASB, 2019, para. 12). 
Furthermore,  
„The economic decisions that are taken by users of financial statements require 
an evaluation of the ability of an entity to generate cash and cash equivalents 
and of the timing and certainty of their generation (…). Users are better able to 
evaluate this ability to generate cash and cash equivalents if they are provided 
with information that focuses on the financial position, performance and 
changes in financial position of an enterprise (…).“ (IASB 2019, para. 15). 
The IASB formulated four main qualitative characteristics in the Conceptual 
Framework for Financial Reporting, to define decision-useful information: 
▪ understandability; 
▪ relevance;  
▪ reliability; and 
▪ comparability.  
These qualitative characteristics apply primarily to financial information in financial 
reports as well as to financial information provided in other ways. 
Understandability of information is an essential quality characteristic to assure 
that information is readily understandable by users (IASB, 2019, para. 25). 
Information about complex matters that should be included in the financial statement 
because of its relevance to the economic decision-making process should not be 
excluded on the grounds that it may be too difficult for certain users to understand. 
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Relevance in the context of financial information, means information, which is 
capable of making a difference in the decision-making process of its users (IASB, 
2019, para. 26). This is given when it has a predictive value, confirmatory value, or 
both. Those two values are interrelated (IASB, 2019, para. 27). The relevance of 
information is affected by its nature and materiality, whereby materiality is an entity-
specific aspect of relevance. According to the Conceptual Framework of the 
International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) para. 30, materiality is defined as 
follows: 
“Information is material if its omission or misstatement could influence the 
economic decisions of users taken on the basis of the financial statements.” 
To be useful, information must also be reliable according to Conceptual Framework 
para. 31. Information is considered to be reliable when it is free from material error 
and bias and can be depended upon by users to represent faithfully that which it either 
purports to represent or could reasonably be expected to represent. Furthermore, 
comparability of information is important to assure that users are able to compare 
information over time in order to identify trends or to evaluate relative differences 
(IASB, 2019, para. 39.). The application of the principal qualitative characteristics 
results in financial information that conveys what is generally understood as a true 
and fair view (IASB, 2019, para. 46).  
In general, corporate reporting can be divided in financial and non-financial 
reporting, whereby the disclosure of information can be obligatory or voluntary. 
Primarily, investors are interested in financial reporting of corporations because this 
information is important for their decision-making process. A special focus of this 
dissertation is on voluntary reporting. Since voluntary reporting includes both, 
financial and non-financial reporting, this dissertation opens the definition of 
decision-useful information to a broader context and applies qualitative 
characteristics to non-financial reporting.  
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The problem of disclosure overload also exists for non-financial disclosure. A 
comprehensive definition of non-financial reporting does not exist on an international 
level. Non-financial reporting contains information about topics which is not covered 
by financial reporting and is mostly associated with disclosure of company’s  
environmental, social and governance (ESG) information (according to European 
Commission 2019; also known as Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) reporting). 
Since non-financial reporting comprises a wide range of topics, which are not solely 
related to CSR aspects, this dissertation focuses on non-financial reporting in a 
broader context. Topics related to CSR and strategy related information build the main 
aspects of the analysis.  
All qualitative principles defined for financial reporting can also be applied to 
non-financial reporting, because non-financial information should also be 
understandable, relevant, reliable and comparable. Furthermore, there are additional 
qualitative principles for non-financial information. New regulations like the 
principles of sustainability reporting from the Global Sustainability Standards Board 
(GSSB), especially Global Reporting Initiative (GRI) 101, could be used to derive 
general quality principles for non-financial reporting. The GRI Frame principles (GRI 
101) are divided into two groups: (i) principles for determination of the content of a 
report and (ii) principles for ensuring the quality of a report. Similar to the GRI 
Guidelines, the Sustainability Accounting Standards Board (SASB) defined in the 
SASB Conceptual Framework guiding principles for topic selection and criteria for 
accounting metrics (SASB, 2017). In addition to the principles of GRI, these 
guidelines can be used from CSR reporting preparers as qualitative principles. The 
‘German Accounting Standard (GAS) 20: Group Management Report’ as national 
regulation in Germany sets out six principles of group management reporting, which 
consists mainly of forward-looking and non-financial topics. In addition to the 
regulations for non-financial reporting, new reporting concepts like ‘integrated 
reporting’ are also discussed in the reporting environment. Especially the concept of 
integrated reporting supports the integration of forward-looking information and 
voluntary disclosure (Ungerer, 2013). There are guiding principles for integrated 
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reports based on The International <IR> Framework (IIRC 2013), which consists of 
qualitative principles regarding the presentation of information. 
Based on the analysis of the different principles in financial and non-financial 
reporting on international and national level, differences and similarities can be 
observed. Table I - 1 shows the former described reporting principles with respect to 
the different guidelines. The guidelines analyzed are the Conceptual Framework of 
the IFRS, the GAS 20, the GRI Guidelines, the Integrated Reporting Guideline and 
the SASB Guidelines. 
Qualitative principles* 
Reporting concepts 
IFRS GAS 20 GRI IR SASB 
Completeness  X X X X 
Comparability X  X X X 
Transparency/Clarity  X X   
Reliability X X X X  
Materiality/Relevance X X X X X 
Stakeholder Inclusiveness   X X  
*Note: Only those principles are shown in the table which occur more than in one of the analysed 
reporting concepts; others are excluded. 
Table I - 1: Reporting Principles Overview 
Source: Own illustration. 
The matrix of the qualitative principles shows, that materiality/relevance is important 
in all analyzed reporting concepts. Moreover, completeness, comparability and 
reliability play a major role as qualitative principles in the different reporting 
concepts. Transparency/clarity and stakeholder inclusiveness should be highlighted 
in the context of non-financial reporting, because these principles are both part of the 
GRI-Guidelines and additionally of either the GAS 20 or IR framework. Reliability 
as qualitative characteristic for non-financial reporting is associated with the 
assurance of this information, which is of high interest for corporate reporting 
addressees (Abernathy, Stefaniak, Wilkins, & Olson, 2017). Some of these principles 
are interconnected. For instance, comparability in financial reporting increases the 
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transparency of information. To ensure an efficient resource allocation in markets, 
transparency through corporate reporting is necessary (Kothari, Ramanna, & Skinner, 
2010).  
 Research Questions of the Dissertation 
This dissertation aims to examine the quality of disclosure in voluntary reporting. 
Special emphasis is put on the disclosure overload problem as well as on the decision 
usefulness of information in voluntary reporting taking into account the most 
important qualitative principles of financial and non-financial reporting. Due to 
current discussions in academic research and management practice, voluntary strategy 
disclosure, sustainability reporting and the concept of integrated reporting have been 
selected as focus topics for the dissertation. In the following, research questions will 
be formulated for the focus topics. This dissertation consists of four manuscripts, the 
research questions will build the basis for the manuscripts. 
The first, second and third research question (RQ 1-3) are related to 
transparency, completeness and comparability of voluntary strategy disclosure. In a 
highly competitive environment, it is important for companies to inform their 
investors and financial reporting addressees how they want to create value in the long-
term. In this regard, transparent information is a decisive factor and voluntary 
disclosure plays an important role. Transparency is the openness of a company to 
communicate to stakeholders and give them access to the information they need for 
their decision-making process (Ungerer, 2013). Due to technological developments, 
transparency in communication and reporting has risen to a new level, which gives 
stakeholders the opportunity to gain information about challenges and corporate 
strategies as well as to evaluate the situation of a company and their products 
(Tapscott, 2005). This dissertation focuses on strategy disclosure only to the extent it 
is voluntary, and not obligatory. In general, this is one of the weakly researched topics 
in academia, but of interest for investors and with high relevance in management 
practice.  
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The aforementioned research questions one to three are examined in manuscript A 
and B. In a first step, the status-quo of the quality of strategy related information in 
corporate reporting is analyzed. Second, principles of high-quality strategy reporting 
are formulated. And third, to better understand which types of companies have a high-
quality strategy reporting, determinants of strategy reporting are analyzed.  
The first three research questions of this dissertation are formulated as follows: 
RQ 1: Do companies inform their reporting addressees transparently about 
their corporate strategy and strategic objectives? 
RQ2: Which qualitative principles are important to ensure complete and 
comparable information in the context of strategy reporting? 
RQ 3: What types of companies have a transparent strategy reporting? 
The fourth research question (RQ 4) is related to transparency and reliability in the 
context of voluntary CSR disclosure. The integration of environmental, social and 
governance topics in corporate reporting are prerequisites for a successful organization 
in the future (Villiers & Maroun, 2018). The growing transparency and relevance of 
CSR related topics is accompanied by an increased demand for external assurance. CSR 
reporting assurance is receiving increased coverage in accounting research, whereas its 
influence on reporting strategy is a neglected topic in academia. The European Union 
Non-Financial Reporting (EU NFR) Directive and the German CSR Directive 
Implementation Act (“CSR-Richtlinie-Umsetzungsgesetz”) from April 2017 can be seen 
as fundamental regulatory frameworks which require the disclosure of non-financial 
items by selected German companies. With this regulation sustainability reporting has 
become mandatory for large, capital market-oriented companies in Germany. This 
underlines the increasing importance of assurance of CSR information and the debate 
on more reliability of CSR disclosure.  
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This dissertation focuses on CSR reporting before the regulation, as voluntary 
information, and formulates the following research question: 
RQ 4: Does external assurance of voluntary CSR disclosure enhance the 
transparency and reliability of information? 
The fifth research question (RQ 5) is related to materiality in reporting concepts for 
different stakeholders. Investors have a high demand on ‘Integrated Reports’ or 
‘Sustainability Reports’ and their interest on non-financial and CSR related topics is 
increasing. Therefore, how to report about this information is important for future 
decision leaders and practitioners. For instance, several studies found positive 
associations between CSR disclosure levels and firm value, because improved 
transparency and accountability lead to enhanced stakeholder trust, which is an 
important factor (Stolowy & Paugam, 2018). Management accountants and leaders in 
managerial practice are confronted with these new reporting concepts and 
requirements. They face the challenges for a better understanding of non-financial 
information and the important relationship to value creation (Cokins & Shepherd, 
2017). As Gerwanski et al. (2019) pointed out, the heterogeneity and 
disconnectedness of non-financial and financial information is increasingly 
associated with information overload and decreased decision-usefulness to investors 
and other stakeholders (Villiers, Rinaldi, & Unerman, 2014). To gain more decision-
useful information, materiality plays an important role. There are different definitions 
of materiality in integrated reporting, sustainability reporting and financial reporting. 
Materiality is an essential qualitative characteristic of decision-useful information and 
of high importance to overcome the disclosure overload problem. Therefore, the last 
research question of this dissertation aims to discuss the materiality aspect in 
reporting concepts for different stakeholders and help future decision leaders to 
identify decision-useful information.   
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The research question five is formulated as follows: 
RQ 5: How can future decision leaders identify decision-useful information in 
the context of materiality in reporting concepts for different 
stakeholders? 
 Overview and Findings of the Manuscripts  
The dissertation consists of four manuscripts, which aim to answer the five research 
questions. Figure I - 1 gives an overview of the key findings of the manuscripts and its 
embedment in the overall context of the dissertation. Chapter I focuses on the problem 
of disclosure overload and explains relevant qualitative principles for decision-useful 
information. Based on the principles, focus topics are discussed to derive research 
questions for this doctoral thesis. The focus topics are strategy reporting, CSR reporting 
and integrated reporting as a new reporting concept. The research questions are 
addressed in four manuscripts. Manuscript A (chapter II) and manuscript B 
(chapter III) focus on voluntary strategy disclosure of German capital market-oriented 
companies and answer the research questions one to three (RQ 1-3). Since Germany is 
one of the few countries with legal requirements for voluntary strategy disclosure, the 
analysis is based on a German sample. In the European context, CSR-reporting has 
become popular and is widely discussed, especially based on the EU NFR Directive. 
Therefore, the fourth research question (RQ 4) will be discussed in manuscript C 
(chapter IV) on a European level, which sheds light on the external assurance and 
transparency in CSR reporting. In manuscript D (chapter V) different reporting 
concepts will be analyzed in an educational case study which answers the fifth research 
question (RQ 5). Since decision-leaders of all countries are faced with new reporting 
trends and the challenge of materiality in reporting, the manuscript D takes an 
international perspective. 
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Figure I - 1: Overview of the Dissertation  
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3.1 Voluntary Strategy Disclosure and Qualitative Principles: Evidence from 
German Management Reports  
Corporate strategy and strategic objectives can be a relevant topic for investors and a 
decisive factor for the future business success of a company. However, strategy 
disclosure is voluntary, as there is no obligation to report on strategy related information. 
Therefore, the question arises if companies report about their strategy and what quality 
this information has. Manuscript A ‘Voluntary Strategy Disclosure and Qualitative 
Principles: Evidence from German Management Reports’ focuses on this question and 
has three main objectives: (1) to develop a scoring model to measure strategy disclosure; 
(2) to describe the quality of strategy disclosure of the analyzed companies using the 
scoring model; and (3) to formulate principles for good strategy reporting. 
The first part of manuscript A analyses to what extent publicly listed German 
companies disclose information about corporate strategy and strategic objectives in the 
management report. The study examines whether the scope of reporting on corporate 
strategy in the management report of German publicly listed companies is measurable. 
The degree of strategy disclosure is measured by a self-constructed and suitable 
measuring instrument that allows a direct comparison. The aim of the empirical study is 
on making a statement about the degree and quality of reporting on voluntary strategy 
disclosure. In addition to this, manuscript A analyses which corporate strategies and 
strategic goals German capital market-oriented companies disclose in their management 
report. Based on the findings, qualitative principles are formulated for managerial 
practice, which can be used from practitioners and preparers of financial reporting to 
enhance their strategy disclosure. Furthermore, they can be seen as quality 
characteristics for good strategy reporting and used as guidelines by financial reporting 
addressees.  
The analyzed sample comprises the 110 largest publicly listed German firms 
(based on market capitalization) between 2014 and 2017. After some exclusion, 315 
firm-year observations build the sample of the study. The analysis of strategy disclosure 
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focuses on the German management report. This part of corporate reporting is of high 
interest to investors because it provides the framework by which corporations disclose 
information about their business and economic situation (Section 264 (1) of the German 
Commercial Code in conjunction with Section 315a of the German Commercial Code; 
Section 289 of the German Commercial Code). Based on a literature review, the 
theoretical understanding and the legal requirements (German Accounting Standard 20), 
fifteen elements were selected which provide a comprehensive picture of strategy 
disclosure. Especially studies from Coebergh (2011), Morris and Tronnes (2018), Padia 
(2012), Santema and van de Rijt (2001), Santema et al. (2005), Sieber (2011), Sieber et 
al. (2014), Ungerer (2013) as well as Ungerer and Vorster (2015) focus on strategy 
reporting and were used to compare the measurement tool and results of the study. The 
fifteen criteria of the scoring model are based on the classical strategic management 
process, which builds the foundation for the model. During the analysis the management 
reports were reviewed with regards to information about strategy analysis, strategy 
formulation, strategy implementation and strategy control. These are the steps of the 
strategic management process and build the evaluation categories of the scoring model. 
The main objective of the evaluation is to quantify the qualitative information by 
introducing the concept of a Strategy Disclosure Score (SDScore). Similar to the 
approach by Sieber (2011), the SDScore gives information about the quality of 
information of strategy disclosure. 
The results of the study show that the quality level of strategy disclosure of the 
largest publicly listed German companies is mediocre in all three years. These results 
are consistent to those of Santema and van de Rijt (2001), Sieber (2011) and 
Padia (2012), who analyzed different samples. The disclosure of information about the 
future business and opportunities/risks within the context of the strategy is extensive. 
The analyzed scoring model category Strategy Analysis has the highest disclosure level 
of all categories in the valuation model. Only little disclosure was found for changes in 
strategy and strategic objectives and for the achievement of strategic objectives. Thus, 
the lowest quality of strategy reporting can be found in the category Strategy Control. 
The results indicate that companies are hesitant to publish information on the concrete 
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extent of the strategic objectives and implementation measures of the corporate strategy. 
Instead, companies prefer to disclose the general business analysis in the strategic 
context. Furthermore, the evaluation results show that 18.47% of the observed 
companies have a significant change in their SDScore in all three years (10% change in 
SDScore or higher) with regards to the change from 2015 to 2016 and from 2016 to 
2017. The results indicate that there is high potential for companies to improve their 
quality of strategy disclosure. 
To enhance the quality of strategy disclosure in the future, qualitative principles 
for good strategy reporting are formulated. They are based on the descriptive results of 
manuscript A and help practitioners and preparers of financial reporting to characterize 
high quality disclosure. The principles are categorized in (i) principles of strategy 
reporting for determination of the content: materiality, connectivity and integrity; and 
(ii) principles of strategy reporting for ensuring the quality: accuracy and clarity. These 
principles of strategy reporting serve as a point of reference to ensure the quality of 
information in strategy reporting and the proper presentation of that information. The 
quality of information is critical to enable stakeholders to make decisions and to derive 
appropriate actions. 
Manuscript A is published as HHL-Working Paper No. 181. Furthermore, it was 
presented at the 14th Asia Pacific Management Accounting Association (APMAA) 
Annual Conference 2018 in Tokyo, Japan. Selected findings of the manuscript have 
been published in ‚Zeitschrift der kapitalmarktorientierten Rechnungslegung‘; 
(ISSN 1617-8084), 2017, 17 (10), pp. 426-433 with Henning Zülch as co-author.  
Manuscript A has been co-authored by Henning Zülch. The research idea and the 
research study were developed by the author of the dissertation herself with Henning 
Zülch providing supervision as co-author. 
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3.2 Determinants of Strategy Disclosure Quality: Empirical Evidence from 
Germany 
Since manuscript A revealed that strategy reporting has a mediocre quality and capital 
market-oriented companies tend to neglect strategy related topics in their corporate 
reporting, the determinants of strategy disclosure should be analyzed further. The focus 
of manuscript B is to understand the determinants of the quality of voluntary strategy 
disclosure in German management reports. Based on a theoretical analysis, hypotheses 
are formulated. Several empirical studies have already examined the determinants of 
voluntary disclosure (Healy & Palepu, 2001) and some of them also in relation to 
voluntary strategy disclosure (Coebergh, 2011; Ferreira & Rezende, 2007; Morris 
& Tronnes, 2018; Sieber, 2011). Manuscript B focuses on determinants with a high 
theoretical foundation (with regard to agency theory, stakeholder theory and signaling 
theory), which are firm size, firm age, firm growth, capital intensity, leverage, 
profitability and ownership structure. The control variable industry membership is 
added. The independent variables firm growth and capital intensity have not been 
previously investigated in other studies in the context of voluntary strategy disclosure. 
As dependent variable the Strategy Disclosure Score (SDScore) is used, which measures 
the quality of voluntary strategy disclosure. The SDScore is measured with a self-
constructed scoring model which consists of fifteen valuation criteria. The criteria are 
based on the GAS 20 and the classical strategy management process (as in manuscript 
A), taking into account the following process steps: strategy analysis, strategy 
formulation, strategy implementation and strategy control. The scoring model is similar 
to the approach by Sieber (2011), but different in such way that it integrates the legal 
requirements (GAS 20). 
Manuscript B focuses on the 110 largest publicly listed German companies (based 
on market capitalization) between 2014 and 2018 of the main indices DAX, MDAX and 
TecDAX of the stock exchange provider Deutsche Börse Aktiengesellschaft. After 
adjustment the total sample comprises 417 firm year observations. Based on this sample 
an empirical model was formulated to analyze, which firm characteristics influence the 
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quality of strategy disclosure in German management reports of capital market-oriented 
companies. The regression model is based on a longitudinal regression analysis with 
random effects and uses a panel data set. 
The results indicate that firm size, firm growth and capital intensity determine 
voluntary strategy disclosure significantly positive. The SDScore is significantly and 
positively correlated with firm size, firm growth and capital intensity without controlling 
for industry effects. The results of the regression model with industry fixed effects show 
a significant correlation between the SDScore and firm size as well as with firm growth. 
Conversely, firm age, financial leverage, ownership structure and profitability do not 
have a significant relationship to voluntary strategy disclosure. The results are robust to 
different statistical analyses. The findings are consistent with those of prior empirical 
research. This study is embedded into the empirical literature on voluntary disclosure in 
financial reporting (Botosan, 2006; Healy & Palepu, 2001; Verrecchia, 2001). Whereas 
some studies focus on determinants of voluntary disclosure; like Hashim et al. (2014), 
D'Amico et al. (2016). In general, determinants of voluntary strategy disclosure are 
rather rarely analyzed. This study is based on regulatory requirements (GAS 20), which 
have not been examined before. Furthermore, the applied scoring-model evaluates all 
criteria based on the individual strategy of a company and is unique compared to other 
measurement tools used in other researches. Therefore, the findings are new insights and 
a valuable contribution to the ongoing discussion on voluntary strategy disclosure, 
which is a neglected topic in academia and of high interest for practitioners. 
Manuscript B is published in the journal ‘Problems and Perspectives in 
Management’ (ISSN 1810-5467), 17(4), 104-120, 2019. It was presented at the 42nd 
Annual Congress of the European Accounting Association in Paphos, Cyprus (2019) 
and got an acceptance for the Annual Conference of the European Academy of 
Management 2019 in Lisbon, Portugal. 
The research idea was developed by the author of the dissertation herself and the 
empirical model as well as the theoretical concept was conducted by her with Henning 
Zülch providing supervision as co-author. 
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3.3 External Assurance and Transparency in CSR Reporting – European 
Evidence 
The increasing public awareness for CSR related topics has led many companies to 
complement their financial disclosure through additional information on their social 
and/or environmental performance. Among private firms this is accompanied by an 
increase of external assurance. Firms are employing assurance to signal the credibility 
of their CSR reports towards stakeholders and improve their reputation. There is an 
ongoing discussion, whether this practice is socially and economically beneficial. 
Especially in Europe, many firms receive external assurance for CSR reports on a 
voluntary basis. However, external assurance is promoted as an instrument to secure 
the transparency of CSR reports (Braam, Uit de Weerd, Hauck, & Huijbregts, 2016; 
Cohen & Simnett, 2015; Hahn, Reimsbach, & Schiemann, 2015; Michelon, Pilonato, 
& Ricceri, 2015; Velte & Stawinoga, 2017). Furthermore, it should increase 
‘recognition, trust and credibility’ (GRI, 2013) towards stakeholders. Velte and 
Stawinoga (2017) found, that CSR reporting assurance is increasingly covered in 
accounting research, but its influence on reporting deserves further attention. Our 
study thus tackles the question and we examine if and how external assurance is 
associated with the transparency of CSR reports. We base our choice of indicators for 
transparency on selected reporting principles as developed by the GRI and formulate 
our research hypotheses in relation to them. 
One of the principles of reporting content is completeness, which in this case is 
an indicator for transparency. This is applied when it comes to define what 
information has to be included in a company’s report about its activities, impacts and 
the expectations it faces from its stakeholders (GRI, 2018). The inclusion of certain 
activities into the reporting scope should be considered from assurance providers. An 
omission of information would result in incomplete disclosure of the companies’ 
impacts and leave stakeholder expectations neglected. That’s why assured reports 
should display a higher relative coverage of company activities (Braam et al., 2016; 
Hummel & Schlick, 2016; Moroney, Windsor, & Aw, 2012). Based on this 
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argumentation, the first hypothesis analyses if external assurance is positively 
correlated with the scope of CSR reporting. Secondly, clarity constitutes a major 
principle of reporting quality. As a common proxy for clarity in reporting, readability 
of the narrative disclosure is used (Rutherford, 2003). Therefore, the second 
hypothesis investigates how external assurance is associated with readability of CSR 
reporting. As a last principle of reporting quality, we consider the balance of CSR 
reports. We evaluated the balance of a report through its verbal tone. Especially, the 
use of positively connoted words makes the message of a report appears more 
optimistic. In our third hypothesis we assume that external assurance is negatively 
associated with optimism in CSR reporting. To investigate the empirical relationship 
of external assurance and the three indicators of transparency: (i) reporting scope as 
an indicator for completeness, (ii) readability as an indicator for clarity and (iii) 
optimism as an indicator for balance in reporting, we used an ordinary least squares 
(OLS) panel data model. The proxies for report readability and optimism come from 
computer-aided text analysis. The sample encompasses the CSR reporting of 185 
European firms from 2014 to 2016.  
Our findings show that assurance correlates with an increased scope of company 
activities covered in CSR reporting as well as with a less optimistic verbal tone, but is 
also associated with a more complex, less readable language. These results show 
statistical significance across several robustness checks. The findings indicate that, 
companies’ external assurance may indeed present a valuable option to increase the 
credibility of their CSR reports and set themselves apart from their peer group. 
Assurance providers may take the findings as a starting point for reflecting their 
potential influence on the clarity of CSR reports under their review. Especially for 
European Union (EU) regulators, the findings suggest that the enforcement of 
substantial external assurance may increase the overall credibility of CSR reporting in 
their country. With these findings the manuscripts add to the scarce literature on external 
assurance for CSR reporting. Specifically, we contribute one of the first investigations 
on how external assurance relates to linguistic aspects of CSR reporting transparency. 
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Manuscript C is in publishing process as HHL-Working Paper. Furthermore, it was 
presented at the RIC Conference at HHL Leipzig Graduate School of Management in 
Leipzig, Germany in 2018 and 2019. Based on the constructive feedback the research 
study was submitted to the journal ‘Sustainability Accounting, Management and Policy 
Journal’ (ISSN 2040-8021) and is currently under review. 
The research study has been co-authored by Carl. W. Weuster, Philipp B. 
Ottenstein and Sébastien P. Jost. The research idea was collaboratively developed 
together with the co-authors and all contributed equally to the development and the 
design of this study. While Carl W. Weuster gathered the relevant theoretical 
background, he and Sébastien P. Jost were responsible for the data collection. Philipp B. 
Ottenstein and the author of the dissertation conducted the statistical analysis and 
empirical results. The author of this dissertation predominantly drafted the research 
model as well as the main result of the regression analyses and robustness checks 
regarding the consideration of potential selection bias. All authors developed all parts 
of the manuscripts further through intensive feedback and revisions. 
3.4 WildCat Inc. – A Modular Case on Materiality Conceptions and 
Reporting Strategies  
In the last 20 years, different standard setters have established distinct spheres of 
corporate reporting and definitions of materiality. New reporting regulations like the 
EU-Directive 2014/95/EU and reporting concepts challenge future decision-leaders of 
all countries. Manuscript D represents an educational case study that focuses on 
materiality concepts in the context of financial reporting, CSR reporting and integrated 
reporting. The case study is applying the legal framework of Canada to an existing 
corporate set-up in the United States (US). The fictitious Toronto-based producer of 
sports apparel WildCat Inc. is comparable in size to leading multinationals in the 
industry, such as Nike or Adidas. Challenged by several external stakeholders, WildCat 
Inc. has to reconsider the materiality of information for several aspects of its financial 
and non-financial reporting. 
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The case is modular in structure and considers materiality issues from IFRS accounting, 
GRI non-financial reporting and integrated reporting. This educational case study is 
designed for use by Business Schools and especially accounting faculties. In Part I, 
students gain knowledge of the materiality concept according to IFRS as well as the 
chance to practice its application in a realistic scenario. They are also introduced to the 
current discussion around materiality in the context of the IASB’s disclosure initiative. 
In the set-up of the case, WildCat Inc. does not provide extensive non-financial 
reporting. Due to negative press coverage and critique from some shareholders, it 
considers to disclose on sustainability matters and to conduct a materiality analysis 
according to GRI. Therefore, in Part II, students are introduced to the practice of 
sustainability reporting in accordance with the GRI reporting standards and the role and 
definition of materiality therein. They learn to conduct the relevant steps of a materiality 
analysis aligned with the GRI standards. In Part III, students are familiarized with the 
concept of integrated reporting according to the International Integrated Reporting 
Council (IIRC) and its distinct materiality definition. Upon comparing it with the 
materiality definitions of the other standard setting bodies from the two prior tasks, the 
students identify similarities and differences between them with regards to the intended 
audience, scope and subsequent disclosure contents. In the concluding task, the students 
are asked to reflect upon the different implications of these and to conceptualize a 
reporting approach they consider fitting in light of the company’s current position, 
potentials and future ambitions. 
The case is constructed to achieve several learning objectives, which focus on the 
understanding of materiality concepts in financial reporting, sustainability reporting and 
integrated reporting and the awareness of differences and similarities. Furthermore, the 
case study should make students familiar with the concept of materiality in the broader 
context of a company’s overall reporting strategy and strengthen the students’ problem-
solving skills. 
Especially for future decision-makers an understanding of decision-useful 
information in corporate reporting is highly relevant as they are likely to be confronted 
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with such scenarios in their potential business career. For this reason, the case was 
implemented in an advanced accounting class of the full-time Master of Sciences 
program at the HHL Leipzig Graduate School of Management. Key results of the 
feedback survey are that the students’ knowledge of the distinct materiality conceptions 
increased through the case study. Furthermore, students responded that the case feels to 
have a basis in ‘real-world’ scenarios and helps them to better understand the inner 
workings of such situations as well as to improve their problem-solving skills. 
Manuscript D was presented at the RIC Conference 2018 at HHL Leipzig Graduate 
School of Management in Leipzig, Germany and the 42nd Annual Congress of the 
European Accounting Association in Paphos, Cyprus (2019). The manuscript D will be 
submitted to the Target-Journal ‘Journal of Accounting Education’ (ISSN 0748-5751).  
The case study has been co-authored by Saskia Erben, Carl W. Weuster and 
Henning Zülch. The research idea was collaboratively developed together with Saskia 
Erben and Carl W. Weuster. The implementation of the research idea through the 
preparation of the case manuscript, the teaching notes and the recommended solutions 
was primarily divided by parts. The author of the dissertation was in charge for part I, 
Saskia Erben for part II and Carl W. Weuster for part III. All three authors developed 
all parts of the case study further through intensive feedback and revisions. Henning 
Zülch provided supervision as well as mentoring throughout the complete process. 
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Abstract 
The empirical research focuses on strategy disclosure in management reports of German 
capital market-oriented companies and analyzes whether and in what quality these 
companies disclose strategy related information. The three main objectives of the 
research are: (1) to develop a scoring model to measure strategy disclosure; (2) to 
describe the quality of strategy disclosure of the analyzed companies using a scoring 
model; and (3) to formulate qualitative principles for strategy disclosure. Disclosure 
about strategy and strategic objectives were hand-collected through content analysis of 
management report. The sample comprises 110 German listed firms from 2014 to 2017. 
Management reports were reviewed on information about strategy analysis, strategy 
formulation, strategy implementation and strategy control. The results show that the 
quality level of strategy disclosure of the largest publicly listed German companies is 
mediocre in all three years. In general, there is a high level of information about the 
business environment and opportunities/risks in the strategic context. In contrast, there 
is little disclosure for changes in strategy and strategic objectives and for the 
achievement of strategic objectives. The study develops a new comprehensive scoring 
model to measure voluntary strategy disclosure. Based on the scoring model principles 
are formulated for good strategy reporting. The results contribute to the previously little 
researched area of voluntary strategy disclosure in management reports and can be seen 
as a relevant source of information for investors and business practitioners. 
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  Introduction  
The strategy of a company is a decisive factor for its future business success. It is vitally 
important especially for capital market-oriented companies to have a clear and focused 
strategy (Ansoff, 1965; Porter, 1980). The communication of the corporate strategy and 
strategic objectives to stakeholders gives a company the chance to distinguish itself from 
its competitors (Kohut & Segars, 1992). However, strategy reporting is often neglected, 
while it can be an advantageous factor for a company to strengthen its position on the 
capital market. Studies have shown that the increasing focus on transparency (Amran, 
Ooi, Mydin & Devi, 2015; Kolk, 2008) has forced companies to reconsider their 
voluntary disclosure. Complete disclosure of a company gives the addressees of the 
annual reporting and investors of the company the opportunity to see anything and 
everything (Elliott & Jacobson, 1994). For this reason, several studies support the 
inclusion of management forecast and forward-looking information (Elgammal, 
Hussainey & Ahmed, 2018) in the financial statements in order to increase the relevance 
and value of the financial reporting to the company’s addressees and investors 
(Abrahamson & Amir, 1996). In particular, this sensitive information may be important 
in credit and investment decisions as they include useful information other than the 
information in the financial statement (Abrahamson & Amir, 1996; Lev & Thiagarajan, 
1993). The International Accounting Standards Board formulated four qualitative 
characteristics for information, to be characterized as decision-useful. They are stated in 
the Conceptual Framework of the International Financial Reporting Standards. The 
principles are: relevance, reliability, comparability and consistency (IFRS 2018). In 
general principles for non-financial information are rather rare. Especially for strategy 
disclosure, no principles have been formulated at the international level. Guidelines for 
other non-financial information like the Global Reporting Initiative Frame (GRI 2016) 
for information in the context of corporate social responsibility are used in this study to 
derive principles for strategy disclosure. Since Germany is one of the few countries with 
legal requirements for voluntary strategy disclosure, based on an analysis of German 
capital market-orientated companies, general qualitative principles should be derived as 
result of this study. 
II. VOLUNTARY STRATEGY DISCLOSURE AND QUALITATIVE PRINCIPLES: EVIDENCE FROM GERMAN MANAGEMENT REPORTS 
 
34 
The first research question of this study is whether and to what extent German capital 
market-oriented companies report on their corporate strategy. The German regulatory 
requirements have not been analyzed before. The findings are a valuable contribution to 
the ongoing discussion on voluntary strategy disclosure, which is a neglected topic in 
academia and of high interest for practitioners. Furthermore, the used scoring-model 
evaluates all criteria based on the individual strategy of a company and is unique 
compared to other measurement tools used in research before. Based on the findings and 
related to the second research question, general qualitative principles will be formulated, 
which can be used for all capital market-oriented companies and companies who are 
interested in a high-quality strategy reporting. 
This study is structured as follows. In section 2, the theoretical concept of 
voluntary strategy disclosure and the related literature are discussed. In section 3, the 
research question is formulated as well as the sample selection procedure and sample 
characteristics are described. In section 4, the results are presented and the descriptive 
statistics is described, whereas we check for reliability and validity of the model. In 
addition, the limitations of the study are discussed. Finally, qualitative principles for 
strategy disclosure are formulated. Section 5 concludes with a discussion of the study 
and further research questions accompanied by a short summary. 
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  Literature Review and Theoretical Background  
2.1  Voluntary Strategy Disclosure  
The definition for strategy used in this study corresponds to the classical understanding 
of strategy, according to which strategy can be defined as ‘the determination of the basic 
long-term goals and objectives of an enterprise, and the adoption of courses of action 
and the allocation of resources necessary for carrying out these goals’ (Chandler, 1993). 
The process of strategic management (Robbins & Coulter, 2016; Welge & Al-Laham, 
2012) formulates individual process steps seen as important and relevant to realize a 
strategy and achieve a strategic goal (see Figure II - 1). This understanding builds the 
basis of this study.  
 
Figure II - 1: Strategic Management Process 
Source: Own illustration, based on Welge and Al-Laham (2012, p. 186). 
Based on strategic planning an analysis of the strengths, weaknesses, opportunities and 
threats (SWOT-analysis) helps to understand the internal and external effects on the 
business. After the analysis a corporate strategy and related strategic objectives can be 
formulated and implemented. The control process builds the last step and is additionally 
linked to each step prior to the strategic management process. Ultimately, the corporate 
strategy is important to achieve the Group’s strategic objectives. Objectives are defined 
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strategy of the corporation is given. Operational objectives are generally part of the 
forecast report and are not directly related to the strategy (see German Accounting 
Standard (GAS) 20.B23). Strategic objectives can be financial or non-financial; hence 
both kinds of strategic objectives are relevant for this study, but only if the reference to 
the corporate strategy is explicit. 
Corporate reporting is an essential requirement for an efficient capital market 
(Healy & Palepu, 2001). Especially based on the capital market transaction hypothesis, 
companies have incentives to disclose financial and non-financial information on a 
voluntary basis to market participants (Healy & Palepu, 2001; Verrecchia, 2001). 
Disclosure of strategy relevant information is on a voluntary basis. This is why it is 
important to focus on the reasons for capital market participants to engage in voluntary 
disclosure. It is widely accepted that the benefit of providing more information to the 
capital markets is a lower cost of capital. This is proven from a theoretical perspective; 
see Amihud and Mendelson (1986), Diamond and Verrecchia (1991), Glosten and 
Milgrom (1985) and Merton (1987). Furthermore, Dye (2001) discusses the relation of 
game theory and voluntary disclosure, whereby he finds that, under the assumption that 
corporates tend to disclose advantageous information, voluntary disclosure is a special 
case of game theory. For corporate reporting, this implies that not providing information 
is a signal. In this context the signaling theory, which is dominated by the work of 
Spence (1973; 2002), should be emphasized. Principal Agent theory provides a common 
framework of why voluntary disclosure contributes to reducing information 
asymmetries (Abdullah, Shukor, Mohamed, & Ahmad, 2015). Based on the Principal 
Agent theory, formulated by Jensen and Meckling (1976) the conflict of interest and 
asymmetric information between a principal and an agent results in agency costs. More 
precise information implies a better decision and thus higher benefit, which is an 
argument for voluntary disclosure based on the Principal Agent theory. Furthermore, 
Stakeholder theory offers convincing arguments for corporates to have a transparent 
communication to their stakeholders. In addition to stockholders, Stakeholder theory 
says that there are other groups who have a stake in the actions of the corporation 
(Freeman & Reed, 1983). A corporation can improve the economic performance through 
engagement with stakeholders, whereby sustainable support of all stakeholders is 
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necessary. Voluntary disclosure of corporate strategy can be seen as an instrument to 
engage with stakeholders to achieve a benefit for the corporation. Furthermore, the 
communication of the corporate strategy and strategic objectives to stakeholders gives 
a company the chance to distinguish itself from its competitors. From a theoretical 
perspective, voluntary disclosure could also be seen in a critical light, because the 
information is non-verifiable and non-binding. For this reason, the risk of ‘cheap talk’ 
exists; see Crawford and Sobel (1982), Farrell and Gibbons (1989) and Sieber, 
Weißenberger, Oberdörster and Baetge (2014). Similar to Sieber (2011), we focused on 
the information provided in the management report to minimize the problem of potential 
cheap talk. Because this is the mandatory part of the annual financial reporting of the 
observed companies. 
2.2 Literature Review  
Relevant studies, which implement parts of the strategic management process in their 
evaluation model, while measuring disclosure of companies, are Botosan (1997), 
Broberg, Tagesson and Collins (2010), Cooke (1989), Gray, Meek and Roberts (1995), 
Jones (2007) and Meek, Roberts and Gray (1995). All these studies focus on the effects 
of disclosure of companies and especially voluntary disclosure. Therefore, all of them 
measure the extent of disclosure while including strategy related criteria. The reporting 
about the strategy of the company and strategic objectives is a central component of 
these studies, but also other reporting components have been analyzed. The presentation 
of strategic objectives and corporate strategy as well as their implementation play a 
comparatively minor role. 
Coebergh (2011), Morris and Tronnes (2018), Padia (2012), Sieber (2011),  Sieber 
et al. (2014), Santema and van de Rijt (2001), Santema et al., Hoekert, van de Rijt and 
Oijen (2005), Ungerer (2013) as well as Ungerer and Vorster (2015) focus exclusively 
on strategy reporting. Whereas Santema and van de Rijt (2001) analyze the strategy 
disclosure of Dutch annual reports, the study by Santema et al. (2005) builds on the 
disclosure score of the previous study and evaluates the strategy disclosure in five 
different European countries. Both studies include the disclosure of the corporate 
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strategy and strategic objectives as a central aspect in their model and analyze the 
business environment in the strategic context. The results of the studies are mediocre, 
because companies pay little attention to objectives, monitoring, business unit goals and 
future-oriented action plans. Padia (2012) analyzes the disclosure of non-financial 
information on strategy in South African annual reports based on the criteria catalogue 
from Santema and van de Rijt (2001). The results of this study show that companies in 
South Africa pay more attention to the description of the strategic mission and objective. 
In general the overall results of the study by Padia (2012) indicate an increase in non-
financial disclosure in the annual reports especially of information that is strategy 
related.  
The study by Sieber (2011), which also builds the basis for the study of Sieber et 
al.  (2014), evaluates the strategy disclosure in German management reports. Sieber et 
al. (2014) deals with the impact of voluntary strategy disclosure on the cost of equity 
capital. As few other studies, this study considers all steps of the strategic management 
process from a theoretical perspective and also integrates legal requirements in the 
criteria catalogue, while evaluating the voluntary strategy disclosure of capital market-
oriented companies. Similar to the results of Santema and van de Rijt (2001), they show 
that the strategy disclosure is mediocre. Additionally, they find that higher disclosure 
levels are, on average, associated with lower cost of equity capital (Sieber et al., 2014). 
Therefore, the study provides evidence that voluntary strategy disclosure in firms’ 
management reports reduce the information asymmetry component of the cost of capital. 
Coebergh (2011) constructed a measuring tool for strategy disclosure based in disclosure 
through annual reports, press releases, websites and annual CSR-reports and orientated 
the model closely on the scoring model from Santema and van de Rijt (2001). 
Ungerer (2013) investigated the level of disclosure related to core strategic elements of 
a firm. In this measurement tool Global Reporting Initiative (GRI) G3 performance 
indicators were included in the empirical analysis. These are mainly: strategy and 
analysis; organizational profile; report scope and boundary; commitment to external 
initiatives; stakeholder engagement; and economic performance. The results also 
indicate a mediocre strategy disclosure in South Africa. Similar results found Morris 
and Tronnes (2018), with an average strategy disclosure score of 56.82%. Those 
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analyzed strategy disclosure in five dimensions, which are boundaries of the firm, 
market and competition, positions and dynamics, internal organization and forecast. 
Based on the current research no study exists which considers the strategic management 
process from a theoretical perspective and includes valid legal requirements, like the 
GAS 20 in Germany, to measure the voluntary strategy disclosure of capital market-
oriented companies in the last years. This study picks up on this neglected topic and thus 
wants to satisfy the claim of closing a research gap. 
 Methodology  
3.1 Research Question  
Based on the theoretical and conceptual foundation in this study, it becomes clear that 
information on the corporate strategy and strategic objectives can be a relevant topic for 
reporting addressees. However, as there is no obligation to report on strategy related 
information, disclosure is voluntary. Based on this theoretical background, we formulate 
the following research question: 
To what extent do publicly listed German companies disclose information about 
corporate strategy and strategic objectives in the management report? 
The first step is to examine whether the scope of reporting on corporate strategy in the 
management report of German publicly listed companies is measurable. Subsequently, 
a statement is to be made as to whether publicly listed German companies publish 
strategy-related information. If so, the degree of strategy disclosure will be measured by 
developing a suitable measuring instrument that allows a direct comparison. The aim of 
the empirical study is ultimately not to evaluate the corporate strategy of a company, but 
to make a statement about the degree and quality of reporting on this topic. In addition 
to information on the level of disclosure, another focus is on the nature of the corporate 
strategies and strategic objectives that companies report on.   
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Assuming that strategy reporting is relevant from an investor's and addressee's point of 
view, the study should include this aspect as part of its findings and the second research 
question is as follows: 
Which qualitative principles can be derived from the strategy disclosure by 
German capital market-oriented companies? 
Based on the second research question qualitative principles will be formulated for 
managerial practice. These principles can be used from practitioners and preparers of 
the financial report to enhance their strategy reporting. Furthermore, they can be seen as 
quality characteristics for good strategy reporting and as orientation for financial 
reporting addressees. This study is mainly descriptive, but has the aim to get new 
insights in an under-researched topic. Based on the descriptive findings strategy 
disclosure the principles can be seen as qualitative guidelines for capital market-oriented 
companies. 
3.2 Sample Size and Research Model   
The sample comprises the 110 largest publicly listed German firms (largest based on 
market capitalization) between 2014 and 2017. We focus on the German capital market 
and on the main indices of the stock exchange provider ‘Deutsche Börse 
Aktiengesellschaft’. The three main indices DAX, MDAX and TecDAX, comprise 110 
companies, which results in 330 firm-year observations. In addition, fifteen foreign 
companies are excluded from the sample as they are not registered under German law 
and therefore do not have to provide a management report in accordance with GAS 20 
in their annual report. Finally, 315 firm-year observations build the sample for the 
analysis (see Table II - 1). Companies with the legal form of a ‘Societas Europaea’ are 
included in the sample, as in these cases the law of the country of residence applies.  




Sampling procedure steps June 30, 2015 June 30, 2016 June 30, 2017 
 
Total 
Firms listed in selection indices       
  Dax 30 30 30  90 
  MDax 50 50 50  150 
  TecDax 30 30 30  90 
  Total  110 110 110  330 
Exclusion because registered 
under non-German law 
-4 -5 -6  -15 
Number of sample firms 106 105 104  315 
Table II - 1: Sample selection procedure 
Source: Own illustration. 
The analysis of strategy disclosure focuses on the German management report, as under 
German GAAP (Section 264 (1) of the German Commercial Code in conjunction with 
Section 315a of the German Commercial Code; Section 289 of the German Commercial 
Code) the management report provides the framework by which corporations disclose 
information about their business and economic situation. Moreover, the management 
report shows a high degree of reliability and availability with regard to its mandatory 
disclosure and audit obligation. As voluntary strategy disclosure is part of the mandatory 
annual financial reporting, it is also a component of the auditor’s examination, which 
increases the credibility of information (Healy & Palepu, 2001). In order to assess the 
extent to which the analyzed firms disclose information about their strategy, the 
management reports of companies were evaluated as of June 30. The data from 
01.07.2014 to 30.06.2015 are categorized as 2015. This procedure is also applied 
analogously for the other years. Each management report has been read and 
subsequently analyzed by an analyst. 
In order to measure the degree of disclosure, literature provides several empirical 
approaches. Studies like Botosan and Plumlee (2002), Healy, Hutton and Palepu (1999), 
Lang and Lundholm, (1993) as well as Lang and Lundholm (2000) used archival metrics 
on disclosure rankings. Based on a normative understanding, other studies developed 
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scoring models (e.g. Botosan & Plumlee, 2002; Healy et al., 1999; Lang & Lundholm, 
1993; Lang & Lundholm, 2000). This study uses content analysis of annual reports; like 
Maaloul, Amar and Zeghal (2016), Santema and van de Rijt (2001), Sieber (2011). It is 
based on a self-constructed strategy disclosure score (SDScore) as an evaluation 
instrument. The advantages of this model are, on the one hand, its independence from 
third-party analysis and, on the other hand, the possibility of combining theoretical and 
normative requirements in one model. However, the risk of subjectivity exists, but has 
been minimized. Similar to the approach of Santema et al. (2005), the first 92 
management reports that have been assessed at the beginning of the research were 
reviewed at the end of the period. As a result, no substantial differences were observed 
between the evaluation results between the first and second assessment. In addition, we 
have explicitly tested the reliability and validity of the measured scores. 
Based on the literature review and legal requirements, fifteen elements were 
selected which provide a comprehensive picture of the disclosure of the corporate 
strategy. For the analysis a scoring model is used. The fifteen criteria of the scoring 
model are based on the classical strategic management process. Furthermore, the legal 
requirements and in particular GAS 20, build the basis for the analysis. In order to reduce 
subjectivity, all requirements of GAS 20 are taken into account in the scoring model, 
which ultimately leads to thirteen criteria. In addition, two further criteria are formulated 
which are based on the relevance of the strategic management process. The strategic 
target planning step of the strategic management process was neglected to such an extent 
that the risk of subjectivity in identifying the vision and mission of the companies was 
too high. In total, the remaining four steps of the strategic management process are 
divided into 7 sub-categories (see Appendix I, Table II - 6 - I). 
The criteria are limited to those items that all companies can disclose regardless of 
firm size and industry affiliation. In addition, we did not award multiple points for 
multiple information on the same criteria and analyzed all criteria at the enterprise level. 
Therefore, information at business level was not included in the analysis. Following the 
SWOT-analysis in conjunction with the requirements of GAS 20.40, both external 
environment aspects and internal business effects are taken into account in the Strategy 
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Analysis category. The Strategy Formulation category focuses on the presentation and 
operationalization of the strategic objectives and the corporate strategy. The 
implementation of the discussed strategic objectives and corporate strategy forms the 
basis for the Strategy Implementation category. A decisive factor here is reporting on 
the remuneration system for management and the internal control system of the 
company in context of the corporate strategy. As a control aspect, the focus in the 
Strategy Control category is on changes in strategy and the achievement of strategic 
goals. 
In this study, a dichotomous method is chosen to evaluate the criteria. For each of 
the criteria a dummy scale (0 or 1) is applicable, indicating whether the relevant 
information is disclosed or not (as in Botosan, 1997; Jones, 2007; Meek et al., 1995; 
Sieber, 2011; Morris & Tronnes, 2018). All criteria are evaluated on the same scale and 
the weighting is equal. The main objective of the evaluation is to translate qualitative 
information into a quantitative value. The same valuation method is used for all 
companies in the sample, which allows a reliable comparison between the analyzed 
companies.  
The scoring model uses a similar approach to Sieber (2011) and the SDScore is 
calculated as follows: 
 
(1)  










𝑠𝑡,𝑘,𝑖 Disclosure of aspect k of corporate i in t; {0 ˅ 1} 
𝑆𝐷𝑡,𝑖 Strategy Disclosure Value of corporate i in t 
𝑆𝐷𝑆𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑡,𝑖 Strategy Disclosure Score of corporate i in t; {0,1} 
𝑆𝐷𝑚𝑎𝑥 Maximum possible number of Strategy Disclosures  
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where the subscript letters indicate the following: t, year; i, firm; k, aspect of strategy 
disclosure. In addition, the formal perspective of the information is part of the 
evaluation. The formal criteria have no impact on the SDScore, but are important to 
assess the significance of the criteria of the scoring model and to provide information 
on the presentation of the strategy disclosure in the management report. This study 
evaluates company-specific information and considers all criteria measured within the 
corporate strategy – explicitly on the basis of the individual strategy of the company and 
not on a general level. In practice, this means that only strategies and strategic objectives 
defined by the company are used to assess the criteria related to this strategically relevant 
information. The SDScore serves as a reliable measurement to obtain an assessment of 
the quality and degree of strategy disclosure. Based on the analysis of the descriptive 
results of the SDScore, qualitative principles are derived. These principles are 
formulated on a general basis and can be applied for all companies, regardless of 
industry affiliation and size.  
 Results  
4.1 Descriptive Statistics  
In this section the descriptive results of the disclosure of the strategy of German capital 
market-oriented companies are presented. Table II - 2 shows the SDScores of the 
companies from the sample size 2015, 2016 and 2017. The data are based on n = 315 
observation. 
 
    Extremes   Percentiles           
  Mean Min Max   25% 50% 75%   σ n 
2015 46.42% 6.67% 93.33% 
 
40.00% 46.67% 53.33% 
 
14.62% 106 
2016 47.87% 6.67% 86.67% 
 
40.00% 46.67% 53.33% 
 
13.36% 105 
2017 46.67% 0.00% 100.00% 
 
40.00% 46.67% 53.33% 
 
15.85% 104 
Table II - 2: Distribution of SDScore 
Source: Own illustration. 
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The average SDScore in 2015 was 46.42%, rose to 47.87% in 2016 and decreased to 
46.67% in 2017. The median for all three years was 46.67%. These are similar results 
like Santema and van de Rijt (2001), Sieber (2011) and Padia (2012) found. The 
mediocre scores indicate that German capital market-oriented companies are generally 
reluctant to publish all strategy related information. The SDScore in 2017 shows the 
largest range with a minimum of 0% and a maximum of 100%. The results show that 
the SDScore of the largest publicly listed German companies is mediocre in all three 
years. It is noteworthy that there is a strong heterogeneity and variation in the SDScores. 
The overall impression is that German capital market-oriented companies neither 
disclose sufficient information about their corporate strategy nor report extensively on 
the business and related topics within the context of the strategy. It is conspicuous that 
most of the companies do not significantly change their reporting on strategy. The 
evaluation results show that 18.47% of the observed companies have a significant 
change in their SDScore in all three years (10% change in SDScore or higher) with 
regard to the change from 2015 to 2016 and from 2016 to 2017. Overall, there are more 
positive than negative changes, as 52.94% of all changes of the SDScore are positive 
over 10% during the period. Only 11.96% from 2015 to 2016 and 6.52% from 2016 to 
2017 of the companies that were in the HDAX in all three years had a change in the 
SDScore of more than 20%.  
Table II - 3 divides the SDScores into relevant categories and subcategories. 
Especially in the category Strategy Analysis, companies have a high degree of 
disclosure. On average, 75.55% of all companies in the sample provide information on 
the internal and external economic situation within the context of the corporate strategy. 
This also applies to the disclosure of the prospective business as well as opportunities 
and risks in the strategic context of 87.77% of the companies. Therefore, the category 
Strategy Analysis has the highest disclosure of all categories in general. Nevertheless, 
the constantly decreasing level of disclosure of information about the company’s 
opportunities and risks in the strategic context should be highlighted. 
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Strategy phase  Sub-category 
SDSub-Score 
2015 2016 2017 Ø 
Strategy Analysis 
Economic environment 75.94% 76.67% 74.04% 75.55% 
Strategic situation 87.74% 90.48% 85.10% 87.77% 
Strategy 
Formulation 
Strategic objectives 44.03% 44.13% 41.35% 43.17% 
Corporate strategy 91.51% 94.29% 88.46% 91.42% 
Strategy 
Implementation 
Implementation process 49.53% 56.67% 57.21% 54.47% 
Strategy Control 
Changes in strategy 7.08% 6.90% 9.62% 7.87% 
Achievement of strategic 
objectives 
17.92% 16.19% 16.35% 16.82% 
 
Table II - 3: SDSub-Score related to the strategy phase and relevant Sub-category 
Source: Own illustration. 
  2015 2016 2017 Ø 
Corporate strategy         
Growth strategy 86.79% 86.67% 79.81% 84.42% 
Diversification strategy  14.15% 11.43% 9.62% 11.73% 
Product development strategy 11.32% 11.43% 8.65% 10.47% 
Strategic objectives         
Leader in innovation and/or technology 29.25% 45.71% 40.38% 38.45% 
Market leader 39.62% 41.90% 31.73% 37.75% 
Enterprise value 33.96% 27.62% 28.85% 30.14% 
Customer satisfaction 29.25% 29.52% 23.08% 27.28% 
Sustainable objectives 24,53% 21,90% 23,08% 23,17% 
Market share 23,58% 28,57% 15,38% 22,51% 
Employee satisfaction 22,64% 20,95% 22,12% 21,90% 
Product development 11,32% 17,14% 21,15% 16,54% 
Product quality  9,43% 16,19% 20,19% 15,27% 
 
Table II - 4: Frequency of disclosure of corporate strategy and strategic objectives  
Source: Own illustration. 
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There is also a high level of disclosure in the category Strategy Formulation, which 
contains information about the company’s strategy and strategic objectives. In both 
cases, the average level of disclosure, based on observed years and companies, is above 
91%. However, there are weaknesses in the quality of disclosure of the scope and timing 
of the strategic objectives. For both criteria, less than on average 19% of companies 
published information in their management report. In addition, the level of disclosure 
about the designation of strategic objectives and their scope decreases over the years 
observed. 
The level of disclosure in the category Strategy Implementation is moderate for the 
sampled companies in all observed years. On average, 54.47% of the companies 
reported on the relevance of the corporate strategy or strategic objectives for the 
remuneration system of the management and for the internal control system. In addition, 
disclosure of the remuneration system in the strategic context is increasing over the 
years. 
The lowest degree and thus lowest quality of strategy reporting can be found in the 
category Strategy Control. Only an average of 7.87% of companies reported changes in 
their corporate strategy and strategic objectives during the observation years. In 
particular, the explanation of changes related to strategy is rather scarce and has the 
lowest level of disclosure. Given the relevance of this information for the addressee of 
the management report and investors, this is a sobering balance. However, reporting on 
changes in corporate strategy is constantly increasing over the years. In addition, the 
higher level of disclosure of the achievement of the strategic objectives in this category 
should be highlighted with an average of 16.80% of the companies observed. Even 
though Sieber (2011) categorized the evaluation criteria differently, the results of his 
study also showed low quality values for the criteria regarding strategy control, which 
confirm the results of this study. 
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Despite measuring the degree of voluntary strategy disclosure, the objective of this study 
is also to identify what corporate strategy and strategic objectives the observed 
companies are pursuing. Therefore, a qualitative analysis of the reported corporate 
strategy and strategic objectives is the basis for this part of the study. Multiple answers 
were accepted for this analysis. A quantitative result for the most commonly reported 
corporate strategies and strategic objectives can be determined based on the average of 
all observed companies (see Table II - 4). It is conspicuous that most companies pursue 
a growth strategy – on average 84.42%. In addition, an average of 11.73% of the 
companies disclosed that they pursue a diversification strategy and an average of 
10.47% reported a product development strategy. Other corporate strategies were also 
disclosed, such as focusing on specialized service, internationalization and stabilization, 
etc., but all were below a disclosure level of 10%. 
The number of disclosed strategic objectives is much higher, but there is no clear 
tendency towards an objective that dominates in terms of the frequency of identifiable 
disclosure. On average 38.45% of the observed companies disclose that being the ‘leader 
in innovation and/or technology’ is a strategic objective. Therefore, this is the most 
frequently reported strategic objective of the analysis. Followed by ‘market leader’ 
(average 37.75%) and ‘enterprise value’ (average 30.14%). Other reported strategic 
objectives reported by an average of less than 30.00% of the observed companies are 
‘customer satisfaction’, ‘sustainable objectives’, ‘market share’ and ‘employee 
satisfaction’. In addition, ‘product development’ and ‘product quality’ are relatively 
rarely reported by companies as strategic objectives, but unlike the other reported 
objectives, they are the only ones show a tendency to be increasingly reported during 
the observation period. 
  





Formal criteria 2015 2016 2017 Ø 
Separate chapter in management report 80,19% 83,81% 77,88% 80,63% 
Separate chapter outside the management report 12,26% 13,33% 13,46% 13,02% 
Graphic element 23,58% 27,62% 26,92% 26,04% 
Headline in the outline of annual report 43,40% 46,67% 45,19% 45,09% 
Headline in the outline of the management report 57,55% 57,14% 52,88% 55,86% 
 
Table II - 5: Frequency of formal criteria  
Source: Own illustration. 
The aim of this study is also to assess the formal presentation of strategy related 
information, which provides information about the quality of presentation. Neither the 
German legislator nor other institutions (such as the Accounting Standards Committee 
of Germany (ASCG)) provide guidelines or requirements for the formal presentation of 
strategy disclosure. It is noteworthy that the most companies (80.63% on average over 
three years) have their own chapter for strategy disclosure in the management report. In 
addition, a separate chapter is included in the table of contents of the management report 
by an average of 55.86% of the observed companies and in the table of the annual report 
by an average of 45.09% of the observed companies. This is a surprisingly low 
percentage of companies as strategy related information is very relevant to investors and 
when companies report on these topics, it is assumed that companies highlight this 
information. Only an average of 13.02% of the observed companies (additionally) 
disclose the strategy related information in a separate chapter, which is contained in the 
annual report but not in the management report and thus not part of the analysis. 
Although only a few companies do not disclose their strategy in the management report, 
the number of companies increases steadily over the years. In particular, the fact that the 
strategy related information disclosed in the management report is under obligation to 
have an audited review may be a reason why companies prefer their strategy reporting 
outside this part of the annual report. 
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4.2 Reliability and Validity  
Although descriptive results provide an indication of the existence of disclosure of 
strategy in the management report, a formal analysis must be performed to determine 
whether the SDScore is capable of measuring the level of disclosure of strategy 
information. Since the criteria catalogue only consists of fifteen criteria which are 
applicable for all companies regardless the size, statistical reliability tests are not 
relevant. To assure that the SDScore measures the level of strategy disclosure in 
management reports and the model is valid, we analyze the statistical correlation 
between the self-constructed SDScore and an external measuring instrument. There are 
two options to measure validity. On the one hand, external proxies can be used. On the 
other hand, alternative measuring instruments can be analyzed for the same or similar 
observed sample period to measure validity. We use the second option to validate the 
evaluation results. Based on the analysis of the German capital market-oriented 
competition ‘Investors’ Darling’, which analyzes the financial communication of the 
160 largest publicly listed German companies, we calculate Sub-Scores for the strategy 
related disclosure parts in this competition and check the statistic relation.1 The focus of 
this study is only on strategy related criteria and analyzes criteria that are similar to this 
model. In addition, we neglect formal criteria and only analyze criteria relevant to 
content in the model. The data from the ‘Investors’ Darling’ competition refer to the 
annual report, where we have a difference to our model in the analyzed reporting parts. 
Due to the fact that the management report is part of the annual report and because of 
the informative function (the management report is the preferred part where companies 
report about their strategy) we neglect this difference. Based on the calculated Investors’ 
Darling Score (IDScore), which measures the degree of strategy disclosure in the annual 
report of the relevant companies from the ‘Investors’ Darling’ competition sample, we 
 
1 The competition ‘Investors’ Darling’ is conducted under the direction of Professor Henning Zülch 
of the HHL Leipzig Graduate School of Management since 2014 in cooperation with the ‘manager 
magazin’ a German business magazine. The competition is based on a criteria catalogue and 
includes the overall reporting as well as investors’ communication and capital market performance 
in the analysis. The scientific team of Professor Zülch analyzes the criteria for three categories each 
year and provided us with the relevant data to test for validity in our model. 
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analyze the correlation between the IDScore and the SDScore of our model. The Pearson 
correlation analysis showed a positive significant correlation between these two 
variables for the entire observation period. Since the Shapiro-Wilk test showed that there 
is no normal distribution of the SDScore variables, we check the correlation of the 
IDScore and SDScore with the Spearman test for correlation. The Spearman test again 
shows a significant and positive correlation (p = .00), which is why we prove the validity 
of the results of our model. Therefore, the SDScore is a valid measurement of the degree 
of strategy disclosure. 
4.3 Limitations  
The two main limitations of this study are the sample size and the catalogue of criteria. 
In this analysis, we focus on the disclosure of HDAX companies between 2014 and 
2017, resulting in a sample size of 315 observed company years. Future research should 
aim to increase the number of companies in the sample and provide a more 
comprehensive picture. This study focuses on a German sample size. Other European 
and international sample sizes could be used in future research to identify differences in 
disclosure quality based on the assumption that different cultures, business 
environments and legal systems affect the level of strategy disclosure. The time horizon 
should be extended to gain new insights into how voluntary strategy disclosure has 
evolved under different economic conditions. The second main concern relates to the 
criteria used in the analysis. 15 criteria were used, which are based on the theoretical 
strategic management process and the legal requirements for strategy disclosure in 
German management reports. There are probably other items that can be criteria for a 
certain degree of disclosure and quality of strategy related information. 
In addition, there are many different factors that influence the extent to which 
companies disclose their strategy, such as industry sector, company size or corporate 
governance. Future research should focus on whether these factors have an impact on 
the level of strategy disclosure, and in this context the impact of strategy disclosure 
should be measured. On the basis of signal theory, it can be particularly interesting to 
examine the effects of the capital market, such as costs of capital, in further research. 
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4.4 Qualitative Principles 
Based on the analysis of the SDScore and the descriptive results, qualitative principles 
can be derived. Five principles have been formulated for practitioners and preparers of 
financial reporting, which characterize a good strategy reporting2. Like the principles of 
sustainability reporting, which is a non-financial disclosure, the strategy reporting 
principles are divided into two groups: principles for determination of the content of a 
report and principles for ensuring the quality of a report (see GRI 2016). The principles 
of strategy reporting serve as a guide to ensure the quality of information in the strategy 
reporting and the proper presentation of that information. The quality of the information 
is critical to enable stakeholders to make decisions and to derive appropriate action from 
this assessment.  
 
Figure II - 2: Five Principles of Strategy Reporting 
Source: Own illustration. 
The first principle focuses on the relevance of information and especially on 
materiality. Quality instead of quantity should be the decisive factor in the context of 
reporting. Companies should limit their strategy reporting to material information. 
Disclosure overload and repetitions leads to ambiguities among financial reporting 
addressees. The most important information about the corporate strategy should be 
 
2 The five principles are an advanced version of the principles for strategy disclosure based on the 
analysis of Zülch and Winter (2017). Since our research includes a different sample and is meant to 
be as general principles for also other than German companies, the principles of this study are 
different to the qualitative characteristics from Zülch and Winter (2017). 
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clearly stated and give little scope for interpretation. The strategy and strategic 
objectives should be presented for the company and at most for the main business areas. 
Unnecessary information can distract from the core contents and dilute the statement 
about the actually pursued strategy. Similar to CSR-Reporting (see GRI, 2016) and 
financial reporting (see IFRS, 2018), an information is material if it influences the 
(economic) decision of the stakeholders and especially of the corporate reporting 
addressees. Not all material issues are of equal importance, and it is expected that the 
priorities will be set out in the report reflect the relative importance of the issues.  
The second principle is related to the connectivity of information. A company's 
strategy serves to achieve its strategic goals – therefore, both should be in line with each 
other and reported on accordingly. In order to give the financial reporting addressee a 
comprehensive picture of the implementation of the strategy and related objectives, 
reference should also be made to it in other parts of the report (e.g. opportunity and risk 
report, forecast report etc.). A holistic picture of the strategy should be conveyed and all 
relevant report contents should be presented in the context of the strategy. According to 
the criteria of the scoring model of this study, especially the current and expected 
business development, economic situation, opportunities and risks, compensation 
system, internal control system of the company should be explained in the context of the 
corporate strategy.  
As a third principle the integrity of information should be emphasized. Trend 
topics for the company, such as digitization, sustainability, innovation and cultural 
change should be integrated into the strategy reporting if relevant. The corporate strategy 
and strategic objectives should present trends that are important for the company in such 
a way that the addressee of the report gets a comprehensive picture of how the company 
wants to deal with these issues and how it will react to future developments. This can be 
illustrated by the formulation of appropriate strategic targets or, for example, a linked 
sustainability strategy, which is part of the corporate strategy. The analysis of the 
SDScore showed that especially, the extent, time reference and statement of 
achievement of strategic objectives of companies shows weaknesses in the reporting. To 
enhance the quality of information, the relation to trend topics of the company can be 
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used. This could help the reporting addressee to get a holistic picture of the company. 
Especially prospective information play a major role in integrated reporting (Ungerer, 
2013), why strategy disclosure is of importance if a company decides to report 
integrated.  
In order to enhance the understandability of information, the disclosed information 
should be accurate, which can be seen as fourth principle. The corporate strategy and 
strategic objectives should be described as concretely as possible and comparable to the 
strategy reporting in previous years. The results of the study showed weaknesses in 
reporting, especially on this topic. For this purpose, it is necessary to provide 
information on the extent, changes and achievement of the strategic goals and to 
establish a time reference. This can take place in qualitative or quantitative form so that 
the financial reporting addressee has a concrete idea of the company's strategy and can 
evaluate the long-term development of the company.  
The fifth principle focuses on the clear presentation of the strategy related 
information. The reporting part with strategy disclosure should be clearly identified as 
such and included in the corresponding content overviews. The addressee of the report 
must be able to find strategic information easily and quickly. A graphical presentation 
can underline links between strategy and strategic objectives or increase the clarity of 
information. In addition, clear language should be used. According to the criteria of the 
scoring model, the strategic objectives and corporate strategy should be named clear and 
in an understandable way. 
 Discussion and Conclusion  
This study examines the extent of voluntary strategy disclosure of German publicly 
listed companies. As predicted by the signaling theory in the context of capital markets, 
voluntary disclosure seems important to reduce information asymmetry. In this respect, 
the question of the extent to which these companies disclose information about their 
corporate strategy and strategic goals in the management report is of interest. The 
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analysis finds evidence that companies report on their corporate strategy and strategic 
objectives and disclose information about their business in the context of strategy.  
The results show that the SDScore of the largest publicly listed German companies 
is mediocre in all three years. It is also noticeable that the majority of companies do not 
significantly change their reporting on strategy. This indicates that strategy reporting 
will not change significantly in the coming years. The majority of the companies 
disclose information about their future business as well as opportunities and risks within 
the context of the strategy. Therefore, the category Strategy Analysis has the highest 
disclosure of all categories in the valuation model. The lowest degree and thus the lowest 
quality of strategy reporting can be found in the category Strategy Control. The results 
show that companies are hesitant to publish information on the concrete extent of the 
strategic objectives and implementation measures of the corporate strategy. Therefore, 
companies prefer to disclose the general business analysis in the strategic context. The 
risk of this disclosure policy is that investors may have difficulty identifying the 
important information to understand how the company will succeed in the future. In 
particular, strategic information without explanation of the specific implementation plan 
could mislead reporting addresses and investors.  
The findings are in general consistent with results from other studies, like Santema 
and van de Rijt (2001), Sieber (2011) and  Padia (2012). Based on the results of this 
study, five principles for strategy reporting have been formulated: materiality, 
connectivity, integrity, accuracy and clarity. These principles can be used from 
practitioners and preparers of the financial report to enhance their strategy reporting as 
well as from investors to evaluate high quality reporting. 
The results show that voluntary strategy disclosure remains an issue that 
companies tend to neglect. From an investor’s perspective, this is an unsatisfactory 
finding, especially since voluntary strategy disclosure has a positive effect on the cost 
of capital in the shadow of empirical research (Sieber et al., 2014). Finally, our results 
were obtained in accordance with the specific German accounting regulations. Further 
investigations are necessary to examine whether this positive correlation exists for this 
setting. If so, there are strong arguments for the need to disclose the corporate strategy 
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and therefore the importance of strategy disclosure may increase in the future. 
Ultimately, there is a need for research on how the strategy disclosure can be measured, 
whether the disclosure of strategy related information has an impact on the cost of capital 
and what determines strategy disclosure. In this context, there are several 
methodological research questions that should be addressed in further research. 
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Appendix I: Data collection instrument 
 




1. Explanation of the business development in the context 
of the strategy 




3. Assessment of the expected business development in 
the context of the strategy 
4. Assessment of the opportunities and risks of the 





5. Naming the strategic objective 
6. Extent of the strategic objectives 
7. Time reference of the strategic objectives 
Corporate 
strategy 





9. Explanation of the relevance of strategy in the 
management compensation system 





11. Significant changes in strategic objectives compared to 
the previous year 
12. Explanation of significant changes in strategic 
objectives compared to the previous year 
13. Significant changes in corporate strategy compared to 
the previous year 
14. Explanation of significant changes in corporate strategy 




15. Statement on the state of achievement of strategic 
objectives 
 
Table II - 6 -I: Data collection instrument 
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Abstract 
Strategy reporting is of high interest to investors and can be seen as decision-useful 
information. The focus of this study is to analyze the determinants of the quality of 
voluntary strategy disclosure in German management reports of capital market-oriented 
companies. Based on a theoretical analysis, hypotheses are formulated to investigate the 
determinants of the quality of voluntary strategy disclosure. In order to test the 
hypotheses a number of statistical tests are performed, especially multiple regression 
analyses. This is based on an unique hand-collected dataset with a self-constructed 
scoring model, which measures the quality of voluntary strategy disclosure. The sample 
comprises the 110 largest companies in Germany for the period between 2014 and 2018. 
The results indicate that firm size, firm growth and capital intensity determine voluntary 
strategy disclosure significantly positive. Conversely, firm age, financial leverage, 
ownership structure and profitability do not have a significant relationship to voluntary 
strategy disclosure. The results are robust to different statistical analysis. This research 
provides insights into a neglected topic in academia and helps decision-makers in 
practice and regulators to better understand voluntary strategy disclosure of capital 
market-oriented companies. 
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 Introduction  
A clear and focused strategy is vitally important, especially for capital market-oriented 
companies because they are of high public interest (Porter 1980; Porter 1997). Investors 
and other addressees of corporate reporting have a decision-making perspective and 
need insights into a firms’ business strategy to understand long-term managerial actions. 
Nevertheless, voluntary strategy reporting is a widely neglected topic in academic 
research as well as in management practice even though the strategy of a company can 
be a decisive factor for companies to be successful in the future. Therefore, the quality 
of strategy disclosure and the correspondingly relevant determinants are of high interest 
to the stakeholders of a company. In a first step this study measures the quality of 
voluntary strategy disclosure. In a second step the impact of various company specific 
determinants on voluntary strategy disclosure in management reports of German capital 
market-oriented companies is analyzed. We test this by relating voluntary strategy 
disclosure level to firm size, firm age, firm growth, capital intensity, financial leverage, 
profitability and ownership structure. We construct a scoring model for the measurement 
of the quality of strategy disclosure and formulate a company-specific Strategy 
Disclosure Score (SDScore). The total firm-year observations are 417, based on a 
sample which comprises the 110 largest capital market-oriented companies in Germany 
between 2014 and 2018. Focusing on the management report according to German 
accounting regulation (par. 264 (1), 315a HGB), voluntary strategy disclosure is 
analyzed in this study. As disclosure of strategy relevant information is on a voluntary 
basis, this study considers regulations on voluntary strategy disclosure according to 
German Accounting Standard (GAS) 20. The management report is a reporting platform 
for companies, where firms have to provide prospective information, which is why this 
part of the annual report is of particular interest to investors. Due to the fact that the 
management report is under audit obligation, the analyzed information about the firm’s 
strategy has a high credibility because of the third-party validation. 
This empirical study belongs to the research field of voluntary disclosure in 
financial reporting. Whereas some studies focus on determinants of voluntary disclosure 
(D'Amico et al., 2016; Hashim et al., 2014), determinants of voluntary strategy 
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disclosure are rather rarely analyzed. Hence, this study extends existing literature on 
voluntary disclosure and analyzes relevant determinants on voluntary disclosure related 
to corporate strategy. Since this study is based on regulatory requirements which have 
not been analyzed before, the findings are a valuable contribution to the ongoing 
discussion on voluntary strategy disclosure, which is a neglected topic in academia and 
of high interest for practitioners. Furthermore, the used scoring-model evaluates all 
criteria based on the individual strategy of a company and is unique compared to other 
measurement tools used in research before. 
This study is structured as follows. In section 2, we discuss the theoretical 
understanding for the empirical model, which is grounded in stakeholder and agency 
theory. We review the literature on similar studies focusing on determinants of 
disclosure scores and on related research questions. In section 3, we formulate the 
research question and derive hypotheses based on the theories. In section 4, the 
methodology of the empirical estimation model is explained and the sample selection 
and characteristics are shown. In section 5, we present and discuss the results of the 
descriptive statistics, the bivariate statistical models as well as of the multiple regression 
analysis. Finally, section 6 concludes with a discussion of the empirical findings and 
further research questions. In this section, limitations of the statistical method are 
presented accompanied by a short summary. 
 Literature Review and Hypotheses Development  
Business literature and research on corporate strategy find various arguments why 
strategy communication is relevant. This study focuses on the factors influencing a 
strategy communication process and especially analysis the determinants of strategy 
disclosure. Stakeholder theory and agency theory include elements which give such 
reasons and can be used to explain enhanced disclosure or a reduction of information 
about corporate strategy. Empirical research explains how voluntary disclosure and 
disclosure of prospective information helps to reduce agency conflicts (Hossain et 
al., 2005). Agency theory focuses on conflicts of interests between principals and agents 
and is especially important in the context of reducing information asymmetries between 
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them. Based on agency theory, which was mainly influenced by Eisenhardt (1989), 
Jensen and Meckling (1976) and Ross (1973), the conflict of interest and asymmetric 
information between principals and agents results in agency costs. In fact precise 
information implies a better decision and thus higher benefit. Related to the agency 
theory, signaling theory focuses on the motives to overcome information asymmetries. 
A negative consequence of information asymmetry is adverse selection, which can be 
solved by signaling, for which ‘trust’ plays an important role (Akerlof, 1970; Healy & 
Palepu, 2001). Signaling theory offers insights in the disclosure of advantageous 
information (Spence, 2002) which have a positive value for the corporation. All theories 
are based on the existence of information asymmetry and are concerned with the 
incentives to disclose information. This also holds for voluntary strategy disclosure in 
the context of the relation from a corporation to its investors and other financial reporting 
addressees. Stakeholder theory offers convincing arguments for corporates to have a 
transparent communication to their audience, which is a variety of stakeholders.  Based 
on a theoretical understanding, this study analyses the determinants of the quality of 
voluntary strategy disclosure and is therefore related to other studies which focus on the 
impacts on (voluntary) disclosure levels in management reports or with respect to 
comparable parts of the financial reporting. The main research question of this study is 
the following: 
What determines the quality of voluntary strategy disclosure in German 
management reports? 
To answer this question several hypotheses based on agency and stakeholder theory as 
well as on other research studies are formulated. Each of the hypotheses will be 
analyzed, which in sum shed light to the research question of this study. 
Since the 1960s, a considerable body of research investigates the impact of 
corporate characteristics on voluntary disclosure level in financial reporting (see Ahmed 
& Courtis, 1999; Cooke, 1989; Meek, Roberts, & Gray, 1995; Singhvi & Desai, 1971). 
The dominant method is to analyze information items expressed via explanatory 
variables on country specific relevant disclosure scores. Disclosure scores are mostly 
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calculated based on an unweighted or weighted scoring model, depending on the focus 
of the research. While most of research is done in context of financial disclosure 
(Ferreira & Rezende, 2007; Healy & Palepu, 2001), only few studies focusing on 
voluntary strategy disclosure. The study from Ferreira and Rezende (2007) analyzed 
analytically the information disclosure about corporate strategy and pointed out that it 
provides strong incentives for partners of the firm to undertake strategy-specific 
investments. Especially the studies of Coebergh (2011) and Sieber (2011) are focusing 
on the determinants of voluntary strategy disclosure. The results of Coebergh (2011) 
showed that listing age, industry, dual-listing status, profitability and national ranking 
status have significant effects on voluntary disclosure of corporate strategy. Sieber 
(2011) showed that there is a significant relation between the independent variables 
company size, industry, leverage, indices classification, shared capital concentration and 
the dependent variable strategy disclosure. Both studies used different proxies for 
measuring strategy disclosure and analyzed different determinants compared to this 
study. The study by Morris and Tronnes (2018) found that strategy disclosures is 
influenced by country-level characteristics and firm-level characteristics. Since an 
integrated reporting needs to contain strategic information and is forward-looking, 
strategy disclosure plays an important role in this reporting concept (Ungerer, 2013). 
Ungerer and Vorster (2015) found a positive relationship of integrated reporting and 
strategy disclosure. 
Since several empirical and conceptual research models have already examined 
the determinants of voluntary disclosure and some of them also in relation to voluntary 
strategy disclosure, this study focuses on determinants with a high theoretical 
foundation. The determinants of this study are primarily based on the theoretical 
concepts of agency theory, stakeholder theory and signaling theory. This study also 
includes two independent variables that have not been previously investigated in other 
studies in the in the context of voluntary strategy disclosure. As firm growth and capital 
intensity could be a decisive factor influencing the quality of voluntary strategy 
disclosure of a company in a theoretical context, the aim of this study is to analyze this 
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relationship from an empirical perspective. We formulated the following hypotheses to 
analyze the research question of this study. 
Firm Size 
Numerous studies found a significantly positive influence of firm size on disclosure 
(Abraham & Tonks, 2006; Bushman, Piotroski, & Smith, 2004; Camfferman & Cooke, 
2002; Chow & Wong-Boren, 1987; Coebergh, 2011; Cooke, 1989; Lang & Lundholm, 
1993; Meek, Roberts, & Gray, 1995; Prencipe, 2004; Sieber, 2011; Singhvi & Desai, 
1971). The majority of the studies found that more reporting is done by large companies 
compared to small companies – but different proxies were used (Ahmed & Courtis, 
1999). Especially for strategy disclosure a positive relation have been found by Sieber 
(2011). Furthermore, Hossain et al. (2005) found that there is a positive relation between 
firm size and prospective information disclosure. This provides strong support for the 
political and agency cost argument. In general large companies have higher agency costs 
according to agency theory (Meek et al., 1995), because information asymmetries are 
more pronounced due to size and complexity of their business. Additional reporting can 
equalize this situation and save costs for the company. However, a larger size implies 
that more stakeholders emerge, who have a higher need for information. Based on the 
stakeholder theory, a large size implies more importance of the company and thus 
pressure from the stakeholder. Based on this argumentation, the following hypothesis 
H1 is set up: 
H1: Firm size has a positive effect on voluntary strategy disclosure quality. 
Firm Age 
The age of a company can be seen representative for the maturity or risk of the 
company (Bukh, Nielsen, Gormsen, & Mouritsen, 2005). As well as the length of time 
a company has been listed on a capital market (Coebergh, 2011; Haniffa & Cooke, 
2002; Li, Pike, & Haniffa, 2008), also the length since foundation may be relevant in 
explaining variability in the disclosure of information. Research indicates increased 
disclosure is positively associated with stock exchange listing status (Wallace, Naser, 
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& Mora, 1994), which contributes to the assumption that the length of time a company 
has been listed on a capital market has positive influence on disclosure. It is expected 
that this relationship also holds true for the length since foundation of the company. 
There are various arguments used to explain how firm age can determine the 
disclosure level of a company. On the one side, firms which face higher uncertainty 
in their business have higher information asymmetries, which especially holds true 
for younger firms (Coebergh, 2011). Those firms can be expected to disclose more 
information than older companies according to the agency theory. However, 
according to stakeholder theory, older and younger companies can be expected to 
have stakeholders who are interested in relevant information. The age is not a proxy 
for importance of the company or public interest. For the reason that a positive as well 
as a negative relation between the lengths since foundation of the firm and voluntary 
strategy disclosure can be expected the hypothesis H2 is drawn up: 
H2: Firm age is related to voluntary strategy disclosure quality. 
Firm Growth 
The firm growth of a company may have an impact on corporate strategy reporting. 
On the one hand, high growth companies may be particularly interested in 
communicating their successful strategy to investors. However, low-growth 
companies should also endeavor to change their situation by thinking about strategies 
for better growth and communicating long-term plans to stakeholders. This 
corresponds to the stakeholder theory, because increased disclosure and especially 
voluntary strategy disclosure may help investors and addressees of financial reporting 
to better understand the long-term goals of the company and growth opportunities in 
the future. Regarding agency theory, fast growing firms are getting more complex. 
This could lead to higher information asymmetries and non-transparent 
communication, why voluntary strategy disclosure could be used to lower the agency 
costs.  
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Based on this argumentation, the positive effect outweighs the negative one and 
therefore hypothesis H3 can be formulated as follows: 
H3: Firm growth of a company has a positive effect on voluntary strategy 
disclosure quality. 
Capital intensity 
Companies with a high level of property, plant and equipment are particularly long-
term oriented and therefore tend to communicate their corporate strategy and strategic 
goals more strongly. Companies that have very little property, plant and equipment 
would tend to have high level of intangibles or short-term assets, which in turn also 
appears to require explanation and justification for relevant stakeholders.  According 
to stakeholder theory, this higher level of disclosure is expected from stakeholders to 
understand the reasons for the high or low capital intensity of the company. More 
information in this context also reduces information asymmetries, which corresponds 
to agency theory and supports the expectation that there is a relation between capital 
intensity and voluntary strategy disclosure. Therefore, the following hypothesis H4 is 
formulated for the present research: 
H4: The capital intensity of a company is related to voluntary strategy 
disclosure quality. 
Leverage 
The capital structure is an important characteristic of a company and can influence its 
long-term preservation. In this context, the ratio of debt used to finance the assets of the 
firm is usually used as financial leverage. According to agency theory, agency costs of 
the firm increase with higher information requirements (Coebergh, 2011). Especially 
companies with higher leverage in the capital structure tend to have higher agency costs 
(Eisenhardt, 1989; Jensen & Meckling, 1976). Therefore, it is assumed that there is an 
enhanced disclosure with increasing debt in order to counteract this effect. According to 
Ahmed and Courtis (1999), there is a positive relation between disclosure level and 
capitalization structures with higher proportions of fixed interest securities relative to 
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equity. Francis, Khurana, and Pereira (2005) found that there is a higher voluntary 
disclosure level for firms with greater external financing needs. The study of 
Camfferman and Cooke (2002) from the Netherlands found that the debt-equity-ratio is 
significantly positively associated with disclosure in annual reports. These results 
support the stakeholder theory, because the pressure for disclosure increases with higher 
interest of (external) stakeholders. Based on empirical studies there are mixed results. 
Some studies found a negative relation between voluntary disclosure and leverage 
(Meek et al., 1995) or no relation between these two aspects (Camfferman & Cooke, 
2002; Chow & Wong-Boren, 1987; Gul & Leung, 2004). Especially for strategy 
disclosure, Sieber (2011) found a positive relation to financial leverage. Based on the 
theoretical argumentation and prior empirical results we expect that the positive effects 
outweigh the negative ones and we formulate the following hypothesis: 
H5: Financial leverage of a company has a positive effect on voluntary strategy 
disclosure quality. 
Profitability 
According to stakeholder theory, there are several incentives of organizations to 
engage with stakeholders. Especially when a firm is successful, it would communicate 
this advantage to its stakeholders (Coebergh, 2011). Because there is cost as being 
perceived as a ‘lemon’ according to Akerlof (1970), which means that the company 
has only negative information. Agency theory and signaling theory play an important 
role in the explanation of the relationship between profitability and disclosure.  
Empirical evidence on the relation between firm profitability and disclosure is mixed. 
Whereas Gray et al. (1995) and Meek et al. (1995) found no evidence that voluntary 
disclosure behavior is different between more and less profitable firms. The study 
from Coebergh (2011) indicates that companies with an extensive strategy disclosure 
are less profitable. The hypothesis for this study is based on the theoretical 
argumentation and formulated as follows: 
H6: Profitability of a company has a positive effect on voluntary strategy 
disclosure quality. 




Based on the concept of agency theory, when a company has a high level of free float, 
there is a greater distance between the owners and the management. Compared to a 
concentrated shareholding, this leads to higher agency conflicts and therefore, higher 
agency costs (Eisenhardt, 1989; Jensen & Meckling, 1976). If ownership is 
concentrated in the hands of few dominant shareholders, they can also exert greater 
influence over company management and use internal information, which reduces 
agency costs. However, with a high level of free float, these costs could be reduced if 
information is voluntarily disclosed. The proportion of the free float in the shareholder 
structure thus appears to be a suitable determinant of corporate strategy reporting. 
Stakeholder theory suggests that the more influential stakeholders an organization has 
and the more the interests of these stakeholders differ, the higher is the need for 
additional information (Coebergh, 2011). Several studies confirm that outside 
ownership is positively associated with the level of disclosure (Patelli and Prencipe, 
(2007). Based on the theoretical argumentation, we hypothesize as follows: 
H7: Ownership structure of a company is related to voluntary strategy 
disclosure quality of a company. 
 Methodology 
3.1 Sample  
This study focuses on the 110 largest publicly listed German companies (based on 
market capitalization) between 2014 and 2018 of the main indices DAX, MDAX and 
TecDAX of the stock exchange provider Deutsche Börse Aktiengesellschaft. In total, 
the sample comprises 440 firm year observations. Following conventions, 22 foreign 
companies have to be excluded from the sample. They chose not to publish a 
management report according to German GAAP, because they were not registered under 
German law. Furthermore, one company has been excluded due to the fact that it has 
not published a management report at the due date June 30, 2018 of the study, because 
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it was newly listed at the German stock exchange. As such, the final sample consists of 
417 firm-year observations (see table Table III - 1)3.  
 
Sampling procedure steps           









Firms listed in three key selection 
indices            
  DAX 30 30 30 30 120 
  MDAX 50 50 50 50 200 
  TecDAX 30 30 30 30 120 
   Total 110 110 110 110 440 
Firms excluded from sample because 
of registration under non-German law -4 -5 -6 -7 -22 
Firms excluded from sample because 
of not published management report - - - -1 -1 
Number of sample firms 106 105 104 102 417 
in % 25.42 25.18 24.94 24.46 100.00 
Table III - 1: Sample selection procedure 
Source: Own illustration. 
In order to proxy the extents to which the analyzed firms disclose information about 
strategy, the management reports with the due date June 30th, have been assessed. We 
categorize the data from July 01, 2014 until June 30, 2015 to the year 2015, as we do 
for the other years, respectively. We chose this due date because most companies have 
December 31st as reporting date and the distance to different reporting dates of 
companies is in this case minimized. This leads to SDScores for the years 2015 to 
2018. The analyzed independent variables are presented on the date December 31 st, 
as this complies with balance sheet date of the most companies in the sample. Based 
on the final 417 firm-year observations, most firms belong to companies from the 
sector ‘Industrial’. Only few companies are member of the industry sector ‘Oil & 
Gas’. The research question is focusing on a German setting for various reasons. As 
Germany is the largest economy in Europe and the fourth largest in the world 
 
3 Companies with the legal form of a ‘Societas Europaea’ are included in the sample because in 
these cases the law of the state of residence must be applied.  
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(International Monetary Found, 2018) voluntary strategy disclosure of German capital 
market-oriented companies seems to be a relevant topic for investors all over the 
world. The legal requirements of the GAS 20 represents a unique legal basis and the 
German management report is a regulatory part of the financial reporting, why the 
German setting differs from other countries and seems valuable to analyze. Therefore, 
integration into a broader sample selection such as an European one or an U.S. setting 
would lead to an inconsistency based on the legal requirements companies have to 
follow. 
3.2 Dependent Variable  
SDScore is the Strategy Disclosure Score and the dependent variable in the model, 
which measures the quality of voluntary strategy disclosure. On the basis of a prior 
literature review regarding evaluation models to measure disclosure of companies 
(Botosan, 1997; Broberg, Tagesson, & Collin, 2010; Cooke, 1989; Gray et al., 1995; 
Jones, 2007; Meek et al., 1995) and regarding self-constructed scoring models which 
solely focus on strategy reporting (Coebergh, 2011; Padia, 2012; Santema et al., 2005; 
Santema & van de Rijt, 2001; Sieber, 2011; Sieber et al., 2014), we identified only few 
established measurement tools for strategy disclosure. The aim of this study is to 
combine legal requirements with the classical understanding of a strategic management 
process. Since the GAS 20 is a regulation which has not been analysed before in context 
of strategy disclosure, we constructed a new scoring model which is not based on one 
from prior literature. Nevertheless, there are similarities to the scoring model from 
Sieber (2011), where the process of the strategy management process played a major 
role. But the study of Sieber (2011) is based on an outdated legal setting and therefore 
focuses on other criteria. For the analysis of this study a scoring model with fifteen 
elements has been selected, that in sum give a comprehensive and decision-relevant 
picture of the disclosure of corporate strategy (for details see Appendix II, Table III - 8 
- II).The categories of the scoring model are aligned with the steps of a classical strategic 
management process (Robbins and Coulter 2016; Welge and Al-Laham 2012), which 
consist of the strategic planning, strategy analysis, strategy formulation, strategy 
implementation and strategy control. The criteria relate to the corporate strategy and 
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strategic objectives of the company on a corporate level, which excludes strategies on 
business unit level or in segment reporting. Furthermore, all criteria in the strategic 
context are analyzed based on the individual strategy and defined strategic objectives of 
the company. Hence, in a first step the corporate strategy and strategic objectives for a 
company are defined and afterwards the criteria of the scoring model are evaluated 
individually for each company of the sample. This increases the validity of the scoring 
model and excludes that companies with inconsistent communication are evaluated 
positive. Therefore, the SDScore measures the quality of reporting and not the extent. 
The scoring model uses a similar approach to Sieber (2011) and the SDScore is 
calculated as follows: 
 










𝑠𝑡,𝑘,𝑖 Disclosure of aspect k of corporate i in t; {0 ˅ 1} 
𝑆𝐷𝑡,𝑖 Strategy Disclosure Value of corporate i in t 
𝑆𝐷𝑆𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑡,𝑖 Strategy Disclosure Score of corporate i in t; {0,1} 
𝑆𝐷𝑚𝑎𝑥 Maximum possible number of Strategy Disclosures  
 
where the subscript letters indicate the following: t, year; i, firm; k, aspect of strategy 
disclosure. An unweighted summation adds the dichotomously distributed ratings for 
each company of the sample. The result presents the SDt,i (Strategy Disclosure Value) 
for a specific corporate i. To calculate the SDScore, the ratio of the Strategy Disclosure 
Value and the maximum Strategy Disclosure Value for the specific corporate will be 
calculated. The maximum Strategy Disclosure value is constant over the observation 
period and equal for all companies with 15 points. The SDScore is a continuous variable 
between 0 and 1, whereas 1 represents a full disclosure and that information to all criteria 
are reported. Next, all values are transferred in a percentage scale to ease later 
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interpretation of statistics and empirical results. The only study which uses a similar 
approach is Sieber (2011), whereas other studies like Santema and van de Rijt (2001) 
and Padia (2012) use non-dichotomous scores and no categorization of the criteria. 
3.3 Independent Variables 
In this study firm size (SIZE) is used as independent variable. We use the firm’s market 
value of equity which is the market capitalization at year-end. This approach is 
consistent with other studies such as Hope (2003) and Lee (2017). To represent the 
maturity and risk of the company the firm age (AGE) is used as independent variable 
(Graham, Harvey, & Rajgopal, 2005). The growth of a company (GROWTH) is 
measured by market-to-book value, which is the market value of the company’s equity 
divided by the book value of the company’s equity. It is thus a statement about the under- 
or overestimation of the firm’s equity and a sign of how cautious the management acts. 
Furthermore, potential growth is already priced in the market value, hence higher market 
capitalization, but not in the book value of the equity, why the market-to-book value can 
be seen as a suitable proxy for firm growth. The capital intensity (CAPIN) is another 
company-specific independent variable, which is measured by the ratio of total 
intangible assets and total assets of the firm. Similar to Chow and Wong-Boren (1987) 
we use the leverage of the company (LEV) expressed by the ratio of the book value of 
total liabilities divided by the book value of total assets to measure the capital structure 
of the company. To proxy for the profitability of the firm (PROF), we employ the 
variable EBITDA-Return on Assets. This is calculated as earnings before interests, 
taxes, depreciation and amortization divided by total assets. As a measurement of the 
ownership structure (OWNERST), the relative free float of a company is used. This is 
the percentage of total shares in issue available to ordinary investors, calculated as the 
total number of shares less the strategic holdings. The variable SIZE is scaled in billion 
Euros and the AGE in years. All other independent variables are a ratio and therefore 
indicated as percent value. 
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3.4 Control Variables 
Because this study considers ten different industries, we control for unobserved 
differences among them. To represent industry membership of firms (INDUSTRY) we 
used dummy variables, which is consistent with most studies like Duran and Rodrigo 
(2018) and Reverte (2009). We followed the Thomson Reuters Datastream classification 
based on the Industry Classification Benchmark. This leads to 10 industry membership 
groups: Consumer Goods (INDUSTRY1), Basic Materials (INDUSTRY2), Healthcare 
(INDUSTRY3), Consumer Services (INDUSTRY4), Industrials (INDUSTRY5), 
Utilities (INDUSTRY6), Financials (INDUSTRY7), Oil & Gas (INDUSTRY8), 
Telecommunications (INDUTSRY9) and Technology (INDUSTRY10). We assigned a 
one if a firm belonged to a particular industry, and a zero if otherwise. 
3.5 Model 
In order to test the formulated hypotheses, we utilize a panel data model and a 
longitudinal regression analysis with random effects. Based on the Hausman test and 
Sargan-Hansen test we decide to use a random effects model for the analysis instead of 
a fixed effects model. This allows controlling for unobserved heterogeneity across firms, 
because companies are studied across time. We construct an empirical model with the 
Strategy Disclosure Score (SDSCORE) as the dependent variable. As explanatory 
variables firm size (SIZE), firm age (AGE), firm growth (GROWTH), capital intensity 
(CAPIN), leverage (LEV), profitability (PROF) and ownership structure (OWNERST) 
are added. The variable INDUSTRY is added to control for industry-specific effects and 
shows the industry membership of the company. This yields the following regression 
equation: 
(3) 𝑆𝐷𝑆𝐶𝑂𝑅𝐸𝑖,𝑡 =  β0 + β1 SIZEi,t + β2 AGEi,t + β3 GROWTHi,t+  
                             β4 CAPINi,t + β5 LEVi,t+ β6 PROFi,t+ β7 OWNERSTi,t   +  
∑  𝛽𝑗  𝐼𝑁𝐷𝑈𝑆𝑇𝑅𝑌𝑖,𝑡
17
𝑗=8
 +  𝜀𝑖,𝑡, 
where the subscript letters indicate the following: t, year; i, firm; j, industry. To avoid 
perfect multicollinearity in the model, we omitted one industry membership dummy 
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variable. The multiple regression model is used to assess the extent to which 
variability in the voluntary strategy disclosure is explained by the previously 
hypothesized financial and non-financial firm-specific characteristics. To check for 
multicollinearity the Person and Spearman correlation matrices are reviewed and 
variance inflation factors (VIF) are analyzed. Normality tests for the residuals are 
conducted based on skewness/kurtosis tests of normality as well as based on the 
Shapiro-Wilk (Shapiro & Wilk, 1965) and Shapiro-Francia normality tests. 
Furthermore, a histogram and Q-Q plot was conducted to test the normality 
assumption. Heteroscedasticity was analyzed by the Breusch Pagan/Cook-Weisberg 
test as well as by an analysis of the plots of residuals against predicted values. To test 
for the autocorrelation assumption, the Wooldridge test for autocorrelation is 
conducted in addition to an analysis of the plots of residuals against predicted values.   
 Results and Discussion 
4.1 Descriptive Statistics and Bivariate Results 
Table III - 2 shows the descriptive statistics of the sample with respect to the SDScore 
(SDSCORE), firm size (SIZE), firm age (AGE), growth (GROWTH), capital intensity 
(CAPIN), leverage (LEV), profitability (PROFIT) and ownership structure 
(OWNERST). The mean, minimum, maximum, percentiles, standard deviation values 
as well as number of observed companies are reported. The SDScore takes a 
maximum value of 100% and a minimum value of 0% over the observation period. 
The results show, that the SDScore of the largest publicly listed German companies 
are moderate in all three years, as the mean is 47.68%. These are similar results like 
Padia (2012), Santema and van de Rijt (2001) and Sieber (2011) found. In Table III - 
3, the matrix shows Pearson and Spearman correlations. As expected, the strategy 
disclosure quality is increasing by size (SIZE), growth (GROWTH), capital intensity 
(CAPIN) and profitability (PROF) of the firm. Small-medium correlations (Cohen, 
1988, p. 80) regarding Pearson’s correlation coefficients) are observed for the 
SDScore with GROWTH (r = .12, p < .05), CAPIN (r = .21, p < .01) and PROF (r = 
.20, p < .01). In line with the respective hypothesis H1, larger firms are more likely 
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to have higher levels of SDScore, exhibiting a medium correlation of r = .29 (p < .01) 
for SIZE. For both parametric and nonparametric correlation measures, these 
relationships are significant and hence support the validity of the estimation as a 
measure of voluntary strategy disclosure quality. All other variables do not show any 
correlation with the SDScore. This bivariate analysis is based on the correlation 
matrix according to Pearson and to Spearman, both analyses provide similar results. 
4.2 Regression Results  
In order to corroborate the hypotheses H1-H8, a multiple regression analysis is 
conducted. Despite the correlation among some variables, which can be seen in the 
correlation matrices (Table III - 3); all other basic assumptions for a regression 
analysis are not violated in the used statistical model. As described before we 
performed tests whether excess multicollinearity is present in the models, we test for 
normality of the residuals, heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation, and find no 
violations. Table III - 4 shows the results from the multiple regression models, using 
a random effects model with the SDScore as dependent variable. The SDScore is 
significantly and positively associated with firm size (SIZE; β1 = 0.0002 at 1% level). 
Furthermore, the same results are found in Model 2 where the control variables for 
industry membership (INDUSTRY) are added and robust standard errors are used 
(SIZE; β1  = 0.0002 at 5% level). As expected in Hypothesis 1 (H1) there is a positive 
relation between the strategy disclosure quality of a firm and the firm size. Thus 
Hypothesis 1 can be confirmed, which is consistent to results of prior empirical 
studies assessing the determinants of disclosure; like Abraham and Tonks (2006), 
Agca and Önder (2007), Bushman et al. (2004), Camfferman and Cooke (2002), Meek 
et al. (1995), Prencipe (2004), and Singhvi and Desai (1971). There is also a positive 
significant effect of firm growth (GROWTH) and capital intensity (CAPIN) on the 
strategy disclosure quality in Model 1 (GROWTH: β3 = 0.5195 at 5% level; 
CAPIN: β4 = 0.0834 at 5% level). For the Model 2 with robust standard errors and 
industry membership only significance for firm growth can be found. Thus, a positive 
effect of firm growth and capital intensity can be observed, which confirms the 
hypotheses 3 (H3) and 4 (H4). No association is found for the independent variables 
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firm age (AGE), financial leverage (LEV), profitability (PROF) and ownership 
structure (OWNERST). 
The results thus support the theoretical assumption that voluntary strategy 
disclosure reduces information asymmetries according to agency theory, because 
these are more pronounced because of the size and complexity of the business and 
voluntary reporting can equalize this situation. Especially large companies mostly 
have an own department for strategy and strategy communication. The larger and 
more fast-growing a company is, the more pressure stakeholders exert on firms to 
provide relevant information to minimize information asymmetries and inform all 
stakeholders about important disclosure. Fast-growing companies are mostly active 
in a highly competitive environment and the strategy of the firm is important to defend 
their position. A high level of intangible assets could also lead to information 
asymmetries because of the nature of the asset, because it appears to require 
explanation and justification for relevant stakeholders. Companies with a high level 
of intangible assets mostly have a high need to explain their business and 
understanding how they want to generate value in the long-term. Therefore, the 
finding that capital intensity, which is measured by a high level of intangible assets, 
increases the quality of voluntary strategy disclosure, supports the assumption that 
information asymmetries can be reduced. Research studies which also focused on 
determinants of strategy disclosure found mixed results. Some empirical studies 
confirm the relation of firm size  and disclosure (Ahmed & Courtis, 1999; Cooke, 
1989; Meek et al., 1995; Morris & Tronnes, 2018; Sieber, 2011). Especially the 
results of Sieber (2011) and Morris and Tronnes (2018) support this hypothesis for 
strategy disclosure. In contrast, the study of Coebergh (2011) did not confirm this 
relation. The findings for firm growth and capital intensity are new in academic 
literature and therefore a valuable new insight for management practice and a 
contribution to the research field of voluntary strategy disclosure. From a practical 
point of view, these results may be of interest for standard setting bodies and 
regulators when evaluating disclosure requirements. 
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4.3 Robustness checks  
Table III - 5 presents the results of the first robustness check of regressions run 
separately for the years 2015 to 2018. These findings are consistent with the main 
results. This supports that firm size (SIZE) has in each year a positive significant 
effect on strategy disclosure quality (SDSCORE). Furthermore, growth of a firm 
shows a positive significant influence on the SDScore. The same holds true for capital 
intensity (CAPIN) in the years 2015 and 2016. A negative significant relationship 
between firm age (AGE) and the SDScore is found in the years 2017 and 2018. 
Profitability (PROF) seems to influence strategy disclosure significantly positive in 
the years 2017 and 2018. The robustness of the previous multiple regression analysis 
is thus shown by the first robustness check to control for time effects. 
As a second robustness check (see Table III - 6), a multiple regression analysis 
with random effects (robust standard errors) with different proxies for firm size is 
conducted, as this is the explanatory variable with the highest significance in the 
previously conducted multiple regression model. In Model 3 we use the number of 
employees (SIZE1), in Model 4 the logarithm of the number of employees (SIZE2) 
and in Model 5 the book value of total assets (SIZE3) as proxies. As it is shown in 
Table III - 6, firm size is positively significant related to the SDScore in the Model 3 
and Model 4. The firm growth operationalized by the market-to-book-value influences 
the quality of strategy disclosure significantly positive in all three models as well as 
capital intensity, which is measured by the ratio of intangibles to total assets. 
Furthermore, we calculated these models with the control variable INDUSTRY (see 
Table III - 7). For Model 6 we use the number of employees (SIZE1), in Model 7 the 
logarithm of the number of employees (SIZE2) and in Model 8 the book value of total 
assets (SIZE3) as proxies. The results show that only Model 7 shows a significantly 
positive relation of size and voluntary strategy disclosure. This supports Hypothesis 
H1 and the results from Model 2, which is the baseline model of this study. All 
robustness checks support the results of the main results from Table III - 4 and 
especially the significantly positive relation of firm size and SDScore. 
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No. Variables Mean Extremes   Percentiles   
Standard 
deviation N 
     Min Max   25% 50% 75%       
1 SDSCORE 47.68 0.00 100.00   40.00 46.66 53.33   15.17 417 
2 SIZE 14,210.58 143.81 111,523.7  1,977.47 5,157.85 13,235.08  21,927.32 417 
3 AGE 71.97 1.00 191.00   21.00 50.00 127.00   53.34 417 
4 GROWTH 2.64 −16.92 15.44   1.34 2.18 3.14   2.38 410 
5 CAPIN 23.08 0.00 94.01   5.28 17.33 37.97   20.24 417 
6 LEV 34.79 0.00 209.30   16.96 33.28 50.23   24.28 417 
7 PROF 11.16 −15.50 77.80   7.67 11.36 14.03   7.75 415 
8 OWNERST 71.41 3.00 100.00   50.00 77.00 93.00   24.15 415 
 
Note: SDSCORE: Strategy Disclosure Score; SIZE: firm size in billion euros (market capitalization); AGE: 
firm age in years; GROWTH: market-to-book-value; CAPIN: capital intensity (intangibles/total assets); LEV: 
financial leverage (total liabilities/total assets); PROFIT: profitability (EBITDA/total assets); OWNERST: 
ownership structure (relative free float). 
Table III - 2: Descriptive statistics of metric variables 
Source: Own illustration. 
 
No. Variables 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
1 SDSCORE +1 +0.25*** +0.01 +0.18*** +0.21*** +0.09* +0.28*** +0.03 
2 SIZE +0.29*** +1 +0.19*** −0.07 +0.01 +0.30*** −0.02 +0.03 
3 AGE −0.04 +0.24*** +1 −0.23 −0.13*** +0.02 −0.10* +0.23*** 
4 GROWTH +0.12** −0.09** −0.23*** +1 +0.42*** −0.16*** +0.48*** −0.09* 
5 CAPIN +0.21*** +0.11** −0.15*** +0.24*** +1 +0.01 +0.31*** +0.01 
6 LEV +0.06  +0.18*** +0.09* −0.21*** +0.01  +1 −0.21*** +0.18*** 
7 PROF +0.20***  −0.03 −0.07  +0.38*** +0.16*** −0.16*** +1 −0.18*** 
8 OWNERST +0.03 +0.17*** +0.23*** −0.14*** +0.02 +0.13*** −0.19* +1 
 
Note: * p≤0.10; ** p≤0.05; *** p≤0.01. 
Note: SDSCORE: Strategy Disclosure Score; SIZE: firm size in billion euros (market capitalization); AGE: 
firm age in years; GROWTH: market-to-book-value; CAPIN: capital intensity (intangibles/total assets); LEV: 
financial leverage (total liabilities/total assets); PROF: profitability (EBITDA/total assets); OWNERST: 
ownership structure (relative free float). The numbers below the diagonal represent Pearson’s correlation 
coefficients and those above the diagonal, Spearman’s rank correlation coefficients. 
Table III - 3: Pearson and Spearman correlation matrix 
Source: Own illustration 
  
III. DETERMINANTS OF STRATEGY DISCLOSURE QUALITY: EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE FROM GERMANY 
 
 85  
Dependent variable: SDSCORE  
 
Explanatory variables  
Model 1 
with robust st. errors 
Model 2 
with robust st. errors and industry 
membership 
Coefficients z-Stat. Sig. Coefficients z-Stat. Sig. 
SIZE   0.0002*** 2.82 0.005 0.0002** 2.35 0.019 
    (0.0001)   (0.0001)   
AGE   -0.0188 -0.87 0.385 -0.0370 -1.61 0.108 
    (0.0217)   (0.0231)   
GROWTH 0.5195** 2.07 0.039 0.5201** 1.97 0.049 
    (0.2513)   (0.2642)   
CAPIN 0.0834** 2.15 0.032 0.0605 1.25 0.21 
    (0.0388)   (0.0483)   
LEV   0.0032 0.07 0.947 0.0326 0.62 0.532 
    (0.0486)   (0.0522)   
PROF 0.1460 1.46 0.144 0.0844 0.88 0.377 
    (0.0999)   (0.0956)   
OWNERST 0.034 0.87 0.386 0.0209 0.48 0.633 
    (0.0392)   (0.0438)   
INDUSTRY       
1 Consumer Goods     4.6534 1.11 0.269 
       (4.2056)   
2  Basic Materials      4.5964 1.16 0.245 
       (3.9522)   
3 Healthcare     2.7763 0.73 0.465 
       (3.7968)   
4 Consumer Services     -5.0136 -1.17 0.243 
       (4.2906)   
5 Industrials     2.4774 0.7 0.486 
       (3.5526)   
6 Utilities     -7.9756 -0.9 0.367 
       (8.8350)   
7  Financials     -3.5165 -0.78 0.433 
       (4.4853)   
8 Oil & Gas    -2.3088 -0.65 0.517 
       (3.5604)   
9 Telecommunications     3.0283 0.58 0.56 
       (5.2020)   
10 Technology     omitted   
          
Constant 38.8079*** 11.3 0.000 40.5847*** 10.6 0.000 
    (3.4337)   (3.8305)   
R-squared within 0.0093   0.0099   
R-squared between 0.1764   0.2260   
R-squared overall 0.1500   0.1942   
Wald Chi Squared 22.64***   38.73***   





Note: * p≤0.10; ** p≤0.05; *** p≤0.01. 
SDSCORE: Strategy Disclosure Score; SIZE: firm size in billion euros (market capitalization); AGE: firm age 
in years; GROWTH: market-to-book-value; CAPIN: capital intensity (intangibles/total assets); LEV: financial 
leverage (total liabilities/total assets); PROF: profitability (EBITDA/total assets); OWNERST: ownership 
structure (relative free float). Robust Standard Errors are in brackets.  
Table III - 4: Results of multiple regression models 
Source: Own illustration. 








t = 2015 t = 2016 t = 2017 t = 2018 
Coefficients Sig. Coefficients Sig. Coefficients Sig. Coefficients Sig. 
SIZE 0.0002** 0.032 0.0002*** 0.001 0.0002*** 0.006 0.0002* 0.086 
  (0.0001)  (0.0001)  (0.0001)  (0.0001)  
AGE 0.0132 0.595 -0.0140 0.613 -0.0484* 0.093 -0.0778** 0.016 
  (0.0249)  (0.0277)  (0.0286)  (0.0318)  
GROWTH 1.3856** 0.027 -0.1655 0.813 0.4141 0.528 -0.7915* 0.078 
  (0.6171)  (0.6968)  (0.6530)  (0.4446)  
CAPIN 0.1508** 0.019 0.1414 ** 0.012 0.0901 0.169 -0.0140 0.792 
  (0.0630)  (0.0550)  (0.0650)  (0.0528)  
LEV -0.0050 0.931 0.0282 0.647 0.1043 0.14 0.0344 0.639 
  (0.0576)  (0.0615)  (0.0700)  (0.0731)  
PROF 0.0617 0.566 0.3525 0.115 0.4429** 0.037 0.7708*** 0.000 
  (0.1071)  (0.2213)  (0.2095)  (0.1838)  
OWNERST 0.0085 0.880 0.0026 0.959 0.023 0.666 0.0679 0.305 
  (0.0563)  (0.0510)  (0.0532)  (0.0658)  
Constant 35.7613*** 0.000 37.5779*** 0.000 33.6348*** 0.000 40.3422*** 0.000 
  (5.2915)  (4.2320)  (5.3169)  (5.7787)  
R-squared  0.1463  0.2301  0.2508  0.1904  









Note: * p≤0.10; ** p≤0.05; *** p≤0.01. 
SDSCORE: Strategy Disclosure Score; SIZE: firm size in billion euros (market capitalization); AGE: firm age 
in years; GROWTH: market-to-book-value; CAPIN: capital intensity (intangibles/total assets); LEV: financial 
leverage (total liabilities/total assets); PROF: profitability (EBITDA/total assets); OWNERST: ownership 
structure (relative free float). All independent variables are measured separately for years 2015-2018 
respectively. Robust standard errors are in brackets. 
Table III - 5: Robustness check 1: regression models by year 
Source: Own illustration. 
  






Explanatory variables  
Model 3 
with robust st. errors  
Model 4 
with robust st. errors 
Model 5 
with robust st. errors 
Coefficients z-Stat Sig. Coefficients z-Stat Sig. Coefficients z-Stat Sig. 
SIZE 0.0000** 1.97 0.048 6.7576*** 4.77 0.000 0.0000 0.52 0.602 
  (0.0000)   (1.4156)   (0.0000)   
AGE -0.0055 -0.24 0.807 -0.0461* -1.87 0.061 -0.0024 -0.1 0.917 
  (0.0226)   (0.0247)   (0.0228)   
GROWTH 0.5768** 2.2 0.028 0.5882** 2.53 0.011 0.5219** 1.99 0.047 
  (0.2622)   (0.2323)   (0.2628)   
CAPIN 0.1042** 2.32 0.02 0.0787* 1.84 0.066 0.1119** 2.37 0.018 
  (0.0450)   (0.0429)   (0.0472)   
LEV 0.0019 0.04 0.969 -0.0175 -0.42 0.677 0.0128 0.25 0.801 
  (0.0475)   (0.0421)   (0.0510)   
PROF 0.1495 1.48 0.14 0.1288 1.3 0.194 0.1518 1.45 0.146 
  (0.1013)   (0.0992)   (0.1046)   
OWNERST 0.0408 1.04 0.299 0.0683* 1.85 0.065 0.0440 1.1 0.272 
  (0.0392)   (0.0370)   (0.0400)   
Constant 37.9853*** 10.68 0.000 14.4656*** 2.54 0.011 38.2127*** 10.96 0.000 
  (3.5569)   (5.6954)   (3.4856)   
R-squared within 0.0059   0.0149   0.0099   
R-squared between 0.1276   0.2223   0.0743   
R-squared overall 0.1005   0.1695   0.0662   
Wald Chi Squared 18.29**   42.56***   14.49**   







Note: * p≤0.10; ** p≤0.05; *** p≤0.01. 
SDSCORE: Strategy Disclosure Score; SIZE in Model 3: number of employees (SIZE1), SIZE in Model 4: 
logarithm of number of employees (SIZE2), SIZE in Model 5: book value of total assets (SIZE3); AGE: firm 
age in years; GROWTH: market-to-book-value; CAPIN: capital intensity (intangibles/total assets); LEV: 
financial leverage (total liabilities/total assets); PROF: profitability (EBITDA/total assets); OWNERST: 
ownership structure (relative free float). Robust standard errors are in brackets. 
Table III - 6: Robustness check 2: regression models with different proxies for firm size without 
control variables 
Source: Own illustration.  




Note: * p≤0.10; ** p≤0.05; *** p≤0.01. 
SDSCORE: Strategy Disclosure Score; SIZE in Model 6: number of employees (SIZE1), SIZE in Model 7: 
logarithm of number of employees (SIZE2), SIZE in Model 8: book value of total assets (SIZE3); All o ther 
variables are as defined in Table III - 4. Robust standard errors are in brackets. 
Table III - 7: Robustness check 3: regression models with different proxies for firm size 
including control variables 




Explanatory variables  
Model 6 
with robust st. errors and 
industry membership 
Model 7 
with robust st. errors and 
industry membership 
Model 8 
with robust st. errors and 
industry membership 
Coefficients z-Stat. Sig. Coefficients z-Stat. Sig. Coefficients z-Stat. Sig. 
SIZE   0.0000 1.60 0.109 7.2810*** 4.52 0.000 0.0000 0.98 0.329 
    (0.0000)   (1.6116)   (0.0000)   
AGE   -0.0224 -0.94 0.349 -0.0624*** -2.66 0.008 -0.0268 -1.14 0.256 
    (0.0239)   (0.0235)   (0.0236)   
GROWTH 0.5918** 2.20 0.028 0.6369*** 2.69 0.007 0.5278* 1.95 0.051 
    (0.2695)   (0.2364)   (0.2707)   
CAPIN 0.0877* 1.68 0.092 0.0675 1.39 0.166 0.0896* 1.68 0.093 
    (0.0520)   (0.0488)   (0.0533)   
LEV   0.0282 0.56 0.574 0.0033 0.08 0.939 0.0364 0.71 0.480 
    (0.0500)   (0.0433)   (0.0516)   
PROF 0.0955 0.97 0.332 0.0944 0.96 0.336 0.0911 0.92 0.359 
    (0.0985)   (0.0982)   (0.0994)   
OWNERST 0.0273 0.63 0.529 0.0444 1.07 0.283 0.0315 0.71 0.476 
    (0.4333)   (0.0413)   (0.0442)   
INDUSTRY          
1 Consumer Goods  5.4363 1.25 0.211 2.4206 0.60 0.548 7.5278* 1.83 0.067 
    (4.3490)   (4.0316)   (4.1032)   
2  Basic Materials   4.899 1.14 0.256 2.3680 0.57 0.569 5.3553 1.22 0.221 
    (4.3111)   (4.1593)   (4.3800)   
3 Healthcare  2.7950 0.63 0.526 2.8210 0.66 0.507 3.5469 0.81 0.421 
    (4.4040)   (4.2546)   (4.4030)   
4 Consumer Serv.  -5.8561 -1.33 0.183 -9.0586** -2.10 0.036 -5.1094 -1.14 0.256 
    (4.3954)   (4.3086)   (4.4948)   
5 Industrials  1.1771 0.30 0.762 -0.3683 -0.10 0.919 2.3925 0.62 0.537 
    (3.8788)   (3.6200)   (3.8773)   
6 Utilities  -6.9430 -0.75 0.451 -12.1963 -1.40 0.160 -6.8078 -0.73 0.466 
    (9.2080)   (8.6822)   (9.3309)   
7  Financials  -2.0115 -0.44 0.656 0.0530 0.01 0.991 -3.6027 -0.77 0.440 
    (4.5215)   (4.4622)   (4.6632)   
8 Oil & Gas -2.5976 -0.67 0.504 -3.0783 -0.94 0.350 -2.8319 -0.71 0.476 
    (3.8845)   (3.2922)   (3.9719)   
9 Telecommunicat.  
  
4.5153 0.67 0.505 2.6972 0.54 0.591 5.1962 0.69 0.493 
  (6.769)   (5.0216)   (7.5765)   
10 Technology  omitted   omitted   omitted   
             
Constant 39.5848*** 9.92 0.000 15.3658** 2.36 0.018 39.6707*** 9.79 0.000 
    (3.9905)   (6.5182)   (4.0512)   
R-squared within 0.0067   0.0159   0.0122   
R-squared between 0.1806   0.2951   0.1473   
R-squared overall 0.1447   0.2233   0.1261   
Wald Chi Squared 38.18***   68.80***   32.10***   
rho    0.6026   0.5569   0.6218   
Observations 408   408   408   




Voluntary strategy disclosure of firms is a widely neglected topic in theoretical and 
empirical research, but of high interest of investors and addressees of financial reporting. 
The determinants influencing the quality of voluntary strategy disclosure are largely 
under-researched, why this study has the aim to close a research gap. This study 
contributes to this relatively new stream of empirical disclosure research. Therefore, this 
topic is of considerable interest for decision-makers in both economic theory as well as 
in managerial practice. Our findings shed light on this matter, examining determinants 
of the quality of voluntary strategy disclosures made by a sample of 417 firm year 
observations of the largest listed German capital market-oriented companies drawn from 
a diverse range of industrial sectors. This study includes two variables, firm growth and 
capital intensity which have not been analyzed before in the context of voluntary 
strategy disclosure, which give new insights in the characteristics of firms which tend 
to have a high quality of voluntary strategy disclosure. Furthermore, a self-constructed 
scoring model has been used which combines legal requirements and a theoretical 
understanding of the strategic management process. The unique aspect of the 
measurement tool that all criteria are individual evaluated for each company based on 
their corporate strategy and strategic objective differentiates this study from others. 
Findings show that the quality of voluntary strategy disclosure is significant positively 
influenced by firm size, firm growth and capital intensity. The results from this empirical 
research remain stable throughout a number of robustness checks. Based on these 
findings, small companies, slow growing companies or with a low level of intangible 
assets are reluctant to disclose information about their corporate strategy and strategic 
objectives. The findings for the influence of firm size on disclosure is consistent with 
other empirical studies like Sieber (2011) and Morris and Tronnes (2018). The relation 
of firm growth and capital intensity on disclosure, especially strategy disclosure, is to 
the best of our knowledge not researched before and is therefore a valuable contribution 
to the research field. Based on the findings it can be understand which types of 
companies have a high quality of strategy disclosure. This may be of interest for standard 
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setting bodies and regulators as well as financial reporting addressees to evaluate given 
information about corporate strategy and strategic objectives. 
For the final appraisal of the study results, it is important to take into account that 
the significance of the results is restricted by the inherent limitations of the study. The 
three main limitations are the analyzed determinants, the sample and the measurement 
tool of voluntary strategy disclosure. Other determinants which influence the disclosure 
quality of strategy related information are also conceivable and could be tested 
empirically. Furthermore, future research should aim to increase the number of 
companies in the sample to get a wider picture. This study focuses on a German sample. 
Future empirical analysis could use other European as well as international samples to 
identify differences in the disclosure quality based on the assumption, that different 
cultures, business environments and legal systems influence the level of strategy 
disclosure; like Morris and Tronnes (2018). The time horizon could be increased to get 
new findings how relevant voluntary strategy disclosure is under different economic 
conditions. To understand differences between capital market-oriented companies and 
non-capital market-oriented companies, the sample in future research could comprise 
both company types. This study is based on disclosure in the management report, other 
sources are also used by the addressees (Ferreira & Rezende, 2007) and can be further 
studied. Furthermore, the criteria used in the analysis are based on the theoretical 
strategic management process and on legal requirements for strategy disclosure in 
German management reports. Future studies could further extent or alternate this 
measurement of strategy disclosure. Despite basing the scoring model on the above 
mentioned theoretical and quasi-legal conceptualizations, it remains based on 
simplifications and on subjective assessment. Due to signaling theory, effects of strategy 
disclosure on the capital market performance of a firm could be analyzed in further 
research; like the study of Sieber et al. (2014) did. Future research could examine 
whether strategy disclosure in firms’ management reports reduces the information 
asymmetry component of cost of capital. This might provide information if voluntary 
strategy disclosure is a relevant source of information for investors. 
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Appendix II: Data collection instrument 





1. Explanation of the business development in the 
context of the strategy 
2. Explanation of the economic situation in the context 
of the strategy 
Strategic situation 
3. Assessment of the expected business development in 
the context of the strategy 
4. Assessment of the opportunities and risks of the 




5. Naming the strategic objective 
6. Extent of the strategic objectives 
7. Time reference of the strategic objectives 





9. Explanation of the relevance of strategy in the 
management compensation system 




Changes in strategy 
11. Significant changes in strategic objectives compared 
to the previous year 
12. Explanation of significant changes in strategic 
objectives compared to the previous year 
13. Significant changes in corporate strategy compared to 
the previous year 
14. Explanation of significant changes in corporate 
strategy compared to the previous year 
Achievement of 
strategic objectives 
15. Statement on the state of achievement of strategic 
objectives 
Table III - 8 - II: Data collection instrument 
Source: Own illustration. 
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EXTERNAL ASSURANCE AND TRANSPARENCY IN CSR 
REPORTING   –       EUROPEAN EVIDENCE 




The spread of CSR reporting among private firms is accompanied by an increase of 
external assurance. Firms are employing assurance to signal the credibility of their CSR 
reports towards stakeholders and improve their reputation. Whether this practice is 
socially and economically beneficial in its current form remains up for debate. In 
Europe, many firms receive external assurance for CSR reports voluntarily. Critics argue 
the voluntary nature of external assurance may interfere with assurance providers’ 
independence and hinder the effective safeguarding of reporting transparency. The 
research question of this paper concerns whether external assurance is associated with 
transparency in CSR reports. An OLS panel data model is used to investigate the 
empirical relationship of external assurance and three indicators of transparency: 
reporting scope as an indicator for completeness, readability as an indicator for clarity 
and optimism as an indicator for balance in reporting. The proxies for report readability 
and optimism come from computer-aided text analysis. The sample encompasses the 
CSR reporting of 187 European firms from 2014 to 2016. An ambiguous relationship 
between external assurance and reporting transparency is found. Notably, in this sample, 
external assurance is positively related to reporting scope and negatively to reporting 
optimism, but is also associated with decreased readability of CSR reports. The findings 
imply that, companies’ external assurance may indeed present a valuable option to 
increase the credibility of their CSR reports and set themselves apart from their peer 
group. Assurance providers may take the findings as a starting point for reflecting their 
potential influence on the clarity of CSR reports under their review. For EU regulators, 
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the findings suggest that the enforcement of substantial external assurance may increase 
the overall credibility of CSR reporting in their country. This study adds to the scarce 
literature on external assurance for CSR reporting. Specifically, we contribute one of 
the first investigations on how external assurance relates to linguistic aspects of CSR 
reporting transparency. 
Keywords:  CSR reporting, external assurance, Europe, readability, 
optimism, computer-aided text analysis. 
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 Introduction  
Reporting on Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR)-related activities and its external 
assurance present two widespread and at the same time controversial practices (Ball & 
Craig, 2010; O'Dwyer & Owen, 2005; 2007; Smith, Haniffa, & Fairbrass, 2011; Junior, 
Best, & Cotter, 2014). On the one hand, increasing public awareness for CSR has led 
many companies to complement their financial disclosure through additional 
information on their social and/or environmental performance. As of 2018, it has 
become an established practice among many of the largest companies worldwide 
(KPMG, 2017). This spread is accompanied by an increased supply of external 
assurance of CSR reports. The Global Reporting Initiative (GRI) supports assurance as 
a means to increase the reliability of reports and increase their credibility towards 
stakeholders (GRI, 2013). Standards for assuring CSR reports have been formulated by 
AccountAbility and the International Audit Assurance Standards Board (IAASB) and 
are widely used on an international level (Velte & Stawinoga, 2017). Surveys by KPMG 
suggest that in 2017, 93% of the worlds’ largest 250 firms (as measured by revenue) 
provided CSR reporting in some form, of which 67% had their reports externally assured 
(KPMG, 2017). 
On the other hand, whether the external assurance of CSR reports present a socially 
and economically beneficial practice in its current form remains up for debate. Critics 
argue that, while intended to ensure that companies adhere to principles of content and 
quality and thus provide transparent reports, assurance may itself fall prey to managerial 
‘capture’. It may thus be ineffective in safeguarding reporting transparency and gains in 
credibility largely undue. As noted by Velte and Stawinoga (2017), while CSR reporting 
assurance is increasingly covered in accounting research, its influence on reporting 
deserves further attention. Our study thus tackles the question: Are externally assured 
CSR reports more transparent? 
For a sample spanning the CSR reporting of 185 European firms from 2014 to 
2016, we analyze the relationship between external assurance and three different 
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indicators of transparency: reporting scope as an indicator for completeness, readability, 
as an indicator for clarity and optimism as an indicator for balance in reporting. We 
complement several prior studies that focus on the influence of assurance on the quantity 
(Michelon et al., 2015) or content (Moroney, Windsor, & Aw, 2012; Michelon et al., 
2015; Braam et al., 2016; Hummel & Schlick, 2016) of CSR reporting. Our findings 
show that assurance correlates with an increased scope of company activities covered in 
CSR reporting as well as with a less optimistic verbal tone, but is also associated with a 
more complex, less readable language. These findings show statistical significance 
across several robustness checks. 
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows: In section 2, we describe the 
theoretical background of our analysis and in section 3, we derive the research 
hypotheses. In section 4, we elaborate our sample selection process, methodology and 
variables. Section 5 is dedicated to the presentation of our results. Finally, in section 6, 
we discuss our findings, their potential implications and suggestions for future research. 
The section also concludes this paper. 
 Theoretical Background  
2.1 CSR Reporting, Assurance and Transparency  
Unlike financial statements auditing, which presents a compulsory exercise for most 
companies worldwide, external assurance of CSR reports so far is mostly conducted 
voluntarily. This lends it to be analyzed through the lenses of agency theory and related 
conceptions (Cohen & Simnett, 2015; Velte & Stawinoga, 2017). One such approach, 
promoted by Cohen and Simnett (2015) as well as Velte and Stawinoga (2017) is 
stakeholder agent theory (Hill & Jones, 1992). In classical agency theory, the role of the 
‘principal’ has traditionally been reserved for company’s shareholders. Under 
stakeholder agency theory, it is enriched by the broader construct of corporate 
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stakeholders.4 Companies thus use CSR reporting in as a signal towards these groups to 
decrease information asymmetries on their social and environmental conduct and secure 
their continued support. Such signaling is only credible when CSR reporting is relatively 
more costly for ‘poor’ social/environmental performers in relation to ‘good’ ones 
(Spence, 1973). Otherwise, it would represent ‘cheap talk’ and be considered easily 
negligible (Crawford & Sobel, 1982). 
Companies are facing increasing public and legislative pressure to verify that their 
CSR reporting indeed provides incremental information. External assurance is promoted 
as an instrument to secure the transparency of CSR reports (Hahn et al., 2015; Cohen 
& Simnett, 2015; Michelon et al., 2015; Braam et al., 2016; Velte & Stawinoga, 2017) 
and increase ‘recognition, trust and credibility’ (GRI, 2013) towards stakeholders. In 
contrast, referring to its voluntary nature, critics suggest that CSR assurance may follow 
a ‘symbolic’ approach to legitimization (Ashfort & Gibbs, 1990; Michelon et al., 2015). 
Corporate managers initiate assurance, pay the assurance providers and decide on the 
scope of assurance (Jones & Solomon, 2010). As a result, assurance providers’ 
independence is often impaired. Their work may be vulnerable to managerial ‘capture’ 
(Smith et al., 2011) and be ineffective in securing or improving the transparency of CSR 
reporting (Ball & Craig, 2010; O'Dwyer & Owen, 2005, 2007; Smith et al., 2011). 
2.2 Empirical Research on Assurance and CSR Reporting  
While scientific research on CSR assurance is broad and growing, its association with 
transparency in CSR reporting has scarcely been investigated empirically (Velte 
& Stawinoga, 2017). Few studies have considered an association between assurance and 
 
4  Unlike shareholders, many stakeholder groups do not hold immediate financial investments in a 
company and as such do not possess explicit ownership rights and claims to financial returns. 
None the less, they may still be ‘invested’ in a number of other ways. For example, employees 
that lend their skills and basic labor power, communities that provide the space to house 
corporate facilities or governments that secure the basic public and legal infrastructures that 
enable economic action all hold a reasonable stake in a company’s success and conduct. They 
raise their own expectations towards it, that may range from receiving an adequate wage for, 
compliance with commercial laws and customs or the basic respect for and consideration of the 
people and natural environment affected by corporate activities (Jensen & Meckling, 1976; Hill 
& Jones, 1992; Gray, Kouhy, & Lavers, 1995; Velte & Stawinoga, 2017). 
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CSR reporting (and related forms of disclosure, such as integrated reporting), and those 
that do so far tend to find a positive association. Moroney et al. (2012) and Braam et 
al. (2016) investigate the influence of assurance on the contents of environmental 
reporting as measured by a disclosure content index developed by Clarkson et al. (2008), 
in Australia and the Netherlands, respectively. Both find that assurance is associated 
with an increased extent of objective and verifiable environmental disclosure. Similarly, 
Hummel and Schlick (2016), for a sample of European firms, use a content indexing 
scheme to distinguish ‘high’ (as proxied for by the amount of numerical information) 
from ‘low` (non-numerical information) social and environmental disclosure. They find 
that assurance correlates with increased levels of ‘high-quality’ and reduced levels of 
‘low-quality’ disclosure. Gerwanski et al. (2019) find that assurance may positively 
affect the quality of materiality disclosure within integrated reports. In contrast, 
Michelon et al. (2015) investigate the impact of assurance on the relative quantity, 
topical density, accuracy and managerial orientation of sustainability reports and find 
no statistically significant relationship with any of these measures. 
We recognize the value of these investigations, but suggest that further research is 
needed in this area for several reasons. First, five studies, (Moroney et al., 2012; Braam 
et al., 2016; Hummel & Schlick, 2016; Velte, 2018; Gerwanski et al., 2019) find a 
positive impact of assurance on reporting transparency while one – across several 
proxies – finds no relation at all. This encourages us to believe there exists further 
demand for investigation to contribute to the overall conclusion on this issue. Second, 
studies’ contents range from purely environmental reporting (Moroney et al., 2012; 
Braam et al., 2016) to environmental and social reporting (Hummel & Schlick, 2016; 
Michelon et al., 2015) and integrated reporting (Gerwanski et al., 2019). This naturally 
impedes their comparability and provides a strong justification to complement any of 
these three areas of research. Third, various other ways in which transparency may find 
its expression in CSR reporting remains underresearched as of yet. The studies 
conducted provide insights on the association of assurance with CSR reporting quantity 
(Michelon et al., 2015), specific aspects of reporting (Michelon et al., 2015; Gerwanski 
et al., 2019) and the content-related depth of CSR reporting (Moroney et al., 2012; 
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Michelon et al., 2015; Braam et al., 2016; Hummel & Schlick, 2016). Such approaches 
work well for capturing the substantial character of the information disclosed within a 
report. Yet, the narrative and discretionary nature of CSR reporting (Cho, Roberts, & 
Patten, 2010) suggest its overall verbal tone or rhetoric makeup may also play a role in 
how transparently information is actually transmitted, even when formally disclosed 
(Davis, Piger, & Sedor, 2012; Arena, Bozzolan, & Michelon, 2015). This aspect appears 
to have been considered only scarcely for external assurance. To the best of our 
knowledge, Velte (2018) provides the only study of this kind: For an European sample, 
he shows that assurance is associated with an improved readability within integrated 
reports. Without further inquiries, the complex relation between assurance and CSR 
reporting will not be fully understood. Thus, the influence of external assurance on the 
readability of CSR reports needs to be investigated. 
 Research Question and Hypothesis Development  
We pick up and contribute to this relatively young conversation. As our main research 
question, we examine if and how external assurance is associated with the transparency 
of CSR reports. However, transparency is an elusive concept and may only be measured 
indirectly. As one of the major standard setters in the field, the GRI has defined a set of 
principles of reporting content and quality that, if applied collectively, contribute to the 
transparency of CSR reporting. In the following, we base our choice of indicators for 
transparency on selected reporting principles as developed by the GRI and formulate 
our research hypotheses in relation to them.5 Details on the dependent variables 
employed to operationalize our hypotheses are given in section 4.3. 
 
5  We base our following elaborations on the formulation of the reporting principles as found in the 
GRI reporting standards, as published in October 2016. Reporting principles did not change with 
transitions from previous iterations, such as G 3.1 or G4 of the GRI Reporting Guidelines, which 
were in effect during our investigated period (2014-2016). 
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3.1 Completeness and Reporting Scope 
Completeness presents a principle of reporting content and is applied when it comes to 
define what information has to be included in a company’s report about its activities, 
impacts and the expectations it faces from its stakeholders (GRI, 2018). Specifically, the 
completeness principle denotes that a CSR report should “(…) include coverage of 
material topics and their Boundaries, sufficient to reflect significant economic, 
environmental, and social impacts, and to enable stakeholders to assess the reporting 
organization’s performance (…).” (GRI, 2018). According to the GRI, completeness is 
secured in an information gathering process when data is collected for all entities in- and 
outside the firm whose activities in relation to it significantly contribute to said impacts 
(GRI, 2018). Based on this guidance, as our proxy for completeness, we employ the 
scope of reporting, which we define as the relative coverage of a company’s activities 
covered in its CSR reporting. 
Assurance providers should take the completeness of reporting into consideration 
during their assurance engagement. Consequently, they should insist on the inclusion of 
certain activities into the reporting scope when an omission would result in incomplete 
disclosure of the companies’ impacts and leave stakeholder expectations neglected. As 
a result, assured reports should display a higher relative coverage of company activities. 
This logic is similar to suggestions by Moroney et al., 2012), Braam et al., 2016) or 
Hummel & Schlick, 2016), that assurance should contribute to the extent of CSR 
reporting, that is, the amount (or ‘breadth’) of information provided therein. We 
therefore formulate our first hypothesis as follows: 
H1: External assurance is positively associated with the scope of CSR reporting. 
3.2 Clarity and Readability  
Clarity constitutes a major principle of reporting quality. These principles sketch the 
expectations raised towards information included in a CSR report, including its proper 
presentation. They also apply to and should guide the processes to gather and prepare 
information for disclosure within a given report. The clarity principle itself denotes that 
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information should be made available “in a manner that is understandable and accessible 
to stakeholders (…).” and comprehensible to those “who have a reasonable 
understanding of the organization and its activities.” (GRI, 2018). A common proxy for 
clarity in reporting is the readability of the narrative disclosure contained in it 
(Rutherford, 2003). Complex and convoluted phrasing makes it harder to read and 
understand a text, and extract given information from it. Poor readability in a text may 
therefore effectively work as a form of obfuscation (Merkl-Davies & Brennan, 2007). 
It is ambiguous how external assurance affects the readability of CSR reports. 
From a stakeholder perspective, assurance providers should consider the clarity of the 
reporting under their review and persuade preparers to draft statements that readers can 
readily access. Although he does not explicitly formulate any hypotheses on the 
relationship between assurance and readability of CSR reports, the findings of Velte 
(2018) support this notion. Alternatively, it may be that assurance providers – 
intentionally or unwittingly – contribute to making CSR reports less readable: Assurance 
is often conducted by members of the auditing profession, which itself holds an affinity 
for judicial language and technical ‘jargon’ terms. Barnett and Loeffler (1979) point out 
that auditing statements are formulated in a manner that is hard to read or understand. 
This affinity may lead assurance providers to promote a similar language within reports 
themselves and decrease their clarity towards readers. Similarly, as Smith et al. (2011) 
point out, there may also exist situations of ‘professional capture’ by assurance 
providers. As assurance providers intent to be perceived as holding special expertise to 
preserve their position within the market, they may effectively offer assurance with an 
attitude of consultancy and actively cooperate with report preparers. Since negative 
information may hold reputational or even legal consequences for companies, they may 
advise companies to obfuscate respective disclosure to mitigate such risks. Based on 
these diverging predictions, we formulate our second, undirected hypothesis as follows: 
H2: External assurance is associated with readability of CSR reporting. 
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3.3 Balance and Optimism  
As a second principle of reporting quality, we consider the balance of CSR reports. To 
the GRI, to be considered balanced, a report should “reflect positive and negative aspects 
of the reporting organization’s performance to enable a reasoned assessment of overall 
performance.” (GRI, 2018). To this end, report preparers should avoid to compile or 
formulate information for the report in a form that transports an (unduly) optimistic 
image of the company and its activities. Notably, it should abstain from any form of 
“selections, omissions, or presentation formats” that could further such a biased 
impression. One way to evaluate the balance of a report is through its verbal tone. Verbal 
tone may find its expression in a heightened use of positively connoted words and a 
decreased use of negatively connoted ones (Hildebrandt & Snyder, 1981; Merkl-Davies 
& Brennan, 2007; Cho et al., 2010), which overall can make the message of a report 
appear as more optimistic. Indeed, Cho et al. (2010) find some evidence that an overtly 
optimistic tone in disclosure indicates ‘poorer’ environmental performance and 
decreased levels of transparency. In contrast, Arena et al. (2015) find optimism to be 
indicative for future positive CSR performance. 
When assurance is effective and free from managerial capture, we assume 
assurance providers will ensure balance within CSR reports. They will try to exert a 
correcting influence on such unduly positive presentation and enforce the use of a more 
neutral, less persuasive style of language. We thus formulate our final hypothesis as 
follows: 
H3: External assurance is negatively associated with optimism in CSR reporting. 
 Data and Methodology  
4.1 Sample Selection and Sample Characteristics  
The sample selection process consists of three steps (see Table IV - 1). First, we select 
listed European firms from the S&P Euro, an index designed to be reflective of the 
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Eurozone market (S&P Indices, 2019). We base our analysis on the index constituents 
list as of June 2018 that encompasses 187 companies. Second, we perform a hand 
collection of the latter firms’ ESG reports, for the years 2014 through 2016. We exclude 
nine firms, for which no ESG report is available (or was not published), e.g. firms whose 
common stock and preferred stock/retirement savings plan/holding corporation are 
included in the S&P Euro. In these cases, we find two ISINs for one firm and exclude 
the ISIN of the non-ordinary share. Third, additional exclusions are caused by missing 
data for single firms or firm-year observations in Datastream. Therefore, the final 
sample consists of 144 firms or 380 firm-years, respectively. 
Table IV - 2 and Table IV - 3 show an overview of the sample distribution by 
country and industry. Overall, more than 50% of total companies in our sample are based 
either in Germany or in France, which appears in line with the countries’ share of the 
Eurozone’s total GDP (European Commission, 2017).  
Looking at the industry distribution (see Table IV - 3) based on the INDM2 
industry classification, the sample mostly encompasses firms classified within the 
industrial and financial sectors, respectively representing 22.11% and 18.42% of total 
firms, followed by firms active within the consumer goods and utilities sectors. The rest 
of the sample appears relatively balanced among the six remaining industries. 
 
Step Selection criteria Σ Unit 
1. 187 listed European firms encompassed within the S&P Euro 
index that feature Refinitiv ESG / ASSET4 data coverage, as 
of June 13, 2018 
187 Firms 
2. No CSR reports available, e.g., firms with two ISINs (regular 
share and preferred share or pension plans or holding 
corporation), where the latter is excluded for the absence of an 
CSR report 
9 Firms 
3. Sample after exclusion 178 Firms 
4. Datastream and Refinitiv ESG / ASSET4 observations missing 34 Firms 
5. Final sample for baseline results 144 Firms 
Table IV - 1: Sample selection and report availability 
Source: Own illustration.  
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Country Observations Percentage 
1. France 113 29.74 
2. Germany 82 21.58 
3. Spain 53 13.95 
4. Italy 40 10.53 
5. Netherlands 29 7.63 
6. Finland 27 7.11 
7. Belgium 13 3.42 
8. United Kingdom 8 2.11 
9. Austria 6 1.58 
10. Portugal 6 1.58 
11. Ireland 3 0.79 
Total  380 100.00 
Note: Country identifications of firms were made based on the Alpha-2 Code available in Datastream 
(Item: GEOGC). 
Table IV - 2: Country distribution in the sample 
Source: Own illustration. 
Industry Observations Percentage 
1. Industrials 84 22.11 
2. Financials 70 18.42 
3. Consumer Goods 53 13.95 
4. Utilities 39 10.26 
5. Basic Materials 31 8.16 
6. Consumer Services 30 7.89 
7. Oil & Gas 20 5.26 
8. Technology 20 5.26 
9. Healthcare 17 4.47 
10. Telecommunications 16 4.21 
Total  380 100.00 
Note: Industry classifications are made based INDM2 industry classification (Datastream item 
INDM2). 
Table IV - 3: Industry distribution in the sample 
Source: Own illustration. 
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4.2 Empirical Model  
In order to test our hypotheses, we utilize an OLS panel data model with a set of 
covariates and fixed effects. We construct three empirical models with reporting scope, 
readability and optimism as dependent variables. The variable of interest in each model 
is the external assurance of CSR reporting (ASSURANCE). Furthermore, we include a 
number of company specific variables and industry membership as control variables 
(Braam et al., 2016). We control for omitted time-varying variables that are constant 
between firms through year dummies. The following Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) 
regression is formulated: 
(1) 
𝑅𝐸𝑃𝑂𝑅𝑇𝐼𝑁𝐺𝑆𝐶𝑂𝑃𝐸𝑖𝑡 =  β0 + β1 ASSURANCEit + 
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where the subscript letters indicate the following: i, company; t, year; j, firm 
characteristic; k, industry membership; l, year membership; m, country membership. 
The analyzed firm characteristics consist of standalone reporting (STANDALONE), 
conformity with GRI guidelines (GRI), mandatory CSR reporting (MANDATORY), 
volume of CSR reporting (VOLUME), ESG performance (ESG), ESG controversies 
score (CONTROVERSIES), firm size (SIZE), volatility of operating cash flow (RISK), 
analyst coverage (COVERAGE), profit warnings (WARNING), and closely held shares 
(CLOSELYHELD). These covariates are further elaborated in the description of our 
independent variables in section 4.4. 
Regarding the assumptions underlying the linear regression model, all parameters 
were estimated with robust standard errors to consider the issue of heteroscedasticity 
and autocorrelation (Gerwanski et al., 2019). Multicollinearity was tested based on the 
variance inflation factor (VIF), similar to the approach by Michelon et al. (2015). The 
VIF analysis does not provide evidence of threat to our findings caused by 
multicollinearity since the mean is VIF = 4.48 (Model 1) and 4.51 (Model 2 and Model 
3). We find the largest VIF values for MANDATORY (in Model 1 to 3 between 18.87 
and 18.93), which indicates that the models may suffer from multicollinearity. 
Therefore, we respecify the three baseline models without the variable MANDATORY 
as robustness checks. These robustness checks confirm our initial results in terms of the 
coefficient signs and significance levels (not tabulated). Furthermore, as the correlation 
matrix Table IV - 8 shows, multicollinearity is not an issue in our model, since 
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correlation coefficients are far below the critical threshold of 80% (Gujarati, 2004, p. 
359). We test our model for heteroscedasticity with the Breusch-Pagan / Cook-Weisberg 
test and find the presence of heteroscedasticity for Models 1 and 3. Since we use robust 
standard errors in all baseline models, this is no threat to our results. 
4.3 Dependent Variables  
To measure the scope of reporting (REPORTINGSCOPE) as described in our hypothesis 
development, we employ the ESG Reporting Scope variable from the Refinitiv ESG 
Score database (formerly Thomson Reuters ESG / ASSET 4). According to Thomson 
Reuters (2018), the indicator presents the percentage of the firm’s activities covered in 
its environmental and social reporting (CGVSDP041). This percentage is calculated 
based on indicators such as the number of employees, group revenue or number of group 
operations covered within reporting. 
For our readability (READABILITY) and optimism (OPTIMISM) variables, similar 
to Cho et al. (2010) and Arena et al. (2015), we employ DICTION (version 7.0) to 
conduct a computer-aided analysis of the firms’ CSR reporting. DICTION is an analysis 
program developed to determine the verbal tone of any given English-language text. The 
software employs a corpus of 10,000 words grouped into 33 distinct dictionaries and 
calculated variables. These are used to calculate the five ‘master variables’ of 
‘optimism’, ‘certainty’, ‘activity’, ‘realism’ and ‘commonality’. Via lexical analysis, 
DICTION is thus able to provide a comprehensive profile of the verbal tone of any 
analyzed text. Cho et al. (2010) and Arena et al. (2015) point out a number of advantages 
of using DICTION. First, its approach provides a strong theoretical basis rooted in 
linguistic semantics and applied linguistics research (Sydserff & Weetman, 2002; Cho 
et al., 2010). Second, it is available to be used by different scholars, and creates 
‘objective, normalized scores’ (Arena et al., 2015). Its continued usage also increases 
the comparability of research results across studies. As the basis of our analysis, we 
employ companies’ CSR reporting available in the PDF-Format, both when companies 
opt for publication within a standalone CSR report or for a distinct chapter within their 
annual report. The use of computer aided text analysis regularly requires the prior 
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‘cleaning’ of the documents to be analyzed, and does so in the context of this study. As 
DICTION follows a dictionary-based approach, the software in itself is unable to 
distinguish ‘relevant’ from ‘irrelevant’ parts of a given text and simply includes all given 
information within a text file. However, CSR reports often contain substantial amounts 
of text not part of the central (narrative) disclosure, such as tables of content, page 
numbers, information on imprint and contact and the like. The inclusion of such 
information may subsequently affect the scores that DICTION calculates for a text, 
which could dilute our results. To mitigate this issue, we prepare companies’ CSR 
reports for analysis as follows: First, we categorize whether a company provides a stand-
alone CSR report or a chapter within the annual report in a given year. In cases of annual 
report chapters, we first cut out the respective pages that make up the chapter and save 
them as a separate PDF-file. Next, we clean the reporting documents of several types of 
‘noisy’ contents that we consider irrelevant to our analysis.6 After conducting this 
standardized cleaning procedure, we conduct a lexical analysis of each document with 
DICTION to receive our two dependent variables. 
As our measure for readability, we employ the reciprocal of DICTION’s 
‘complexity’ sub-variable. The variable calculates the average number of characters-
per-word of an analyzed text. As such, it follows a suggestion by Flesch (1951) in that 
 
6  We regularly clean the documents of the following reoccurring types of information: (1) tables of 
content, (2) images, tables and their respective headlines or explanatory footnotes, (3) hyperlink-
references within the document or from the document to other documents or HTML-Websites, (4) 
page numbers, headers and footers, (5) imprint and contact information, (6) assurance statements by 
external auditors, and (7) GRI content indices. In a prior testing for our analysis, we found that 
DICTION counts any numerical value within a table or an image as a separate numerical term. This, 
however, could dilute results, as in many cases individual values may only ‘function’ (that is, 
transport reasonable, interpretable information) when considered together with the rest of the values 
contained in their respective table or image. The individual counting by DICTION may therefore be 
interpreted as a ‘double counting’ and unduly increase the total number of words of a document that 
the software uses as its basis to calculate its scores. For this reason, tables and images are deleted. 
Assurance statements are deleted as they do not present a part of disclosure that is under the control 
of the reporting company, but is formulated by the assurance provider. GRI content indices are 
deleted since, in the main, they present reference documents that provide guidance to readers in 
search for specific disclosure items, but do not generally provide additional information on their own. 
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a text’s message becomes more abstract – and thus, less understandable – the more 
convoluted its phrasing is. 
To measure the optimism in CSR reports’ narrative disclosure, we follow Cho et 
al. (2010) and Arena et al. (2015) and use DICTION’s ‘optimism’ master variable. 
According to the DICTION 7.0 manual, the variable calculates a score to what degree a 
text’s language is “endorsing some person, group, concept or event or highlighting their 
positive entailments.” (Digitext Inc. 2013).7 
4.4 Independent Variables  
To test our three hypotheses, we use the variable ASSURANCE as our variable of 
interest. The latter corresponds to a dummy variable equal to one if a given firm has an 
external auditor for its sustainability report in a given year, and zero otherwise (Bollas-
Araya, Polo-Garrido, & Seguí-Mas, 2018, Moroney et al., 2012). Moreover, we include 
a set of independent variables at the firm-, industry- and country level. All variables 
except our instrumental variable and the fixed effects-covariates are defined on a firm-
year basis, in line with our panel structure. 
  
 
7  The ‘optimism’ master variable is calculated via the formula [Praise + Satisfaction + Inspiration] - 
[Blame + Hardship + Denial] Digitext Inc., 2015 2013 . Like Ober, Zhao, Davis, & Alexander 1999, 
Cho, Roberts, & Patten (2010) and Arena, Bozzolan, & Michelon (2015), we do not adjust the 
variable for our analysis. 













Dummy variable = 1 if the company i has an external 
auditor for its CSR report in year t, 0 otherwise. 
(Source: Refinitiv ESG; Code: CGVSDP041) 
2. 𝑆𝑇𝐴𝑁𝐷𝐴𝐿𝑂𝑁𝐸𝑖,𝑡 
Dummy variable = 1 if the company i publishes CSR report 
separated from its annual report in year t, 0 otherwise. 
(Source: Hand-collected) 
3. 𝐺𝑅𝐼𝑖,𝑡 
Dummy variable = 1 if the company i’s CSR report is 
published in accordance with the GRI guidelines in year t, 
0 otherwise. 
(Source: Refinitiv ESG; Code: CGVSDP028) 
4. 𝑀𝐴𝑁𝐷𝐴𝑇𝑂𝑅𝑌𝑖,𝑡 
Dummy variable = 1 for fiscal years (FYs) starting from 
the first time a CSR report had to be disclosed onwards, 0 
for FYs before. 
(Source: Hand-collected) 
5. 𝑉𝑂𝐿𝑈𝑀𝐸𝑖,𝑡 
Total number of words within the CSR report of company i 
in year t. 
(Source: DICTION) 
6. 𝐸𝑆𝐺𝑖,𝑡 
ESG Score of company i in year t. 
(Source: Refinitiv ESG; Code: TRESGS) 
7. 𝐶𝑂𝑁𝑇𝑅𝑂𝑉𝐸𝑅𝑆𝐼𝐸𝑆𝑖,𝑡 
ESG Controversies Score of company i in year t. 






Measured as the natural logarithm of company i’s net sales 
/ revenues in million US-Dollars in year t. 
(Source: Datastream; Code: WC07240) 
9. 𝑅𝐼𝑆𝐾𝑖,𝑡 
Ratio of the standard deviation of company i’s net 
operating cash flow (i.e. net OCF) over the last 3 years. 
(i.e. t-2; t-1; t) to the 3-year average value of its net OCF. 
(Source: Datastream; Code: WC04860, calculated) 
10. 𝐶𝑂𝑉𝐸𝑅𝐴𝐺𝐸𝑖,𝑡 
Total number of analyst earnings per share (i.e. EPS) 
forecasts for company i in year t. 
(Source: Datastream; Code: EPS1NET) 
11. 𝑊𝐴𝑅𝑁𝐼𝑁𝐺𝑖,𝑡 
Dummy variable = 1 if the company i issued a profit 
warning in the fiscal year t. 
(Source: Datastream; Code: ECSLDP059) 
12. 𝐶𝐿𝑂𝑆𝐸𝐿𝑌𝐻𝐸𝐿𝐷𝑖,𝑡 
Ratio of the total number of closely held shares of company 
i in year t to company i’s number of common shares 
outstanding in year t (in percent). 






The percentage of firms that receive CSR report 
ASSURANCE in country m. 
(Source: Datastream; Code: CGVSDP041, calculated) 
Table IV - 4: Overview of the independent variables used within the model 
Source: Own illustration. 
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To control for the CSR reporting practices on our dependent variables, i.e. 
REPORTINGSCOPE, READABILITY, OPTIMISM, we use a set of variables focusing 
on firms’ CSR disclosure. To that extent, we first include the variable STANDALONE, 
to distinguish firms releasing an integrated report (i.e. IR) from the ones publishing two 
separate reports (i.e. an annual report and a CSR report). We use a dummy variable set 
to one if a given company publishes its CSR report separately from its annual report and 
zero otherwise. Moreover, similar to (Michelon et al., 2015) we also distinguish whether 
firms follow the GRI standards or guidelines in their CSR reporting via the variable GRI, 
a dummy variable equal to one if a given firms releases its CSR report in accordance 
with the GRI guidelines and zero otherwise (Bollas-Araya et al., 2018; Moroney et al., 
2012). To differentiate mandatory from voluntary disclosure practices, we use the 
variable MANDATORY, a dummy variable set to one for firms reporting under 
mandatory CSR disclosure regime, and zero otherwise. Furthermore, we include the 
variable VOLUME, which corresponds to the total number of words contained within a 
firm’s CSR report in a given year to control for the quantity of CSR disclosure. To 
measure the firm’s CSR performance, we use two distinct variables provided within the 
Refinitiv ESG / ASSET4 database, namely ESG and CONTROVERSIES. This database 
(ASSET4) has become increasingly used in research on CSR reporting (Gomes & 
Marsat, 2018; Lys, Naughton, & Wang, 2015). Specifically, ESG corresponds to the 
firms’ ESG scores, which assess their CSR performance relatively to a peer group, based 
on the information they disclose within the environmental, social and governance fields. 
Complementing ESG, the variable CONTROVERSIES corresponds to a firm’s ESG 
Controversies score, which reflects the level of controversies regarding environmental, 
social or governance problematics firms face: the higher the number of controversies, 
the more the firms are penalized by the scoring model (Thomson Reuters, 2018). 
Second, we include additional firm-level variables to control for firm specificities 
and their (potential) influence on REPORTINGSCOPE, READABILITY and 
OPTIMISM. For instance, Braam et al., 2016 and Bollas-Araya et al., 2018, Guidry & 
Patten, 2012 showed that firm size influences its environmental reporting practices; thus 
we include SIZE as the natural logarithm of a firm’s total revenues. Following Wasley 
IV. EXTERNAL ASSURANCE AND TRANSPARENCY IN CSR REPORTING – EUROPEAN EVIDENCE 
 
118 
and Wu (2006), we also include a proxy for companies’ business model volatility 
through the variable RISK, as a more volatile business model may incentivize a firm to 
provide more transparent disclosure to manage stakeholders’ expectations. We 
operationalize RISK as the volatility of a firm’s three-year net operating cash flow over 
the average of its three-year net operating cash flow. To control for differences in 
information asymmetry, we use the variable COVERAGE, i.e. the number of earnings 
per share forecasts available for a given firm (Hope, 2003; Dhaliwal, Li, Tsang & Yang, 
2011). Indeed, analysts operate as information providers or information asymmetry 
reducers, through the release of recommendations and forecasts (Chang, Khanna, & 
Palepu, 2000; Healy & Palepu, 2001). To control for capital-market-induced pressure 
on results and, therefore, disclosure, we add the variable WARNING, i.e. a dummy 
variable set to one if a given firm issued a profit warning during the fiscal year and zero 
otherwise. Finally, we include the variable CLOSELYHELD, corresponding to the ratio 
of a firm’s closely held shares to the company’s total number of common shares 
outstanding; we use the latter variable to control for differences in firms’ corporate 
governance practices (Nagar, Petroni, & Wolfenzon, 2011). Descriptive statistics for 
dependent and independent variables are summarized in Table IV - 5. 
  




Variable N M SD Min P25 P75 Max 
1. REPORTINGSCOPE 375 88.11 22.40 0.00 86.00 100.00 100.00 
2. READABILITY 380 0.182 0.014 0.134 0.174 0.189 0.227 
3. OPTIMISM 380 51.37 2.73 44.47 49.66 52.83 61.70 
4. ASSURANCE 380 0.950 0.218 0.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 
5. STANDALONE 380 0.537 0.499 0.000 0.000 1.000 1.000 
6. GRI 380 0.968 0.175 0.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 
7. MANDARTORY 380 0.297 0.458 0.000 0.000 1.000 1.000 
8. VOLUME 380 28,809 19,300 1,377 15,621 38,869 100,623 
9. ESG 380 73.20 10.84 39.15 66.62 80.95 93.1 
10. CONTROVERSIES 380 39.16 24.41 0.37 10.45 58.45 67.24 
11. SIZE 380 9.70 1.23 6.59 8.89 10.67 12.18 
12. RISK 380 0.344 1.043 -2.814 0.086 0.286 6.946 
13. COVERAGE 380 25.03 6.58 0.00 21.00 30.00 37.00 
14. WARNING 380 0.134 0.341 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 
15. CLOSELYHELD 380 22.44 20.53 0.00 3.10 36.86 72.58 
16. PERCASSUREDa) 380 86.15 25.70 0.00 81.65 100.00 100.00 
Note: This table summarizes all variables for firms in the sample. The analyzed sample is a panel 
covering 380 firm-year observations in 11 countries during the period from 2014 to 2016. The number 
of observations, mean, standard deviation, minimum, values at the 25th percentile, and values at 75th 
percentile, and maximum are shown for each variable. Firm-level data are obtained from Thomson 
Reuters Datastream, I/B/E/S, and Refinitiv ESG / ASSET4 databases. All metric variables are 
winsorized at their 1st and 99th percentiles. 
a) PERCASSURED is our instrumental variable, explained in detail in section 4.4. 
Table IV - 5: Descriptive statistics 
Source: Own illustration. 
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To control for unobserved differences across industries and countries, we add a set of 
dummy variables. In fact, Simnett, Vanstraelen, Chua (2009), and Kolk and Perego 
(2010), show that reporting practices are influenced at country-level by the stakeholder-
orientation level as well as at the industry-level, since industries such as mining or 
finance are more highly exposed to CSR issues than other sectors. We therefore use 
industry fixed effects, following the Thomson Reuters Datastream classification based 
on the Industry Classification Benchmark (ICB). We assign a one if a firm belongs to a 
particular industry and a zero otherwise. Similarly, we use country fixed effects, 
assigning the value one for firms belonging to a given country, and zero otherwise. To 
avoid perfect multicollinearity in the model, we omit one industry membership dummy, 
respectively one country belonging dummy. For further details on independent 
variables, refer to section 4.4, Table IV - 4. 
 Empirical Results  
5.1 Univariate and Correlation Analyses   
We conduct univariate tests of differences to understand how firms set their CSR 
reporting strategies along with REPORTINGSCOPE, READABILITY, and the 
OPTIMISM of their CSR reports. Given the nonparametric nature of panel data, we use 
Wilcoxon rank-sum tests. The test results show that firms that issue a standalone CSR 
report are likely to have lower READABILITY (p = .042) and OPTIMISM (p = .013). 
The univariate test indicates that firms in a mandatory CSR reporting regime are likely 
to exhibit higher REPORTINGSCOPE (p = .009). 
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Note: This table summarizes mean differences and univariate test results for dependent variables for firms in 
the sample. The analyzed sample is a panel covering 380 firm-year observations in 11 countries during the 
period from 2014 to 2016. All metric variables are winsorized at their 1st and 99th percentiles. 
a) Reported variation (total, between, and within) is the respective standard deviation statistic. 
b) Values reported under (1), (2), (3) and (4) are mean statistics. 
c) Differences reported are mean differences. The tests for differences are two-sample Wilcoxon rank-sum tests. 
*, **, and *** indicates significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. 
Table IV - 6: Univariate tests by reporting format and mandatory sustainability reporting 
Source: Own illustration. 
Variable  
GRIa)      = 
1 
(1) 
GRI     = 
0 
(2) 
Diff.b)    
(1)-(2) 
ASSU-
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 89.569 43.917 
45.652*** 
(.000) 90.367 45.367 
44.896*** 
(.000) 
2. READABILITY  0.1817 0.1792 
0.0025 
(.594) 0.1814 0.1865 
-.0052 
(.190) 
3. OPTIMISM  51.382 51.133 
0.248 
(.634) 51.283 53.097 
-1.814*** 
(.001) 
Note: This table summarizes mean differences and univariate test results for dependent variables for firms in the 
sample. The analyzed sample is a panel covering 380 firm-year observations in 11 countries during the period 
from 2014 to 2016. All metric variables are winsorized at their 1st and 99th percentiles. 
a) Values reported under (1), (2), (3) and (4) are mean statistics. 
b) Differences reported are mean differences. The tests for differences are two-sample Wilcoxon rank-sum tests. 
*, **, and *** indicates significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. 
Table IV - 7: Univariate tests by GRI reporting compliance and external assurance of CSR 
report 
Source: Own illustration. 
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Firms that receive CSR assurance are likely to exhibit higher REPORTINGSCOPE 
(p < .000); with approximately double the REPORTINGSCOPE of firms without 
assurance. Similarly, firms with assurance are likely to issue less optimistic CSR reports 
(p = .001). 
Non-parametric Spearman (1904) correlations indicate a positive and significant 
correlation of our variable of interest ASSURANCE with REPORTINGSCOPE 
(rs = .252, p < .000), and a negative and significant correlation with OPTIMISM (rs = -
.157, p = .0047). In the correlation analysis, the empirical association of ASSURANCE 
and READABILITY is negative but statistically insignificant (rs = -.076, p = .1137). 
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Table IV - 8: Pearson and Spearman correlations  
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5.2 Regression Analysis  
To test our hypotheses H1 to H3, we conduct a multiple regression analysis. Table IV 
- 9 shows the results from the baseline multiple regression models (Models 1 to 3) 
with fixed effects, with REPORTINGSCOPE, READABILITY and OPTIMISM as the 
dependent variable, respectively. There is a strong relation between reporting scope 
of ESG related topics (REPORTINGSCOPE) and external assurance (ASSURANCE), 
GRI conformity (GRI), volume (VOLUME) as well as size (SIZE). Since reporting 
scope is significantly positively associated with external assurance of CSR reporting 
(ASSURANCE; β1 = 33.92, p < .01), GRI conformity (GRI; β3 = 29.04, p < .01) is 
significantly negatively associated with volume of CSR reporting (VOLUME; 
β5 = - 0.000, p < .05) as well as with size of the company (SIZE; β8 = -  2.847, 
p < .05). Furthermore, there is a weak relation between reporting scope and the 
variable closely held share (CLOSELYHELD; β12 = 0.1033, p < .1). The readability 
(READABILITY) is significantly negatively associated with external assurance of 
CSR reports (ASSURANCE; β1 = -0.009, p < .05). A negative relation between the 
verbal tone optimism (OPTIMISM) in CSR reporting and external assurance 
(ASSURANCE) can be found (ASSURANCE; β1 = -1.667, p < .05). There is a strong 
positive significant relation between the variable of mandatory sustainability 
reporting (MANDATORY; β4 = 4.310, p < .05) and the optimistic tone on CSR 
reporting. Thus, Hypotheses 1, 2 and 3 are strongly supported. The results contribute 
to the current discussion about external assurance in CSR reporting and show another 
perspective compared to the results from Velte (2018).  
To assess the possibility of an omitted variable bias to the validity of our baseline 
findings, we conduct a variety of specification tests and find no violation. 
5.3 Consideration of Potential Selection Bias  
The used sample is non-randomly selected which might raise concerns about the validity 
of the empirical findings of our study. Our sample considers the 187 largest firms (by 
market capitalization) in the EURO STOXX 300. This could lead to a sample bias in the 
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selection procedure. To address this potential sample selection bias, we employ a 
Heckman two-step selection model (Heckman, 1979; Michelon et al., 2015; Steinmeier 
& Stich, 2019). First, the following probit regression model was estimated for all firms 
included in the EURO STOXX 600 from 2014-2016. The model is: 
(4) 
𝑃(𝐼𝑛𝑐𝑙𝑖𝑡 = 1) =  (𝛽0+ 𝛽1 𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡  +  𝑢𝑖𝑡)                                                         
where the subscript letters indicate the following: i, firm; t, year. 𝐼𝑛𝑐𝑙𝑖𝑡 is a 
dichotomous variable that indicates whether an observation is included in the major 
analysis. The criterion for an inclusion in our sample is whether a firm belongs to the 
185 largest public firms in the EURO STOXX 300. Further, market capitalization 
(𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡) in USD is included in the model. Based on equation (4), we obtain 
the inverse Mills ratio (𝐼𝑀𝑅𝑖𝑡). The inverse Mills ratio (IMR) is used to construct a 
selection bias control factor. In a second step we include the inverse Mills ratio as an 
additional control variable for each baseline regression model (see Table IV - 10 for 
Models 4 to 6) to account for the impact of potential sample selection bias. The results 
from these Heckman selection models support our baseline results. Therefore, it is 
unlikely that our baseline models suffer from a sample selection bias. 
  

















with robust st. errors 
Coefficients Sig. Coefficients Sig. Coefficients Sig. 
ASSURANCE 33.92*** 0.001 - 0.009** 0.014 - 1.667** 0.028 
STANDALONE -1.114 0.636 -0.001 0.635 0.252 0.433 
GRI 29.04*** 0.002 0.007 0.230 0.279 0.795 
MANDATORY 3.720 0.156 0.009 0.115 4.310** 0.012 
VOLUME -0.000** 0.019 -0.000 0.529 -0.000 0.989 
ESG 0.138 0.242 0.000 0.965 -0.003 0.860 
CONTROVERSIES -0.056 0.257 -0.000 0.708 0.011 0.130 
SIZE -2.847** 0.012 0.001 0.139 0.181 0.249 
RISK -0.130 0.888 -0.000 0.691 -0.159* 0.089 
COVERAGE 0.123 0.533 -0.000 0.107 -0.007 0.771 
WARNING 3.629 0.193 -0.002 0.298 0.057 0.888 
CLOSELYHELD 0.100* 0.052 -0.000 0.141 0.006 0.455 
Industry Effects Yes  Yes  Yes  
Year Effects Yes  Yes  Yes  
Country Effects Yes  Yes  Yes  
Constant 55.971*** 0.000 0.175*** 0.000 50.588*** 0.000 
        
R-squared  0.328  0.128  0.193  
Adjusted R-squared 0.263  0.044  0.117  
F 7.941*** 0.000 2.248*** 0.000 3.170*** 0.000 
Degrees of freedom 
of the residuals 341  346  346  
Observations 375  380  380  
Note: * p≤0.10; ** p≤0.05; *** p≤0.01. 
Table IV - 9: Results of multiple regression models 
Source: Own illustration. 
 
  

















with robust st. errors 
Coefficients Sig. Coefficients Sig. Coefficients Sig. 
ASSURANCE 32.361*** 0.001 -0.010** 0.012 -1.554** 0.043 
STANDALONE -0.834 0.736 -0.001 0.566 0.165 0.621 
GRI 29.963*** 0.002 0.007 0.238 0.212 0.846 
MANDATORY 1.586 0.608 0.009 0.121 4.571*** 0.006 
VOLUME -0.000** 0.033 -0.000 0.579 0.000 0.829 
ESG 0.113 0.366 0.000 0.968 -0.006 0.715 
CONTROVERSIES -0.039 0.449 -0.000 0.750 0.011 0.141 
SIZE -3.846*** 0.001 0.001 0.195 0.245 0.175 
RISK -0.219 0.820 -0.000 0.660 -0.194** 0.046 
COVERAGE 0.058 0.793 -0.000 0.141 0.013 0.619 
WARNING 3.766 0.182 -0.002 0.331 0.109 0.788 
CLOSELYHELD 0.076 0.152 -0.000 0.115 0.007 0.431 
IMR -18.690** 0.025 -0.001 0.819 1.554 0.159 
Industry Effects Yes  Yes  Yes  
Year Effects Yes  Yes  Yes  
Country Effects Yes  Yes  Yes  
Constant 92.801*** 0.000 0.178*** 0.000 47.693*** 0.000 
        
R-squared  0.336  0.129  0.201  
Adjusted R-squared 0.269  0.042  0.121  
F 7.794*** 0.000 2.186*** 0.000 5.181*** 0.000 
Degrees of freedom 
of the residuals 333  338  338  
Observations 368  373  373  
Note: * p≤0.10; ** p≤0.05; *** p≤0.01. 
Table IV - 10: Results of multiple regression models with Heckman correction 
Source: Own illustration. 
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5.4 Addressing Endogeneity Concerns  
Since firms have considerable discretion, whether to receive ASSURANCE of their CSR 
report or not, ASSURANCE is regarded to be an endogenous regressor. This is especially 
prevalent in a voluntary setting of CSR report assurance (Simnett et al., 2009; Steinmeier 
& Stich, 2019). This self-selection stems from the fact that firms seek CSR report 
assurance on a voluntary basis in Europe throughout our sample period from 2014 to 
2016—except for French firms, that have been reporting under a mandatory CSR 
reporting regime since 31st December 2013 (Kaya, 2016; Sethi, Martell, & Demir, 
2017). Therefore, our baseline results may be prone to firms’ self-selection mechanism 
and resulting bias because of management’s decision to receive CSR report assurance 
(Ruhnke & Gabriel, 2013; Sethi et al., 2017). Consequently, a classical assumption of 
our OLS estimator, i.e. no endogeneity (Studenmund & Johnson, 2017) would be 
violated. Therefore, our estimates of the true regression coefficients would be biased 
and inconsistent (Greene, 2008; Backhaus, Erichson, Plinke, & Weiber, 2016). 
We follow Sethi et al. (2017) and make use of the Heckman two-step approach to 
consider this endogeneity concern (Heckman, 1979). Specifically, we use a two-stage 
regression with ASSURANCE as dependent variable in the first-stage equation, and each 
dependent variable REPORTINGSCOPE, READABILITY, and OPTIMISM in the 
second-stage equations (excluding ASSURANCE in the second-stage equation). 
Our instrumental variable (IV) for the first-stage regression is PERCASSURED, 
defined as the percentage of firms that receive CSR report ASSURANCE in a particular 
country, as an exogenous regressor for the first-stage equation, which is a regression of 
ASSURANCE on PERCASSURED and the exogenous covariates used in our baseline 
models. Country- or industry-means like our IV have frequently been used as 
instruments by prior empirical studies (Lev & Sougiannis, 1996; Nevo, 2000; Hanlon, 
Rajgopal, & Shevlin, 2003; Cheng, Ioannou, & Serafeim, 2014; Sethi et al., 2017). For 
the second-stage equations, the predicted values of ASSURANCE (obtained from the 
first-stage regression), are used as an independent variable instead of the observed 
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values of ASSURANCE. The results of our two-step models (Models 7 to 9) are tabulated 
in Table IV - 11. 
These Heckman (1979) two-step models allow us to analyze the potential impact 
of firms’ self-selection bias. The results of the respective second-stage regressions 
feature coefficients for ASSURANCE with the same sign directions as our baseline 
models and the same – or even higher – significance levels (p-values less than 10%, 5%, 
or 1% respectively). We conclude that our baseline results are not subject to a potential 
self-selection bias concerning our variable of interest, ASSURANCE. However, like 
Michelon et al. (2015), we acknowledge a potential cause of endogeneity due to reverse 
causality: given the present data granularity of firm-year observations, we presume that 
firms simultaneously decide on whether to receive external CSR report assurance, the 
verbal tone, and the incremental information of their CSR report. Therefore, we cannot 
infer from our findings that an adoption of ASSURANCE will inevitably lead to shifts a 
firm’s REPORTINGSCOPE, READABILITY, and/or OPTIMISM. Likewise, our 
empirical research design could not identify such causal effects. 
 
  

















with robust st. errors 
1st stage 2nd stage 1st stage 2nd stage 1st stage 2nd stage 
ASSURANCE  56.016***  -0.024***  -3.013*** 
PERCASSURED 0.101**  0.098**  0.098**  
STANDALONE -0.778 -0.911 -0.837* -0.002 -0.837* 0.257 
GRI 6.122 25.960*** 5.800 0.011** 5.800 1.275 
MANDATORY 9.033 0.768 8.727 0.006*** 8.727 -0.621* 
VOLUME 0.000 -0.000*** 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
ESG 0.031 0.104 0.038* 0.000 0.038* 0.002 
CONTROVERSIES -0.001 -0.045 -0.001 0.000 -0.001 0.006 
SIZE 0.768** -3.537*** 0.776*** 0.002*** 0.776*** 0.059 
RISK 0.093 -0.644 0.084 -0.000 0.084 -0.154 
COVERAGE -0.076 0.124 -0.075* -0.000 -0.075* 0.002 
WARNING -0.503 5.284* -0.518 -0.002 -0.518 -0.144 
CLOSELYHELD -0.007 0.080 -0.006 -0.000 -0.006 0.006 
Constant -20.109 38.285*** -20.132 0.175*** -20.132 51.786*** 









Observations 375 380 380 
Note: * p≤0.10; ** p≤0.05; *** p≤0.01. 
Table IV - 11: Results of instrumental variable regression models 
Source: Own illustration. 
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 Conclusion  
Our study addresses the question whether external assurance is associated with increased 
transparency in CSR reporting. To this end, we investigate the empirical relation of 
assurance with three dimensions of reporting content and quality: completeness, clarity, 
and balance. 
This study contributes to the literature on the external assurance of CSR reporting 
in several ways. First, complementing the pioneering work by Velte (2018), we add to 
the stream of research investigating the relation of assurance with linguistic aspects of 
reporting. To the best of our knowledge, we are also the first to consider the potential 
association of assurance with reporting optimism. Our results add to the understanding 
of how assurance is associated with transparency across several dimensions of reporting 
quality. On the one hand, our results show that assurance is, at statistically significant 
levels, positively associated with reporting scope and negatively with reporting 
optimism. In this, they support other studies which suggest that assurance is positively 
related with alternative indicators for report transparency, such as reporting content 
(Moroney et al., 2012; Braam et al., 2016; Hummel & Schlick, 2016) or materiality 
disclosure (Gerwanski et al., 2019). On the other hand, we find that external assurance 
is also associated with decreased readability of CSR reports. Questions of comparability 
notwithstanding, our results challenge those of Velte (2018), who finds assurance to be 
associated with increased readability in integrated reports. Our findings remain 
significant across several robustness checks. Taken together, they suggest that, while 
assurance may contribute to make CSR reporting more comprehensive in its coverage 
of corporate activities and balanced in its verbal tone, it does not necessarily make 
reporting clearer and more accessible. In fact, it may even run counter to these 
aspirations. 
Our study comes with certain limitations. First, our sample comprises the largest 
blue-chip European firms. This implies that our findings have limited generalizability 
but are mostly valid in the realm of large listed firms. Second, as already stated in the 
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assessment of potential endogeneity, we cannot infer from our findings that the adoption 
of CSR report assurance leads to shifts in completeness, clarity, and balance. 
In this, our study provides a clear starting point for future research. We have 
already formulated some suggestions for further investigation: For one, it may be that 
assurance providers from the financial auditor profession are introducing a more 
technical and ‘jargon’-heavy language to reporting (Barnett & Loeffler, 1979) that, as a 
side effect, also turns out to be less readable. Future studies on the relation of assurance 
and report readability could thus investigate differences between assurance from 
auditing and non-auditing firms. Complementary, it may also be that assurance 
providers ‘consult’ firms on the report under their review (Smith et al., 2011) and 
actively suggest more hedged, complex statements in regard to negative information, to 
avoid reputational or compliance issues. In line with Cohen and Simnett (2015), insights 
on this suggestion, which concern behavior at the individual or group decision-making 
level, may be won through the use of experimental or survey designs. Additionally, 
further research may also consider the influence of assurance on reporting principles 
associated with transparency in CSR reporting that are not covered in our study or in 
other studies (such as Gerwanski et al. (2019) who consider materiality). For example, 
they may consider principles of reporting content, such as stakeholder inclusiveness and 
sustainability context, or of reporting quality, such as accuracy, comparability, 
reliability and timeliness. Differences in association between distinct levels of assurance 
scope and security may also provide a point for further inquiry. 
We conduct our study for a European sample from the period 2014-2016, shortly 
before non-financial reporting became mandatory for many firms from the European 
Union in 2017. Nevertheless, our findings have implications for CSR reporting in the 
EU under the current system. The respective Directive 2014/95/EU only demands a 
‘formal’ check of assistance of CSR disclosure by the financial statement’s auditor. 
Most countries have so far opted to content with this minimum requirement. 
Consequently, substantial assurance remains a mostly voluntary exercise to many 
companies in the EU. Our findings, as far as they concern reporting completeness and 
balance, may thus promote external assurance in two ways: For companies it may indeed 
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present a valuable option to increase the credibility of their CSR reports and set 
themselves apart from their competitors. For EU regulators, our findings provide 
encouragement that the enforcement of substantial assurance may increase the overall 
credibility of CSR reports in their sphere of influence, and thus present a valuable 
contribution to the socio-economic system. 
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Abstract 
WildCat Inc. is a Toronto-based producer of sports apparel, comparable in size to 
leading multinationals in the industry, such as Nike or Adidas. Challenged by several 
external stakeholders, WildCat Inc. has to reconsider the materiality of information for 
several aspects of its financial and non-financial performance and align its disclosure 
strategy accordingly. The case is modular in structure and designed for use by 
accounting faculties. Part I requires to evaluate the materiality of several notes to the 
financial statements according to IFRS. In Part II, the company faces external pressure 
to introduce sustainability reporting, leading it to conduct a materiality analysis 
according to GRI. Part III sees the management considering the future reporting strategy 
of WildCat Inc., with integrated reporting in line with the IIRC being one possible 
option. Thus, throughout the case, students are confronted with materiality definitions 
from different reporting practices and the opportunity to practice their application. 
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A Warning Shot for the Wild Cat 
Activist Investor Alan Morrisson voices concerns about transparency at sports 
apparel manufacturer WildCat Inc. – Gordon McKellar for the Toronto Business 
Observer8 
Toronto. Alan Morrisson has made a name for himself to take no prisoners when it 
comes to judging the companies in his portfolio. Over the years, the enfant terrible 
of the activist investor scene and CEO of the investment firm Cassiopeia Inc. has 
been a reliable source of controversy as well as strikingly unprejudiced reflections 
on the doings of some of Canada’s largest Blue Chips. As such, observers have not 
been wondering if but only when he would decide to speak his mind on one of his 
latest investments: Sports apparel manufacturer WildCat Inc. However, no one could 
have foreseen his latest scoop: On January 5th, roughly two months before WildCat’s 
Annual General Meeting, he uploaded a video via his twitter account containing an 
interview with himself, moderated by business journalist Michael Huntington. In the 
interview, after a short back and forth of friendly small talk, Huntington asks 
Morrisson to share his perspective on WildCat’s current operating performance and 
success at the capital market. His Answer: “my current working hypothesis is that 
it’s basically a big bubble!” – dramatic pause – “I’m sure it will burst.” Morrisson 
goes on to explain his prediction, stating: “The problem with WildCat is that it is a 
black box. It’s hard to get a realistic impression of what and how they’re doing. They 
are not transparent and that makes me suspicious.” After some questioning by 
Huntington, he goes into further detail: “I pride myself to be one of the few to 
actually read companies’ annual reports. And that’s where I have a problem with 
 
8  All names, dates and locations are fictitious, as are the characters involved in the case.  
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WildCat.” Among other things, he says: “Their report is this huge 250 plus pages 
document. But it tells no story. I sometimes wonder if they have ever heard that term 
‘material information’. The notes to the financial statements are especially messy. 
Also, sustainability issues are almost non-existent in their whole communication.” 
Morrisson keeps quiet on the future of his investment in WildCat Inc., but states he 
would consider the necessary steps, should the company not change its […] 
(continued on page 10) 
Toronto Business Observer, January 6, 2018, p. 9 
Christina Chen, CEO of WildCat Inc., angrily folded the pages of the newspaper and put 
it away on her desk. This was, indeed, bad news for the company. She had already seen 
Morrisson’s infamous interview and, as such, had heard all his criticism first hand. Of 
course, she took it seriously. Most of the issues he raised actually had a point to them. 
WildCat’s reporting strategy had to change; she was the first to admit that. But she had 
hoped the company would have gotten a bit more time. In a sense, it way ironic: Over 
the last few years, the only direction WildCat had known had been upwards. The 
company had grown so quickly, their performance had been so astonishing, that most 
investors and analysts could not have cared less about the quality of their reporting, as 
long as their earnings’ guidance had sent the right signal. And all of a sudden, they had 
reached a whole new level and were being mentioned within the same breath as giants 
like Nike, Puma or Adidas. So, people were holding the company at the same standards 
of accountability as these peers, and reporting, which had been a second-order problem 
to many, was becoming a major issue. Morrisson’s interview had not created this 
situation, only escalated it to a more public sphere. Now, again, the company appeared 
to be in a hurry. Only this time, it was involuntary. They had to close the gap to their 
competitors quickly and provide a reporting that fit the expectations the public was 
holding towards the company. 
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Christina leaned back in her chair and called for her assistant, the only person she knew 
to, like her, willingly spend a Saturday at the office. Quickly and quietly, the assistant 
entered through the office’s front door. “Yes, Mrs. Chen? What is it?” – “Thank you. 
Could you get me my CFO and my CCO on the phone, please?” she answered: “I need 
to talk to them. Immediately.” 
1.2 Background to the Case 
WildCat Inc. is a Canadian company specialized in the manufacture of footwear, sports 
and casual apparel. The company was founded in 1999 by its current CEO Christina 
Chen. It is the company’s self-proclaimed aspiration to revolutionize the sports apparel 
business with modern ideas. The company has had a strong growth from the beginning 
and in recent years recorded tremendous sales. Still headquartered in the city of Toronto, 
Canada, where the company was founded, WildCat Inc. gained a lead position in the 
market with the development of body-contiguous and temperature-regulating clothing. 
In 2006, it broadcasted its first ‘Memorial Cup’ commercial featuring the company’s 
newest sports shoe with ultra-light material. As this sport event is one of the most 
popular Ice Hockey championships in Canada, WildCat Inc. received a strong public 
perception. In the same year, the company went public at the Toronto Stock Exchange.  
WildCat Inc.’s mission (and slogan) is to make the customer ‘always better’. The 
company intends to do everything possible to expand human potential through its 
products. Based on innovative ideas, it contributed to a re-shaping of the industry and 
changed the way athletes dress today. By building an innovative and diverse global team 
and by making a positive impact for the company’s environment, WildCat Inc. wants to 
be a market leader and strive for constant and sustainable growth. Recently, the company 
has reached a market capitalization, outreach and public recognition similar to other 
major sports apparel producers such as Nike, Puma and Adidas, which it also considers 
as its main competitors. 
Besides its economic success, WildCat Inc. also proudly declares its commitment 
to sustainability. On its website, WildCat states that sustainability is woven into the 
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company's DNA and affirms that it is integrated into its operations and strategy as well 
as directly related to the company's core values. Furthermore, the athletic apparel giant 
claims its sustainability practice to be the result of a continuous improvement process 
with the objective to actively seek ways of adding value to the communities it serves. 
Thus, WildCat Inc. constantly improves its sustainable practices in its corporate, retail, 
logistics, and manufacturing operations. Thereby, it states to focus on materials usage 
and its design process. 
However, as the sports industry in which the company operates relies heavily on 
the supply chain with vendors and manufactures located worldwide the greatest impacts 
are associated with the manufacturing phase. Therefore, WildCat Inc. joined the 
Sustainable Apparel Coalition (SAC) as part of its efforts to minimize its environmental 
impacts throughout its supply chain. Furthermore, the company has partnered with the 
Fair Labor Association (FLA) to support the efforts of third-party manufacturers to 
improve working conditions. The company claims to work closely with its suppliers and 
has implemented a Supplier Code of Conduct, which is a set of environmental and social 
standards that the company and its suppliers agree to respect. 
1.3 Part I: Materiality in Financial Reporting according to IFRS 
Under a cold, yet unexpectedly cloudless Monday morning sky on January 8th, Emma 
Jones, Head of Accounting and Reporting at WildCat Inc., entered the company’s 
headquarters in Downtown Toronto. She greeted the man at the reception desk with a 
short wink of her hand, got into the elevator and travelled upwards to the 35th floor, 
where the accounting department was located. As usual, she was the first to arrive in the 
morning and thus, she planned to do what she always did and enjoy this hour of solitude, 
with a steaming cup of black tea in front of her computer, flipping through her E-Mail. 
Usually, this procedure proved to present the start to a successful day with little to no 
negative surprises. Not so today. The first mail to grab her attention today came from 
her superior, WildCat’s CFO Thomas Butler, and the fact that he had marked it as 
‘highly important’ promised that it would contain some form of challenge. And it did: 
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From: Thomas Butler <thomas.butler@wildcat.com> 
To: Emma Jones <emma.jones@wildcat.com> 
Cc: Edward Milton <edward.milton@wildcat.com>; 
Christina Chen <christina.chen@wildcat.com>  
Sent: Saturday, January 6, 2018 07:30 PM 
Subject: Materiality? A topic we need to discuss! 
Dear Emma, 
I had a very serious conference call today with Christina Chen and our Chief 
Communication Officer, Edward Milton. Maybe you heard the news: a very 
unfavorable interview with Alan Morrisson popped up on Friday afternoon and has 
gone viral all weekend. All in all, he criticizes our current reporting and is not 
satisfied with the disclosed information. Amongst other things, he said: “There is so 
much immaterial information, I cannot find what I am looking for!” He also spoke 
very negatively of the quality of our notes to the financial statement. Christina is, 
understandably, very upset with this situation and so am I. Furthermore, when I met 
other investors of ours last week, I heard similar opinions. Some criticized our last 
financial report a lot and suggested we put more effort in improving it this year. They 
said there is a lot of useless information in the notes and they are missing ‘the story’ 
in our financial report. In hindsight, it is astonishing how much in line they were with 
many of the suggestions from the Morrisson interview. 
I am unsure what we can do to report more material information and to help our 
investors find what they need to know to make their decisions. We already discussed 
the immense volume of the financial report for this year and I am afraid that we won’t 
meet the expectations of our investors with the report in the current version. So, my 
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questions are: What do we need to consider when we talk about a more material 
reporting and how can we implement this? 
In two weeks, we will have our next board meeting. Christina has made it very clear 
that this topic will be one of our main topics to be discussed. So please prepare a 
presentation to give me an update so we may have a decision template for how to 





Emma nodded in silent approval. So finally, one of their investors had stood up and said 
it. She remembered all her intensive discussions with Thomas in which she had told him 
that, compared to last year, the upcoming annual report would have an additional 10 
pages and that she was concerned about the fact that readers could be overwhelmed by 
sheer information overload. She had also highlighted that she heard from several 
competitors that they started to “cut the clutter” and improved their financial reporting 
by focusing on the needs of the investors. After all, that been a debate at the international 
level for years now. The International Accounting Standards Board (IASB) had sought 
to improve the situation by giving companies more guidance on helping their addressees 
in making their economic decisions. So, now, in the end, this growing pressure had also 
reached WildCat Inc. After pondering over Thomas’ mail for a few more minutes, she 
reached out to her left, where she knew a printed version of WildCat Inc.’s 2017 annual 
report was lying. She pulled the book towards her and flipped forward through the pages, 
where the notes to the financial statements began. 
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1.4 Part II: Materiality in Sustainability Reporting according to GRI 
Thursday morning, Edward Milton, Chief Communication Officer of WildCat Inc. was 
sitting in the back of a cab on his way to the office. Part of his morning routine was 
reading the latest newspaper articles, followed by a quick check of his e-mail inbox. 
Normally, his days started very hectic and with a lot of open topics. This last week had 
been no exception. There had been an issue with a very erratic video one of investors 
had uploaded on twitter concerning the company’s reporting, and it had needed a 
Saturday-afternoon conference call with the CEO and CFO to get the right reaction from 
the company on track. Now, they were re-evaluating their financial reporting and, it 
appeared, the dust was finally settling. Or so he thought. 
When he opened his inbox and scanned through the latest e-mails, one particularly 
caught his attention. It was from a journalist of one of the major mainstream newspapers 
in Canada and came with the telling subject ‘Human Rights Violations in Sumatra – 
Statement requested’. His heart skipped a beat. Quickly, he read through the e-mail. The 
newspaper was quoting a campaign from the Rainforest Rescue Alliance (RRA). He had 
heard about the campaign and its attacks on major apparel brands. However, this was 
months ago. He and his team had considered the accusations a storm in a teacup. This 
was the first time mainstream media picked up the topic and connected the campaign 
with WildCat Inc. The allegations were more than bold. It was suggested that the 
company had direct impact on land-grabbing and human rights abuses caused by the 
production of fabrics in Sumatra. The e-mail stated that the newspaper planned to report 
in a two-page article about the campaign and the involvement of WildCat Inc. as a 
Canadian company. They offered Edward to react with an official statement until 12 am 
the following day, otherwise the article would be printed uncommented in the upcoming 
Saturday issue. After reading the e-mail, he realized that there was a second one with a 
similar request coming from another major news outlet. Beads of sweat occurred on his 
forehead.  
While arriving at the office, he forwarded the e-mails to his boss, Christina Chen 
and dialed her number. “Good Morning Ed, this is an unexpectedly early call. How are 
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you?” Christina answered the phone. Edward got straight to the point: “Hi Christina, 
sorry to call this early, but we have a situation with an environmental campaign against 
our company. Mainstream media just got wind of it and two papers are demanding a 
public statement until 12 am tomorrow. We have to react quickly, otherwise we lose 
control over this situation.” After a moment of silence, Christina answered: “Thank you 
for directly calling me with this matter, Ed. So, this is a serious topic? Are the 
accusations correct?” – “The whole thing seems serious enough, since they want to 
address the topic in a larger article. In any case, we should not take it lightly. We cannot 
afford another blow of this caliber so shortly after the Morrisson interview. I recommend 
we respond and emphasize our already existing CSR measures. Furthermore, I would 
state that we plan to investigate the incidents and will coordinate follow-up measures 
accordingly.” – “Sounds right. Could you please send me a draft of the statement before 
we go public? I would like to stay updated on this matter.” – “Sure. However, I think 
these allegations will be forgotten over the weekend. This is just a flue that passes by.” 
Edward assured. They finished their phone call and he got to work. In the evening, he 
and his press team had a solid statement finished. Christina was very pleased, and the 
article turned out less judgmental and negative due to the company’s response. The 
weekend passed by and Edward enjoyed some time with his family.  
On the following Monday, it was Christina to call him out of the blue. “Christina, 
good to hear you. What is it?” he cheerily answered her call. However, his good mood 
soon crumbled when the CEO told him the latest news: “Good morning, Ed. I really 
wish I could have a relaxing weekend again just once. But there’s another issue. I got a 
very agitated call yesterday from Mr. Markson – the representative of Fergusson Inc., 
that Hedge Fund that acquired a five Percent stake in our company last year. You 
remember him?” – “Of course.” Edward replied: “What was bothering him?” – 
“Apparently, he read about the RRA allegations as well as the press statement. He also 
brought up again what Mr. Morrisson dropped about our lack of communication on 
sustainability. So naturally, he was concerned about further market reactions since CSR 
has become a trending topic recently. He demands more information about the 
company’s risk management regarding CSR issues within two weeks. He also pointed 
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out that the media highlighted the fact that many of our competitors provide a 
comprehensive reporting about their CSR activities. He recommends we align our 
reporting strategy accordingly.” Edward paused, irritated: “When has anyone compared 
our CSR reporting to that of our competitors? I never heard of any such an article.” – 
“But there is one.” Christina answered: “Mr. Markson was so kind to send it to me. I 
forwarded it to you five minutes ago. Have a look at it, please.” – “I will.” Edward said, 
embarrassed. It bothered him that something like this could have been published right 
under his nose without him noticing. After a moment, he heard Christina sigh at the 
other end, before she began anew: “Ed, this is annoying. We are just reacting. I want to 
get ahead of these things.” So far, there was no specific position for CSR or 
sustainability. Edward and his team were in charge for all incoming media inquiries and 
CSR publication on the website. “I want to make this CSR topic a priority.” the CEO 
continued: “Let us put it on the agenda of the next board meeting. Could you please 
prepare something? We need a systematic approach for these matters.” Thus, they 
agreed to initiate a company-wide process to systematize and tackle the CSR issues. 
Edward knew that WildCat Inc.’s competitors published formal sustainability reports 
based on the Global Reporting Initiative (GRI) Standards. The reports addressed 
material topics based on a formal materiality assessment process. Reflecting upon it 
now, he considered such a materiality analysis to be a useful first step for the company 
to manage its CSR activities and a good preparation for the next board meeting. 
1.5 Part III: Integrated Reporting and Reporting Strategy 
Two weeks after the Morrisson Interview, with her hands grasped behind her back, 
Christina Chen looked through the speckless glass wall of the 40-floor office building 
her company called its home in Downton Toronto, Canada. Today, a thick, pale morning 
mist hid the streets from her view and muted the usually unending noise of traffic from 
below. Yet, behind her, the meeting room buzzed with the agitated discussions of her 
fellow board members. First, they had discussed cutting clutter in their financial report, 
as proposed by Thomas Butler, her CFO. That had gone smoothly. Then Edward Milton, 
CCO, had presented the results of his CSR materiality evaluation. Christina had 
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expected this issue to stir up some dispute the very moment she had decided to make 
WildCat’s future sustainability reporting and overall reporting strategy a major topic of 
today’s meeting. She had, however, not foreseen such a lengthy debate. The 
commitment to become more transparent on their ecological and social footprint had 
brought up the question of how to implement such information into their existing 
reporting activities. A question, as it now turned out, that was far from trivial for some 
members of her board. As an afterthought to his presentation, Edward had unexpectedly 
brought up three distinct options for the company: Publish a separate CSR report, 
implement a CSR chapter into their annual report or move forward to an integrated 
report concentrated on the company’s value creation in the broader sense. This spectrum 
of options had uncovered some very different perspectives within the board, which, in 
turn had initiated a tenacious struggle over the right approach and format. At some point, 
Christina had just quietly gotten up from her chair and wandered off to her spot at the 
window, as she often did when she needed to clear her thoughts and concentrate on a 
particular problem. Now, she closed her eyes and listened to the latest round of the main 
contestants behind her: 
“I don’t see why we should opt for something that still lags behind what many of 
our competitors are doing!” Louis Jost, COO of WildCat Inc., sighed, noticeably tired 
by the ongoing resistance of his colleagues: “If we decide to implement this new kind 
of information into our reporting, we might as well do it right. I don’t think anyone in 
the industry is creating value in such a variety of ways as we do. We ought to let it show. 
I say, we go for a full-fledged Integrated Report. It fits our ambition.” Christina had not 
expected Louis to participate in this discussion so actively. Usually, he tended to take a 
backseat when it came to the external communication. Oddly, the opportunity to align 
the company’s reporting to highlight its operational strong points had sparked an 
unusual interest in this topic within him. Thomas Butler, the company’s CFO, shook his 
head: “Adidas and Puma may do what they have to, they’re European firms and operate 
under their own conditions. But we tailor our annual report to what our analysts and 
investors want and need. Do you realize what signal this would send to them? We only 
just arranged to cut a lot of clutter from our annual report to make it more accessible. 
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And we have already been quiet talkative about how much shorter it is going to be in 
background-talks with some of our major investors.”, he looked Louis straight in the 
eyes: “If we blow it up all over again like this, what are they supposed to think of us?” 
– “That we finally tell them the full story!” the COO countered, but Thomas was not 
satisfied: “They’ll think we’re erratic. They’ll think we have no concept. They don’t 
want this kind of information, and frankly, I don’t think they need it. Our customers, our 
employees, the public – they do. Let’s just give them their separate CSR report and be 
done with!” he took a pause to lean back in his chair. Then, somewhat calmer, he added: 
“I also don’t see our external auditors following us on such an unexpected turn.” Louis 
prepared for another reply, but this time, Edward Milton got ahead of him. He rose his 
hands soothingly towards his two fellow board members: “I would not go as far as 
saying that our investors don’t care how we’re doing in the social and environmental 
arena.”, he objected: “If anything, the last few weeks have shown that some of them 
indeed are concerned about it. If nothing else, they might find it useful to make sure that 
we have no skeletons hidden in our closet in these areas.” – he paused to acknowledge 
Louis Jost’s approving nod in his direction – “But I agree that a fully Integrated Report 
might not be the thing for us just yet.” “What do you mean?”, the COO asked, irritated. 
Edward explained: “I fear that to do an Integrated Report might mean doing the second 
step before the first. Integrated reporting is a very special approach promoted by the 
International Integrated Reporting Council. It comes with a unique understanding of 
which information is relevant and which is not. If we declare our report as ‘integrated’, 
it may raise very strong expectations.” Louis furrowed his brow. “I didn’t know that.” 
he acknowledged. Edward gave a slight nod: “We are barely starting to be more 
transparent about out sustainability endeavors. Going straight to implementing 
integrated reporting may prove too ambitious for us. And it might overwhelm our 
readers. So why not choose a middle way? Combine our CSR Report with our Annual 
Report, but as separate chapters. Would that not conform to the quality of information 
we can offer at the moment much more and be more in line with what our addressees 
expect?”.  
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Louis and Thomas hesitated, stared at each other and then at Edward across the table; 
“No!” they yelled, in unison and with almost the same, dissatisfied tone in their voices. 
For a moment, the whole board room turned silent as the three men exchanged a long 
look. Then, they burst into liberating laughter. Christina opened her eyes and turned 
around. “Enough of this!” she said, placing her knuckles on the table, waiting for her 
board members to stop chuckling: “This is no easy decision and we won’t be making it 
today.” she said, allowing herself a slight smirk. She eyed her young Head of 
Accounting and Reporting, Emma Jones, who was also present and had been the only 
person at the table that had remained silent so far: “Emma. I would really appreciate it 
if you could dig into this issue more deeply. Specifically, you should get us all more 
informed on integrated reporting. What benefits and consequences should we expect if 
we follow this approach? Please prepare another briefing material for our next meeting 
that will help us to move forward on this matter.” Emma, now the sudden centre of 
attention, straightened her back in her chair and nodded: “Yes.”, she answered: “I will.” 
– “Fine.”, Christina said: “In that case, we are done here. Emma, I will write you a mail 
with a detailed list of questions I hope your report will help us answer.” The young 
woman nodded. And with that, Christina raised her hands and animated her board 
members to get up from their seats “Thank you. Then that’s that. I declare this meeting 
closed.”  
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1.6 Requirements  
1.6.1 Part I 
Consider the situation described in the case and put yourself in the situation of Emma 
Jones. You and your team have to re-evaluate the materiality of the information in the 
notes to the financial statements and prepare a presentation for the upcoming board 
meeting. In your presentations, please put emphasis on the following issues: 
1) Address the concern of Thomas Butler and answer the question raised in the e-mail. 
In particular, pay attention to the following topics: 
a) What is the current state of materiality discussion at the international level? 
Include an overview of the IASB’s Disclosure Initiative. 
b) Which materiality definition exists under IFRS from the IASB? Why is this 
definition important in the context of financial reporting and how can a preparer 
of the financial statement use this concept? 
2) Evaluate the provided parts of the notes to the financial statements of WildCat Inc. 
in terms of materiality (see appendices III - I-IV). Use the Materiality Practice 
Statement 2 (IASB, 2017) and discuss examples there. If necessary, use quantitative 
and/or qualitative decision criteria in the assessment. Also, consider the following 
information: 
The Investors Relation department got an official request from the investors John 
Button, who holds 6 percent of WildCat Inc.’s voting rights and would prefer that 
the company discloses information about PPE expenditures in India. Since he is 
interested in a big investment in India and would like to have as much as possible 
detailed information about WildCat’s business.  
3) Evaluate, from the perspective of a preparer of the financial statement, how helpful 
current guidelines on materiality are; especially with regard to the Materiality 
Practice Statement 2 (IASB, 2017). 
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1.6.2 Part II 
Consider the situation described in the case and put yourself in the situation of Edward 
Milton. You and your team have to conduct a materiality analysis in accordance with 
GRI and present your results in the upcoming board meeting. In your presentation you 
should address the following topics: 
1) Explain what the Global Reporting Initiative (GRI) is. 
2) Describe which materiality definition exists under GRI. What are differences to 
traditional financial reporting? 
3) Describe how the materiality assessment in accordance with GRI is defined. What 
are the main process steps? 
4) Consider the 2017 sustainability reports of WildCat Inc.’s three major competitors, 
Nike, Puma and Adidas as a basis of peer-review. Also, read the article on WildCat 
Inc.’s sustainability performance forwarded to Edward Milton by Christina Chen 
from appendix III -V. Use the cumulated information of these sources to: 
a) Identify the main stakeholders of WildCat Inc. and list them. 
b) Prepare a materiality matrix for WildCat Inc.in accordance with the template 
given in appendix III - VI. To this end identify material CSR topics of WildCat 
Inc. and prioritize these topics in your matrix and give arguments for your 
decision.  
1.6.3 Part III 
Consider the situation described in the case and put yourself in the situation of Emma 
Jones. You and your team have to prepare a briefing material and decision template on 
the company’s future reporting strategy. Within, you should address the following 
issues: 
1) Briefly explain the origins of the International Integrated Reporting Council (IIRC). 
What are their mission and vision and how do they define integrated reporting? 
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2) Compare the individual definitions of materiality for IFRS Financial Statements, 
GRI Sustainability Reporting and integrated reporting according to the IIRC’s IR 
Framework. What are the conceptual differences and similarities of these forms of 
reporting in regard to their intended purpose, their main audience and the intended 
scope of their content? 
3) Re-examine the financial and sustainability reporting of WildCat’s competitors 
(Nike, Puma and Adidas). 
a) What different structures/formats have they chosen to publish their sustainability 
information? To what degree are these aligned to the conception of an integrated 
report in accordance with the IR Framework? 
b) What advantages and disadvantages do you associate with each approach? 
4) What structure/format to publish its financial and non-financial (sustainability) 
information would you recommend to the board of WildCat Inc. in the future? 
Explain your recommendation briefly. 




Appendix III - I: WildCat Inc. Balance Sheet, December 31, 2017 
 
 
YEAR END DECEMBER 31st 
($ millions except where otherwise indicated) 
2017 2016 
ASSETS     
Cash and cash equivalents 1,122 1,058 
Short-term financial assets 3 27 
Accounts receivable 1,297 1,206 
Other current financial assets 265 122 
Inventories 1,684 1,756 
Income tax receivables 61 57 
Other current assets 283 337 
Assets classified as held for sale 181 7 
Total current assets 4,898 4,571 
Property, plant and equipment 969 825 
Goodwill 779 803 
Trademarks 955 946 
Other intangible assets 108 109 
Long-term financial assets 86 80 
Other non-current financial assets 28 20 
Deferred tax assets 385 324 
Other non-current assets 70 54 
Total non-current assets 3,380 3,161 
Total assets 8,278 7,733 





Table V - 1: WildCat Inc. Balance Sheet, December 31, 2017 
Source: Own illustration. 
 
YEAR END DECEMBER 31st 
($ millions except where otherwise indicated) 
2017 2016 
LIABILITIES AND EQUITY     
Short-term borrowings 192 454 
Accounts payable 1,101 1,217 
Other current financial liabilities 61 75 
Income taxes 196 160 
Other current provisions 313 300 
Current accrued liabilities 833 765 
Other current liabilities 191 184 
Liabilities classified as held for sale 31 n.a. 
Total current liabilities 2,919 3,155 
Long-term borrowings 1,056 435 
Other non-current financial liabilities 6 15 
Pensions and similar obligations 189 170 
Deferred tax liabilities 260 225 
Other non-current provisions 25 17 
Non-current accrued liabilities 54 43 
Other non-current liabilities 23 19 
Total non-current liabilities 1,615 924 
Share capital 136 139 
Reserves 387 214 
Retained earnings 3,226 3,306 
Shareholders’ equity 3,749 3,659 
Non-controlling interests -5 -5 
Total equity 3,745 3,654 
Total liabilities and equity 8,278 7,733 
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Appendix III - II: WildCat Inc. Income Statement, December 31, 2017 
 
YEAR END DECEMBER 31st 
($ millions except where otherwise indicated) 
2017 2016 
Net sales 9,689 9,469 
Cost of sales 5,073 4,801 
Gross profit 4,616 4,667 
Royalty and commission income 68 69 
Other operating income 92 95 
Other operating expenses 4,135 4,009 
Goodwill impairment losses 52 35 
Operating profit 589 787 
Financial income 13 17 
Financial expenses 45 63 
Income before taxes 557 742 
Income taxes 181 227 
Net income from continuing operations 376 515 
Losses/gains from discontinued operations, net of 
tax 
45 11 
Net income 331 527 
Net income attributable to shareholders 327 525 
Net income attributable to non-controlling 
interests 
4 2 
Table V - 2: WildCat Inc. Income Statement, December 31, 2017 
Source: Own illustration. 
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Appendix III - III: WildCat Inc. Notes to the audited Consolidated Financial 
Statements, December 31, 2017 
 
Note 1 Nature of the Reporting Entity  
Note 2 Summary of Significant Accounting Policies 
Note 3  Discontinued operations 
Note 4  Acquisition 
Note 5  Cash and cash equivalents 
Note 6  Short-term financial assets 
Note 7  Accounts receivable 
Note 8  Other current financial assets 
Note 9 Inventories 
Note 10  Other current assets 
Note 11  Assets/liabilities and disposal groups classified as held for sale 
Note 12  Property, plant and equipment 
Note 13  Goodwill 
Note 14  Trademarks and other intangible assets 
Note 15  Long-term financial assets 
Note 16  Other non-current financial assets 
Note 17 Other non-current assets 
Note 18  Borrowings and credit lines 
Note 19 Other current financial liabilities 
Note 20 Other provisions 
Note 21 Accrued liabilities 
Note 22 Other current liabilities 
Note 23 Other non-current financial liabilities 
Note 24 Pensions and similar obligations  
Note 25 Other non-current liabilities 
Note 26 Shareholders’ equity 
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Note 27 Non-controlling interests 
Note 28 Leasing and service arrangements 
Note 29 Financial instruments 
Note 30 Other operating income 
Note 31 Other operating expenses 
Note 32 Cost by nature 
Note 33 Financial income/ financial expenses 
Note 34 Income taxes 
Note 35 Earnings per share 
Note 36 Segmental information 
Note 37 Additional cash flow information 
Note 38 Commitments and contingencies 
Note 39 Related party transactions 
Note 40 Other information 
Table V - 3: WildCat Inc. Notes to the audited Consolidated Financial Statements, December 31, 
2017 
Source: Own illustration.  
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Appendix III - IV: WildCat Inc. Extracts Notes to the audited Consolidated 
Financial Statements, December 31, 2017 
Description of the Business: 
WildCat Inc. is a worldwide leader in development, marketing and distribution of 
branded performance apparel, footwear and accessories. It sells products worldwide and 
they are worn by athletes at all levels as well as by consumers with active lifestyles. 
WildCat Fitness platform powers the world’s largest digital health and fitness 
community. This platform is used to engage with consumers and increase awareness and 
sales of products. 
In the following, extracts from the notes to the audited consolidated financial 
statements of WildCat Inc., as of December 31, 2017 are presented: 
Extract Note 1 – Nature of the Reporting Entity  
WildCat Incorporated Company (Inc.) is a Canadian public company incorporated in 
1999, with its registered office located at 55 St. Barbara Avenue, Toronto, ON M5G 
2K8, Canada. 
The consolidated financial statements of WildCat Inc. as at December 31, 2017 
comprise WildCat Inc. and its subsidiaries and are prepared in compliance with 
International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS). The audited annual consolidated 
financial statements include the accounts of the Company and other entities that the 
Company controls and are reported in Canadian dollars, except where otherwise noted. 
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Note 12 – Property, plant and equipment: 
The company capitalizes expenditures on items of property, plant and equipment 
only in excess of $ 0.02 million. Smaller amounts will be capitalized as an expense. 
Property, plant and equipment consist of the following: 
 
($ millions except where otherwise indicated) Dec. 31, 2017 Dec. 31, 2016 
Land, land leases, buildings and leasehold 
improvements 
715 535 
Technical equipment and machinery 179 169 
Other equipment as well as furniture and fixtures 882 801 
  1,776 1,505 
Less: accumulated depreciation and impairment 
losses 
913 787 
  864 718 
Construction in progress, net 106 107 
Property, plant and equipment, net 969 825 
 
Depreciation expenses were $ 172 million and $ 156 million for the years ending 
December 31, 2016 and 2017, respectively. Impairment losses amounted to 
$ 11 million and $ 3 million for the years ending December 31, 2016 and 2017, 
respectively. These are related to assets within other equipment as well as furniture 
and fixtures, mainly in the Group’s own-retail activities, for which contrary to 
expectations there will be an insufficient flow of future economic benefits. In 2017, 
reversals of impairment losses were recorded in an amount of $ 1 million (2016: $ 1 
million). 
The increase in ‘Land, land leases, buildings and leasehold improvements’ mainly 
relates to the acquisition of the Indian Distribution Centre in New Delhi which was 
previously leased. 
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Due to concrete plans to sell the one operating segment, assets amounting to 
$ 8 million were transferred from ‘Property, plant & equipment‘ to ‘Assets classified 
as held for sale’ at year-end 2017. 
 
Note 20 – Other provisions: 

















Marketing 38 1 - 36 - 2 50 - 51 - 








13 1 - 2 - 9 - 20 - 
Sundry 117 1 - 25 - 29 39 - 103 20 
Other 
provisions 
317 9 - 151 - 46 213 - 4 339 25 
 
Marketing provisions mainly consist of provisions for promotion contracts. 
Provisions for personnel mainly consist of provisions for short- and long-term 
variable compensation components as well as of provisions for social plans relating 
to restructuring measures. With regard to provisions for early retirement, claims for 
reimbursement in an amount of $ 0 million (2016: $ 0 million) are shown under other 
non-current assets. 
Provisions for returns, allowances and warranty primarily arise due to bonus 
agreements with customers and the obligation of fulfilling customer claims with 
regard to the return of products sold by the Group. The amount of the provision 
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follows the historical development of returns, allowances and warranty as well as 
current agreements. 
Provisions for taxes other than income taxes mainly relate to value added tax, real 
estate tax and motor vehicle tax. 
Sundry provisions mainly include provisions for customs risks as well as anticipated 
losses from purchases and other transactions, and provisions for litigation and other 
legal risks. The reversal of sundry provisions in 2017 is mainly related to the 
completion of customs audits and a risk reassessment. 
Individual claims comprise: 
In June 2015 the United States-based Canine Inc. and certain of its subsidiaries 
instituted legal proceedings in the United States against WildCat Inc. Canine Inc. 
filed several amended complaints between 2014 and 2015. As amended, the lawsuit 
alleges copyright infringement, unfair competition, intentional and negligent 
interference with prospective economic advantage, and civil conspiracy. The lawsuit 
alleges that WildCat Inc. unlawfully copied and misappropriated proprietary, 
copyrighted products developed by Canine Inc. to service its own customers. The 
lawsuit sought injunctive relief and monetary damages, including punitive damages, 
alleged by Canine Inc. to be in the millions of $. The trial was held in November 
2015. Prior to trial, WildCat Inc. stipulated to liability for certain claims and WildCat 
Inc. agreed to pay Canine Inc. $ 20 million for attorneys’ fees. After the trial, the 
jury returned a damages verdict of $ 15 million. The judgment, which was issued on 
December 4, 2015, additionally provided for prejudgment interest of $ 5 million. The 
judgment amount was also subject to post- judgment interest.  
WildCat Inc. considered the relevant local laws, regulations and other reporting 
requirements and concluded that there were no locally prescribed obligations relating 
to the inclusion of prior-period information in the current-period financial statements 
based on the legal dispute with Canine Inc. 
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Management follows past experience from similar transactions when assessing the 
recognition and the measurement of other provisions; in particular, external legal 
opinions are considered for provisions for customs risks and for litigation and other 
legal risks. All evidence from events until the preparation of the consolidated 
financial statements is taken into account. 
The transfers include reclassifications to ‘Liabilities classified as held for sale’ 
 
Note 39 – Related party transactions 
According to the definitions of IAS 24 ‘Related Party Disclosures’, the Supervisory 
Board and the Executive Board of WildCat Inc. were identified as related parties 
who solely received remuneration in connection with their function as key 
management personnel.  
The Genesis Pension Trust Corporation, a registered association, is regarded as a 
related party. Based on a Contractual Trust Arrangement, Genesis Pension Trust 
Corporation manages the plan assets in the form of an administrative trust to fund 
and protect part of the pension obligations of WildCat Inc. Employees, senior 
executives and members of the Executive Board of WildCat Inc. can be members of 
the registered association. WildCat Inc. has the right to claim a refund of pension 
payments from Genesis Pension Trust Corporation under specific contractually 
agreed conditions. 
WildCat Inc. signed a contract with TechnologySmart Inc. about a 10 years contract 
for the IT Service of the company starting on June 20, 2017. The payment for the IT 
Service will be payed annually and costs $ 0.5 million per year, which has to be paid 
at January 01st, each year. This is a special offer from TechnologySmart Inc. as a 
related party of WildCat Inc. Furthermore, the company sold IT Hardware, which 
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was fully depreciated, to TechnologySmart Inc. on September 18, 2017. The market 
value of the IT Hardware has been $ 0.02 million, which corresponds to the value 
for which TechnologySmart Inc. bought the IT Hardware. 
  
V. WILDCAT INC. – A MODULAR CASE ON MATERIALITY CONCEPTIONS AND REPORTING STRATEGIES 
 
170 
Appendix III - V: Econ Insider Article 
 
Econ Insider 
Toronto’s Paper Tiger? 
Despite its bold claims, WildCat Inc. has been confronted with criticism of its 
sustainability performance on a regular basis. Compared to its competitors from the 
US and Europe, the company has to catch up. – By Jordan B. Salzman 
At least since going public in 2006, WildCat Inc. has been well known for its bold 
claims to performance. In the financial arena, these claims are grounded on 
impressive sales figures, as no analyst would reasonably deny. Yet, what was special 
for a company such as WildCat, which basically started out as the maverick of its 
industry and became a major player in a comparatively short time, was their claim to 
be ‘always better’. Granted, this slogan was meant to describe what the company 
wanted its customers to be (with the help of its products), one could not help but 
think the words were also intended to describe the company itself, its services and 
business conduct. So it appeared only natural that WildCat Inc. would extend its 
aspirations to other dimensions of performance: To the dimension of corporate 
sustainability, that is. Over the last few years, however, evidence is piling up that 
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Ratings and rankings 
Two years ago, a small NGO, called SCC, conducted a peer benchmarking analysis 
of the sports apparel industry evaluating the sustainability performance of several 
prominent brands. The analysis focused on six dimensions of sustainability with 
several subcategories: Governance (Materiality, Ethics, Risk, Communications), 
Environment (Energy & Climate, Waste & Recycling, Water, Land Use & 
Biodiversity), Workplace (Diversity, Health & Safety, Training & Education, 
Working Conditions), Community (Philanthropy, Volunteering, Community 
Investment, Engagement), Product (Life Cycle Management, Product Quality, 
Product Safety, Packaging), and Supply Chain (Materials Stewardship, Green 
Purchasing, Social Standards, Engagement). 
The assessment relied only on publicly available data reviewing the aspects policies, 
programs, and performance to each category. WildCat Inc. was deemed to be the 
worst performing company in the peer benchmark analysis. The company had the 
lowest score in all aspects of the Environment dimension. It got the weakest score 
among its peer in the water category as well as the energy and climate change 
category. Furthermore, it was the only company which did not mention any 
information about waste and recycling. Unlike its competitors Nike and Puma, 
WildCat Inc. made no statement about land use or biodiversity. The overall results 
of the assessment showed a tremendous gap between WildCat Inc. and its 
competitors. Nike placed first with (49/57 points) followed by Adidas (47/57) and 
Puma (41/57). WildCat Inc. scored in a distant last with 8 points. Several news 
outlets reported on the poor result of WildCat Inc. and the gap between the peer 
groups. Some articles pointed out that the top three companies are larger businesses 
with annual sustainability reports and complementing detailed information on their 
websites. In comparison, WildCat Inc. and other companies do not have a formal 
sustainability reporting and provide only a limited amount of information on their 
sustainability websites.  
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Unfortunately, the SCC rating results of WildCat Inc. are no isolated incident. 
According to ‘Rate a Company’, an independent and reliable brand-comparison 
website that assesses and ranks consumer brands in several sectors on sustainability 
and social responsibility dimensions, WildCat Inc. was ranked as an ‘E’ grade and 
therefore an ‘don’t buy’ recommendation. WildCat Inc. underperformed all its 
competitors like Nike, Puma, and Adidas. 
Another rating website ‘Responsible Consumer’ came to similar results. Responsible 
Consumer proclaims to be the world's most sophisticated and simple to use, personal 
ethical rating system with detailed information of over 40,000 companies, brands 
and products. In June last year, the rating website gave WildCat Inc. the worst rating 
on its measures of sustainability based on its cotton sourcing, toxic chemicals 
reporting, general environmental reporting and supply chain management. The 
scoring was also based on publicly accessible information of WildCat Inc. as well as 
publications by well-known global environmental organizations. 
For example, the sustainable cotton score was based on a WWF report regarding the 
cotton sector and its sustainability. Cotton is a key raw material for the textile 
industry and its cultivation is associated with numerous social, economic and 
environmental challenges that threaten the sector’s sustainability. In its annual 
report, the WWF provided a performance assessment of an expanded list of 
companies. The companies are ranked according its policy, update and traceability 
of cotton. WildCat Inc. was one of the companies rated in the report. It scored 0/20 
in the Policy category, 0/55 in Uptake and 3.8/25 in Traceability. Thus, the company 
scores 3.8 out of 100 points in this rating and placed in the lowest scoring brand in 
the report (described as ‘not yet started’). Additionally, the rating considered that 
WildCat Inc. has been publicly accused of using cotton derived from slave labor in 
Uzbekistan. Uzbekistan, located in Central Asia, is one of the largest exporters of 
cotton in the world. The Uzbek government forcibly sends upwards of 2 million 
children - some as young as seven - to work in the fields for 10 hours a day, for two 
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to three months each year, according to the Responsible Sourcing Network. 
Therefore, most of the world’s leading apparel brands and retailers have pledged to 
boycott cotton knowingly harvested using child laborer’s in Uzbekistan. 
In June last year, Responsible Consumer reviewed WildCat Inc.’s website for its 
clothing toxic chemicals policy. On the company’s website no policy, specific 
information or announcement of plans to eliminate toxics chemicals from its supply 
chain could be found. A surprising result since most of the leading apparel brands 
signed a commitment to cut specific chemicals from their clothing production and to 
work together with other companies towards a clean textile industry (Zero Discharge 
of Hazardous Chemicals Group (ZDHC)) in the last years. The initiative was a 
reaction to the Greenpeace Detox campaign, which was launched in 2011 and 
addresses the global apparel industry with the aim of reducing the use of hazardous 
chemicals. As a result of the lack of information WildCat Inc. received the worst 
rating in the “Pollution and Toxics” category. 
Fierce Competitors 
WildCat Inc.’s main competitors are Nike, Adidas and Puma. Summarizing different 
sustainability ratings and rankings, it becomes clear that WildCat Inc. is constantly 
outperformed by its competitors. All three main competitors focus on sustainability 
practices and publish annual sustainability reports. 
During the last 20 years, Nike has developed from being perceived as the CSR villain 
and bad example for CSR in the appeal industry towards a well-recognized CSR 
frontrunner. Throughout the 1990s, Nike had to face strong allegations of bad 
working conditions, child labor and sweatshops resulting in public protest. Due to 
the lack of ethical business practices, Nike was confronted with protests of furious 
consumers as well as numerous organized boycotts. A situation hard to believe given 
the numerous awards Nike received for its CSR activities in the past ten years. In 
1998, the turning point was announced with a public speech by the then-CEO Phil 
Knight. He acknowledged the company’s struggles and promised change. In 2005, 
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the company made a huge effort towards more transparency by publishing a 
complete list of its contract factories and vendors. A novelty in the industry. In the 
same year, Nike published its first version of a CSR report. In this report Nike stated 
details on pay scales and working conditions in its supply chain but also admitted 
ongoing problems and challenges. This demonstration of transparency as well as 
other CSR measures led to a completely new perception of the company; making 
Nike one of CSR leaders in the industry today. 
Similar ambitious development in CSR activities can be found by Adidas. For more 
than 20 years Adidas has followed constantly and but rather quietly its declared path 
towards a sustainable brand. Adidas has set out aspiring goals for all products, stores, 
and offices by 2020. These goals include reducing its waste by half as well as 
downsizing the use of virgin plastic in all its products. Furthermore, Adidas demands 
from its material suppliers a decrease in water usage by 50 percent and from its key 
suppliers a 20 percent reduction in their energy consumption. Adidas ‘sustainability 
history’ goes back till 1989. In this year the company declared a ban for the use of 
ozone-depleting chlorofluorocarbons even though the gas was never used in Adidas 
products. In 1998, Adidas implemented a supplier code of conduct which is based 
on international human rights and labor rights conventions. Adidas’ CSR efforts can 
be characterized by the belief that making quality products is just as important as 
reducing waste and using recycled materials. 
The third main competitor has a similar long-lasting sustainability history. Puma 
introduced its Code of Conduct in 1993. The guideline was implemented to review 
and enhance the working, social and environmental conditions in suppliers’ factories 
and is binding for all manufacturers of Puma products. Another important milestone 
for the athletic footwear and apparel manufacturer was the environmental profit and 
loss (E P&L) accounting framework. Puma set out the goal to monetize the “true 
costs” of its reliance on nature as a source of critical supplies, such as fresh water, 
clean air, healthy biodiversity and productive land. The then-CEO Jochen Zeitz 
proclaimed the question “if our planet was a business, how much would it ask to be 
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paid for the services it provides to a company to operate.” Unable to find a tool to 
measure these costs Puma decided to develop its own. Thereby Puma has become 
the first company in the world to put a value on the eco services it uses to produce 
its products. This marks a radical change in the way businesses account for their use 
of natural resources. John Elkington, who developed the idea of triple-bottom line 
accounting, which considered people, planet and economic impacts, rather than just 
shareholders, said: “This sort of accounting was pretty much what I had in mind 
when I came up with the triple bottom line 17 years ago. We've taken a while to get 
there, but the pace is accelerating”. With the introduction of its E P&L Puma has 
jumped well ahead of its competitors who were pioneering in making their supply 
chains more transparent. 
In sum, all three competitors have a long history with sustainability practices and 
communicating its achievements transparently. 
Regulatory requirements – CSR Directive Implementation Act  
Two of WildCat Inc.’s main competitors are based in Germany. Thus, Puma as well 
as Adidas operate in a highly regulatory environment with a strong focus on 
environmental and social business standards. Both are obliged to report on social and 
ecological aspects since 2017. In this year, the German parliament passed the law to 
strengthen companies’ non-financial disclosure in their management reports and 
group management reports. Adidas and Puma are affected by this CSR Directive 
Implementation Act, based on the EU Directive 2014/95/EU (non-financial 
reporting). Consequently, both companies had to review their already existing 
voluntary CSR reporting and make necessary changes regarding the new regulatory 
requirements. Since WildCat Inc. is a Canadian company, it is not affected by the 
CSR reporting law. However, the legislation might be a catalyst for sustainability 
reporting in Europe, which can further increase the gap between WildCat Inc. and its 
European competitors.  
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All in all the Toronto sports apparel manufacturer is facing strong headwinds now 
that it has been accepted in the prime league of its business. The company is offering 
a less-than-optimal track record of sustainability performance and is up against 
more experienced competitors not likely to slack off any time soon. Time will tell if 
the company will keep its promise of being ‘always better’ in the sustainability arena 
or if it will indeed turn out to be – a paper tiger. 
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Appendix III - VI: Sustainability Matrix Template 
 
 
Figure V - 1: Sustainability Matrix Template 
Source: Own illustration. 
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 Case Learning Objectives and Implementation Guidance  
2.1 Case Overview and Learning Objectives  
The case allows students to reflect upon the relevance of the materiality concept in 
different accounting disciplines as well as to practice its application within 
corresponding settings. As a multinational company, WildCat Inc. is increasingly held 
accountable for both its financial and non-financial performance by various stakeholder 
groups, which hold distinct expectations as to what constitutes material information and 
how the company should disclose it. Notable standard setters – most prominently the 
IASB, the GRI and the IIRC – have translated these expectations into corresponding 
materiality definitions and wider sets of frameworks and standards, which the company 
has to navigate when following and (re) defining its reporting strategy. Throughout the 
case, various representatives of WildCat Inc. consider the materiality concept as 
applicable to their respective domain or conduct materiality judgements on their basis 
of informational at hand: 
In Part I, students gain conceptual knowledge of the materiality concept according 
to IFRS as well as the chance to practice its application in a realistic scenario. They are 
also introduced to the current discussion surrounding materiality in the context of the 
IASB’s disclosure initiative. In Part II, students are introduced to the practice of 
sustainability reporting in accordance with the GRI sustainability reporting standards 
and the role and definition of materiality therein. They also learn to conduct the relevant 
steps of a materiality analysis aligned with the GRI standards. In Part III, students are 
familiarized with the concept of integrated reporting according to the IIRC and its 
distinct materiality definition. Upon comparing it with the materiality definitions of the 
other standard setting bodies from the two prior tasks, they identify similarities and 
differences between them in regard to the intended audience, scope and subsequent 
disclosure contents. In the concluding task, they reflect upon the different implications 
of these and conceptualize a reporting approach they consider fitting in light of the 
company’s current position, potentials and future ambitions. 
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The modular structure of the case allows instructors to tailor it to the needs of the course 
in which they intend to employ it. In its complete form, it is designed to enhance 
students’ understanding of the materiality concept and sensitize them to its peculiar 
definitions in different accounting disciplines in ‘real life’ scenarios. As such, it 
introduces them to the conceptual knowledge relevant in each context and allows them 
to practice their use of professional judgement to decide on the materiality of 
information in different settings. Further, by going through all three parts, students 
critically reflect upon the intentions and limitations of existing materiality definitions 
and develop an understanding of the concept from a broader perspective of corporate 
reporting and communication. In this way, the case also enhances students’ awareness 
of the challenge to align corporate reporting to the (voiced or implicit) informational 
priorities of various stakeholder groups. While not exclusively an IFRS case, the 
requirements of Part I, in combination with the other parts, support students’ 
understanding of judgements and interpretations necessary for applying IFRS. Thus, it 
can be employed in second or third stage Framework-based teachings in accordance 
with the IFRS Foundation Education Initiative. In the following, we elaborate on the 
case’s learning objectives in detail: 
LO1: To gain a deeper understanding of the materiality concept in financial 
reporting according to IFRS and apply it the ‘real life’ scenario of a materiality 
analysis. The achievement of this learning objective presents the central basis for Part I 
of the case. More specifically, students gain basic knowledge on materiality in IFRS and 
consider its importance to the disclosure initiative and the solution to the issue of 
‘information overload’ through Tasks 1 and 3. In Task 2, students get to practice the 
first-hand application of materiality considerations when evaluating the notes to 
WildCat Inc.’s financial statements. 
LO2: To gain a deeper understanding of the materiality concept in sustainability 
reporting according to GRI and apply it the ‘real life’ scenario of a materiality analysis. 
This learning objective presents the basis for Part II of the case. In a way similar to 
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Part I, students acquire theoretical knowledge on this topic through solving Tasks 1 to 3 
and learn to conduct a materiality analysis through tackling Task 4. 
LO3: To develop awareness of integrated reporting and its distinct materiality 
conception, as well as the challenges and implications associated with its 
implementation. This objective is achieved through, in a stepwise manner, solving Part 
III, Tasks 1 to 3. Notably, Task 3 will demand students to assess the reporting of major 
competitors of WildCat Inc. and identify the potential advantages and disadvantages 
related to the level of integration they realized in their reporting of financial and non-
financial reporting. 
LO4: To develop awareness of and understand differences and similarities 
between materiality definitions from distinct reporting practices. The achievement of 
‘fluency’ in different accounting and reporting systems will present a major requirement 
for coming generations of accounting professionals. Thus, to be able to navigate 
between the different materiality definitions in use presents a necessity. The realization 
of this learning objective is implicitly implemented in the case when Parts I and II are 
applied in direct juxtaposition to one another. More explicitly, Part III, Task 2 demands 
students to compare and reflect upon materiality definitions of financial, non-financial 
and integrated reporting. 
LO5: To contemplate the concept of materiality in the broader context of a 
company’s overall reporting strategy. A second step to evaluating the materiality of a 
company’s disclosure in individual reporting practices demands to also consider 
materiality, in a broader sense, within its reporting strategy as a whole. Specifically, it 
will require to also reflect and decide upon questions of reporting scope and format. This 
learning objective is achieved through tackling Part III, Task 4, in which students have 
to propose a future reporting strategy for WildCat Inc., notable whether it should publish 
a stand-alone sustainability report or aim for integrated reporting. 
LO6: To strengthen the students’ problem-solving skills. In line with Teuteberg et 
al. (2016) we also strive to strengthen students’ ability to solve problems, critically 
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reflection on them and solve them in a discursive manner. Throughout the case, students 
will be demanded to transfer knowledge gained from guiding material published by 
standard setting bodies to a concrete task at hand, conduct desk research to gain and 
evaluate a required base of information and discuss possible approaches of the future 
reporting strategy of WildCat Inc. To varying degrees, these tasks will require them to 
evaluate information in regard to its applicability to their given task at hand or support 
their position with arguments developed in preparation to or within discussion. 
2.2 Contribution of the Case 
In financial accounting, the debate surrounding a potential ‘information overload’ of 
reporting addressees by excessive redundancies and ‘boilerplate’ disclosures in financial 
statement notes and management reports has motivated major standard setters to 
reconsider the materiality principle in different ways: As for IFRS, the IASB has made 
materiality a central issue in its ongoing disclosure initiative and released a respective 
practice statement in late 2017 (International Accounting Standards Board (IASB), 
2017). While such endeavours aim to reduce the amount of immaterial information in 
financial reporting, the simultaneous establishment of non-financial reporting –
promoted by the GRI and other institutions – ascribes relevance to several matters 
traditionally considered ‘out of scope’ by many accounting practitioners, such as a 
company’s social and ecological performance (Owen, 2013). Aiming at surmounting 
traditional ‘silo-thinking’ and consolidating the usually distinct spheres of financial and 
non-financial reporting, the International Integrated Reporting Council (IIRC) has 
proposed a framework for integrated reporting and in the process introduced another 
materiality conception (International Integrated Reporting Council (IIRC), 2013). This 
new environment creates the necessity to educate accountants to become fluent in the 
distinct ‘languages’ of varying reporting spheres or conceptualizations and be aware of 
the differing meanings of seemingly shared vocabulary. Such ‘multilingualism’ is 
necessary both for professionals in financial accounting assigned with the 
supplementary task to implement non-financial reporting as well as those working in 
V. WILDCAT INC. – A MODULAR CASE ON MATERIALITY CONCEPTIONS AND REPORTING STRATEGIES 
 
182 
coordination with colleagues in other corporate communication departments (Gibson, 
1997; Lockhardt & Mathews, 2000; Owen, 2013). 
Reporting and disclosure challenges of multinational corporations as the ones 
above are ascribed a high relevance in international accounting education (Ashcroft, 
Chevis, & Smith, 2008). Our case contributes to the existing body of educational 
literature on the matter in several ways. First, to the best of our knowledge, our case is 
the first to tackle the topic of materiality as a central issue in corporate reporting in its 
own right. Additionally, it also presents the first teaching resource to do so since the 
publication of the second practice statement by the IASB in September 2017, providing 
it with additional topicality and relevance. Consequently, it is also the only case we 
know to incorporate examination of the practice statement as an integral requirement for 
in the processing of the tasks. Second, our case allows students to gain first-hand 
experience in conducting ex ante materiality judgements from the perspective of 
corporate executives in charge of preparing a company’s annual reporting documents. 
Previous cases on both financial (Lindberg, 1999; Ruhl & Smith, 2013) and non-
financial reporting (Borkowski, Welsh, & Wentzel, 2010; Bouten & Hoozée, 2015; 
Brown & Kohlbeck, 2017) address materiality in more abstract manner in ex post 
scenarios, where the relevance of information in a given report is evaluated from the 
perspective of external auditors, a jury in a contest rewarding high-quality reporting, or 
other ‘onlookers’. Thus, our case complements prior work by providing students with 
an internal perspective on disclosure materiality and the opportunity to practice their 
professional judgement thereof. It can also be employed vis-à-vis teaching cases on audit 
materiality (such as Lindberg, 1999) to juxtapose differences in defining and 
determining the materiality of accounting information/misstatements. Third, while other 
cases usually focus either on the sphere of financial or on non-financial disclosure, our 
case promotes an integrative perspective and invites students to reflect on differences 
and similarities between distinct materiality definitions employed in practice, as well as 
the advantages and disadvantages arising from them. Via discussing the option of 
introducing integrated reporting, the case also promotes and integrated view on 
materiality in corporate reporting and touches upon the question how the consolidation 
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of such diverging conceptions (at the organizational or personal level) may shape 
companies’ forthcoming reporting strategy. 
2.3 Case Implementation 
The case has been developed in early 2018 for the use in the graduate course on financial 
reporting and communication (i.e. investor relations) in the Master of Science (M.Sc.) 
and MBA programs at the authors’ business school. The course is targeted at students 
with prior basic accounting knowledge, preferably (but not necessarily) on International 
Financial Reporting in accordance with IFRS. As such, the course level can be 
categorized as intermediate to advanced. Course topics usually cover legal requirements 
of preparing financial statements according to IFRS, accounting rules of basic IFRS 
standards, as well as conceptual knowledge on Investor Relations. Students who pass 
the course are generally able to apply basic IFRS and reflect on the role of financial 
accounting in the broader context of capital market communication. A major aim is to 
prepare students to not only master the technical aspects of applying IFRS, but to also 
critically reflect on the informational value and communicational aspects of individual 
disclosures, as well as to consider the role of financial reporting in a broader corporate 
communication environment. After its first application in the year of its original 
inception, the case has undergone only minor revisions in formulation and become a 
standard assignment in the above mentioned course. To complement the lectures, this 
instructional case is used to stimulate students to actively participate in the course and 
allow them to gain practical experience in assessing the relevance of financial and non-
financial information in the process of report preparation. Depending on the intended 
aims of the given course at hand, we suggest to emphasize different aspects of the 
learning outcomes or to tailor the case by leaving out individual parts. For example, 
advanced accounting courses or courses concerned with corporate reporting and 
communication in a wider sense, may give room to discuss the full set of Parts I-III. 
Courses concentrated on (IFRS) financial accounting may benefit from a focus on Part I. 
Additionally, courses with larger numbers of participants (as in our standard application, 
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see below) may benefit from assigning parts to be solved and/or presented by different 
groups of students. 
The case is regularly used in the full-time M.Sc. program at the authors’ business 
school, in a course with around 50 participants on average. This enables us to assign the 
case to different student groups to see how they fare in solving the case as well as to 
compare and discuss different solutions in class. To this end, we have developed the 
following approach: In a first step, prior to the course, dates the given year in which the 
case is set to ‘take place’ and all corresponding temporal information is updated in order 
to secure an adequate ‘present day’ feel for students. Students are then assigned into 
usually about nine different groups ranging in size from five to six students, each, five 
weeks before the start of the respective course. The full case is handed out to all groups 
simultaneously. They are tasked to prepare their solutions for all three parts in the form 
of a written report to be handed in until the start of the course. The handed-in reports are 
then internally reviewed by the tutors in charge. Following, Student groups are tasked 
to present selected solutions from their report in class in a special session reserved to 
this purpose at the end of the course. Of the nine groups, we then assign three groups 
each to present their solutions on Parts I, II and III. Individual presentations have a time 
limit of fifteen minutes plus an additional ten minutes for in-class discussion. As all 
groups have worked through all three parts of the case prior to the start of the course, all 
students are usually well prepared and contribute by intensively discussing the presented 
solutions in class, constructively debating them with the members of the presenting 
group, but also within the class as a whole. The written report accounts for 50% of the 
overall course grade and the presentation of the solutions are graded with 25%. The 
remaining 25% are assigned to a short multiple-choice test on materiality in reporting, 
which is also regularly used to assess student’s learning success through the case.  
2.4 Student Assessment and Feedback 
As a standard-procedure following each application of the case, we evaluate its 
effectiveness by two means: First we conduct a short in-class quiz of five questions, all 
of which relate to the contents of the case in some way. To receive additional feedback, 
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a questionnaire is handed out to all students in which they are asked to evaluate their 
learning experience and satisfaction with the course after the last session. As all results 
stem from our standardized implementation of the case within our M.Sc. course with its 
relatively high number of participants, results may in parts be indicative of the typical 
and specific learning experience and class situation within that course. 
2.4.1 Student Success in Multiple Choice Quiz  
As a direct assessment of students’ learning progress, we assign classes with a multiple-
choice quiz containing five questions corresponding with the contents of the case study 
(i.e. materiality in financial reporting, sustainability reporting and integrated reporting). 
Each question is accompanied with four potential answers for students to choose from, 
of which only one was correct. The quiz accounts for 25% of the overall course grade.   








Question 1: Materiality in Financial Reporting (IFRS) LO1 75% 
Question 2: Materiality in Integrated Reporting (IIRC) LO3 81% 
Question 3: 
Differences and Similarities between Materiality 
Conceptions 
LO4 82% 
Question 4: Materiality in Sustainability Reporting (GRI) LO2 88% 
Questions 5: Materiality Conceptions and Reporting Strategy LO5 80% 
Average: 81% 
Table V - 4: Quiz questions, learning objectives and students’ average scores 
Source: Own illustration. 
Questions in the quiz correspond to several of the learning objectives of the case and 
include Materiality in financial reporting according to IFRS (Question 1, LO1), in 
sustainability reporting according to GRI (Question 4, LO2), in integrated reporting 
according to the IIRC (Question 2, LO3), as well as differences and similarities between 
distinct materiality conceptions (Question 3, LO4) and the consequences of materiality 
consideration on reporting strategy (Question 5, LO5).9 Across the whole quiz, students 
on average gain a score of 81%, providing some evidence that they acquire good 
knowledge and understanding of materiality across different reporting practices. The 
individual results for questions two, three and five fluctuate around this average, while 
for question four, students reach an average score of 88%. This shows that – in our 
application of the course – students gain a particular robust knowledge of materiality in 
the context GRI sustainability reporting. As for IFRS financial reporting, students fare 
somewhat less well, reaching only an average score of 75%. While this result is still 
encouraging, the fact that graduate students in an accounting course (i.e. with a majority 
 
9 To make the quiz less linear in regard to the structure of the case (and thus less predictable and 
more challenging for students), the order of topics is randomized compared to the order within 
the case. 
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of them having at least some prior knowledge or education in accounting) specifically 
struggle the most with materiality under IFRS gives credit to suggestions by Jackling et 
al. (2012), to further intensify efforts to educate students in basic accounting principles. 
2.4.2 Student Feedback  
In addition to our direct assessment, we also conduct an indirect assessment through the 
means of a short questionnaire survey that we regularly ask students to participate in 
after the end of the last lecture session. As noted by Teuteberg et al. (2016), such surveys 
are enjoying increased usage in order to evaluate participants’ subjective perception of 
a given educational case or other instructional resource (see, for example, Churyk & 
Stenka, 2014; Davis & Matson, 2014; Detzen, Hoffmann, & Zülch, 2013; 2015; 
Teuteberg et al., 2016). We based our questionnaire on similar tools employed in 
Teuteberg et al. (2016) and Detzen et al. (2013; 2015). Overall, it contained 13 
statements and is distributed to all participants after the end of the course. For each 
statement, they are given the opportunity to indicate their level of agreement through a 
five-point Likert scale ranging from one (‘Strongly Agree’) to five (‘Strongly 
Disagree’). Submitting feedback is allowed to be conducted anonymously in order to 
decrease social desirability response effects (Joinson, 1999). Aggregated results of the 
survey for each statement can be taken from Table V - 5.   
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Agree Neutral Disagree Strongly 
Disagree 
Average 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Prior to the case, my 
understanding of materiality 
under IFRS was weak. 
83% 17% 0% 0% 0% 1.17 
The case increased my 
understanding of materiality 
under IFRS. 
83% 17% 0% 0% 0% 1.17 
Prior to the case, my 
understanding of materiality 
under GRI was weak 
72% 28% 0% 0% 0% 1.28 
The case increased my 
understanding of materiality 
under GRI. 
60% 40% 0% 0% 0% 1.40 
Prior to the case, my 
understanding of materiality 
in integrated reporting was 
weak. 
79% 21% 0% 0% 0% 1.21 
The case increased my 
understanding of materiality 
in integrated reporting. 
72% 28% 0% 0% 0% 1.28 
The case helped me to better 
understand the type of ‘real-
world’ issues faced when 
dealing with the materiality 
concept in various reporting 
practices 
50% 38% 6% 6% 0% 1.68 
The case required me to 
integrate knowledge from 
several reporting topics. 
11% 67% 11% 11% 0% 2.22 
The case study enhanced my 
problem-solving skills. 
28% 44% 22%4 6% 0% 2.06 
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The case study was too 
difficult. 
0% 11% 50% 28% 11% 4.05 
The case study was too easy. 0% 11% 33% 39% 17% 3.62 
Overall, the case study 
provided a beneficial 
learning experience. 
57% 37% 6% 0% 0% 1.49 
Overall, I enjoyed working 
on the case study. 
44% 50% 6% 0% 0% 1.62 
Table V - 5: Questionnaire and average student feedback 
Source: Own illustration. 
Across the three questions on the knowledge of the distinct materiality conceptions, 
students generally agree that their understanding is increased through the case, with 
many even agreeing that it was increased ‘strongly’. This suggests that the case in this 
class setting achieves its first three learning objectives. Additionally, a majority of 
students also acknowledges that the case feels to have a basis in ‘real-world’ scenarios 
and helps them to better understand the inner workings of such situations. This suggests 
that the second parts of learning objectives 1 and 2, i.e. to provide an opportunity to 
practice the application of materiality conception in a realistic context, are usually also 
fulfilled. Learning objectives 4 (awareness of similarities and differences between 
materiality conceptions) and 5 (contemplate the relation of materiality and reporting 
strategy) also appear to be achieved, as most students agree, although somewhat more 
moderately, that the case requires them to integrate their knowledge from several 
reporting topics. The statement that the case helps them to improve their problem-
solving skills (learning objective 6) is also supported by over 70% of the students, 
though generally at lower levels of emphasis. Searching for the reason for this more 
‘reluctant’ support, we take it from student’s comments in the free-text field to this 
question that the at times relatively large group sizes of five to six students per team 
may occasionally run somewhat counter to our intention. Some students comment that 
the team size allows them to distribute tasks among themselves rather comfortably, in 
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turn somewhat decreasing the individual challenge to each student. Only few students 
support the statements that the case may have been too difficult or too easy, although 
only moderate levels of agreement. Again, students’ comments in the free text fields to 
these questions provide helpful insights to the reasons for their opinion. Students that 
consider the case too easy often overlap with those that also comment on team size as 
elaborated above, suggesting that they indeed consider this situation less challenging 
and thus below their preferred or experienced level of difficulty in a case study. 
Ironically, students that comment on the case being too difficult also mention team size 
as a major factor, pointing out that it requires more effort to organize team meetings and 
keep track of every member’s contribution. They also occasionally propose that more 
time may mitigate this effect. Consequently, we suggest that the case – as a group 
assignment – may, if possible, under the given conditions other applicants find 
themselves in, work best in a setup slightly altered to the one employed in our usual 
application. Notably, groups may profit even more form the case by capping the number 
of members at around three to four per team or from providing them with more time, 
potentially six weeks in total, to allow groups to properly constitute and organize 
themselves. In the two concluding questions surveying students’ overall experience and 
satisfaction with the case, again a majority supports the notion that it provides them with 
a beneficial learning experience and that they enjoy working on it. 
In combination with students’ performance in the multiple-choice quiz, the 
feedback provided after the case suggests that it achieves all of its intended learning 
objectives and generally provides students with a valuable and enjoyable learning 
experience, supporting its further distribution and active usage. 
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 Teaching Notes 
3.1 Case Synopsis 
This instructional resource illustrates the case of (fictional) WildCat Inc., a Canada-
based multinational manufacturer of sports apparel products listed at the Toronto Stock 
Exchange. Since its foundation in 1999, the company has seen a fast growth and, in 
recent years, reached a market capitalization, outreach and public recognition similar to 
other major producers in its industry, such as (real-life) Nike, Puma and Adidas, all of 
which it now considers its main competitors. With its arrival in this comparatively small 
circle of global market leaders, WildCat has reached a new stage in its development and 
starts to experience a shift in the expectations placed upon it by various external 
stakeholders in terms of communication, especially reporting: In a newspaper-article, a 
major activist investor of the company publicly criticizes the quality of its reporting in 
general as well as its lack of application of the materiality principle in particular, both 
in regard to financial and non-financial information. This criticism is later substantiated 
further through other major shareholders of the company and several NGOs and news 
publications, ultimately leading the company to reconsider its overall reporting strategy. 
The case familiarizes students with the materiality conceptions from distinct 
reporting practices, notably financial statements reporting according to the International 
Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) and sustainability reporting in line with the 
standards of the Global Reporting Initiative (GRI). Specifically, they are made to 
consider both materiality conceptions and their respective processes to identify material 
information on a theoretical level and receive opportunities to practice their professional 
judgement in this context in the form of ‘real-life’ scenarios. Additionally, materiality 
in integrated reporting according to the International Integrated Reporting Council 
(IIRC) is also touched upon. Both modular and integrative in nature, the case invites 
students to reflect upon the differences and similarities between these conceptions and 
the consequences of applying materiality considerations to a company’s broader 
reporting strategy in a multi-stakeholder environment. 
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3.2 Solutions to the Requirements 
Following, we give an overview of the solutions to the requirements of the case as 
intended by us based on prior experiences with teaching the case. Where necessary 
and/or helpful, we provide instructional guidance. The solutions recommended here 
shall allow interested instructors to implement the case in a variety of different courses 
and class settings. While initially intended for graduate courses in accounting & 
reporting, other potential fields of application include (but are not limited to) courses on 
business ethics and Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) as well as courses related to 
the communication sciences. To this end, we provide a comprehensive set of solutions 
and elaborate on several issues that appear particularly worthwhile when discussing the 
case in class or with individual students. The purpose of the solutions is to simplify and 
accelerate the introduction of the case into their intended courses. As such, they are not 
supposed to be distributed to students tasked with solving the case in any way. It should 
be noted that those parts of the solutions based on personal judgements present the 
personal opinion of the authors. 
In light of the wide thematic scope of the case, reflections on the respective 
theoretical underpinnings of each part have, to a large extend, been incorporated into 
their individual assignments. This requires students to acquire the necessary background 
knowledge by their own initiative and partly eliminates the need for instructors to 
provide them with excessive information beforehand. As such, the case may be handed 
out to students with relatively little prior knowledge of the practices in question. 
Instructors wishing to employ the case in more advanced settings may thus consider 
eliminating those assignments of the case concerned with theoretical issues or discuss 
them in less detail.  
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3.2.1 Part I: Materiality in Financial Reporting according to IFRS 
General Requirement: 
Consider the situation described in the case and put yourself in the situation of Emma 
Jones. You and your team have to re-evaluate the materiality of the information in the 
notes to the financial statements and prepare a presentation for the upcoming board 
meeting. 
Task 1:  
Address the concern of Thomas Butler and answer the question raised in the e-mail. In 
particular, pay attention to the following topics: 
(a) What is the current state of materiality discussion at the international level? 
Include an overview of the IASB’s Disclosure Initiative. 
(b) Which materiality definition exists under IFRS from the IASB? Why is this 
definition important in the context of financial reporting and how can a 
preparer of the financial statement use this concept? 
Solutions to Task 1: 
In relation to task a., the following aspects should be included in the answer: The IASB 
(International Accounting Standards Board) is responsible for the development and 
revision of IFRS, develops concepts to improve the quality of the consolidated financial 
statements. Especially in the context of the increasing regulatory requirements, it is a 
challenge for the preparer of an IFRS financial statement to meet all the disclosure 
requirements and, at the same time, to design an effective and company-specific 
reporting. The IASB has identified three main concerns about disclosure in the financial 
statements, which are collectively termed ‘the disclosure problem’ (see Figure V - 2). 
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Not enough relevant 
information 
Irrelevant information Ineffective communication 
   
Can lead to inappropriate 
investing or lending 
decisions 
Can obscure relevant 
information and reduce 
understandability of financial 
statements 
Can reduce understandability 
of financial statements 
 
Figure V - 2: The Disclosure Problem 
Source: Own illsutration, based on International Accounting Standards Board (IASB), 2017a. 
The IASB launched its Disclosure Initiative in 2013 to respond to feedback that there is 
a need to improve the effectiveness of disclosures in financial statements. To help 
companies address this issue, the IASB has addressed the quality of reporting as part of 
the Disclosure Initiative and presented principles for effective communication in a 
discussion paper (IFRS Foundation, 2017). According to this, information should be 
company-specific, clear and understandable, structured, linked, formatted appropriately, 
free of redundancies as well as comparable to each other. These principles can be 
understood as guidelines by the IASB to help companies prepare financial statements 
and improve the quality of their reporting. In addition, various projects of the IASB are 
currently in progress, which also affect the topic of effective reporting. In the Staff Paper 
of July 2018 IASB Agenda ref 11E) the IASB stated that it has undertaken several 
activities to help entities to make materiality judgements.   
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These activities may influence the decisions that entities make about which accounting 
policies to disclose. They included: 
(a) 2014 amendments to IAS 1 Presentation of Financial Statements relating to 
materiality and aggregation. These amendments became effective for annual 
periods beginning on or after 1 January 2016;  
(b) development of Making Materiality Judgements: Practice Statement 
(Materiality Practice Statement) issued in September 2017;  
(c) development of Better Communication: Making Disclosures More 
Meaningful case studies (issued in October 2017); and  
(d) separate Disclosure Initiative project on the Definition of Material (Exposure 
Draft published in September 2017).  
In relation to task b., the following aspects should be included in the answer: 
The Conceptual Framework for Financial Reporting (Conceptual Framework) 
provides a definition of material information (IAS 1 Presentation of Financial 
Statements and IAS 8 Accounting Policies, Changes in Accounting Estimates and Errors 
provide similar definitions). In this context ‘Material’ means: 
“Omissions or misstatements of items are material if they could, individually or 
collectively, influence the economic decisions that users make on the basis of the 
financial statements. Materiality depends on the size and nature of the omission or 
misstatement judged in the surrounding circumstances. The size or nature of the 
item, or a combination of both, could be the determining factor.” (See IAS 1.7 and 
IAS 8.5) 
The objective of financial statements is to provide financial information about the 
financial position, performance and changes in financial position of an enterprise that is 
useful to a wide range of users in making economic decisions, according to the 
conceptual framework of the IASB, para. 12 (2019). The entity identifies the 
information necessary to meet that objective by making appropriate materiality 
judgements (International Accounting Standards Board (IASB), 2017b, para. 7). 
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The need for materiality judgements is pervasive in the preparation of financial 
statements. An entity makes materiality judgements when making decisions about 
recognition, measurement, presentation and disclosure. Requirements in IFRS 
Standards only have to be applied if their effect is material to the complete set of 
financial statements, which includes the primary financial statements and the notes. 
However, it is inappropriate for the entity to make, or leave uncorrected, immaterial 
departures from IFRS Standards to achieve a particular presentation of its financial 
position, financial performance or cash flows (International Accounting Standards 
Board (IASB), 2017b, para. 8). 
The concept of materiality is company-specific and can relate to the type and/or 
scope of the information. In this respect, according to IAS1.31, IFRS disclosures may 
also be omitted if they are not material. At the same time, a company has to consider 
additional disclosures if the IFRS requirements are insufficient to allow the addressees 
of the financial statements to assess the impact of individual transactions and other 
events and conditions on its financial position, performance and cash flows to 
understand. In the context of IAS 8, it is planned to adjust the concept of ‘materiality’ 
to the extent that the omission, misrepresentation and obfuscation of information is 
likely to result in an economic decision taken on the basis of the general-purpose 
financial statements of a particular entity of the primary reporting addressee. At this 
point, particular attention should be drawn to the disguise of the information, because a 
presentation of too much and/or irrelevant information favours this state. This change 
will not only allow companies to highlight essential information, but also focus on 
identifying irrelevant information and eliminating it from reporting. 
When assessing whether information is material to the financial statements, an 
entity applies judgement to decide whether the information could reasonably be 
expected to influence decisions that primary users make on the basis of those financial 
statements. When applying such judgement, the entity considers both its specific 
circumstances and how the information provided in the financial statements responds to 
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the information needs of primary users (International Accounting Standards Board 
(IASB), 2017b, para. 11). 
According to the Materiality Practice Statement 2 (IASB, 2017b) there are four 
steps, which need to be considered to decide whether an information is material or not. 
These are the following: 
(a) Step 1—identify: Identify information that has the potential to be material. 
(b) Step 2—assess: Assess whether the information identified in Step 1 is, in fact, 
material. 
(c) Step 3—organise: Organise the information within the draft financial 
statements in a way that communicates the information clearly and concisely 
to primary users. 
(d) Step 4—review: Review the draft financial statements to determine whether 
all material information has been identified and materiality considered from 
a wide perspective and in aggregate, on the basis of the complete set of 
financial statements. 
It is important to note that materiality will differ for each company and can change 
period to period. Therefore, a review of the materiality is necessary every year and can 
change based on the circumstance of the company and its forecast. 
Task 2: 
Evaluate the provided parts of the notes to the financial statements of WildCat Inc. in 
terms of materiality (see appendices I-IV). Use the Materiality Practice Statement 2 
(IASB, 2017b) and discuss examples there. If necessary, use quantitative and/or 
qualitative decision criteria in the assessment. Also, consider the following information: 
The Investors Relation department got an official request from the investors John 
Button, who holds 6 percent of WildCat Inc.’s voting rights and would prefer that the 
company discloses information about PPE expenditures in India. Since he is interested 
in a big investment in India and would like to have as much as possible detailed 
information about WildCat’s business. 
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Solutions to Task 2:  
The following suggestions for solutions present an overview of the topics that should be 
recognized by the students. In addition, there are other solutions that can be addressed 
by the students or that instructors may find relevant to discuss regarding materiality in 
the notes: 
Note 12 – Property Plant and Equipment: 
In general, when making materiality judgements, companies do not have to consider the 
specific information needs of a single investor (IASB, Materiality Practice Statement 2, 
Example E, 2017b), especially if his/her voting rights are relative small and he/she 
cannot be seen to have a material impact on the firm. In the case of WildCat Inc., The 
information about the company’s PPE expenditure in India is immaterial information 
for its primary users as a group. Therefore, WildCat Inc. is not obliged to provide such 
information in its financial statements. 
According to IAS 16.7 the costs of an item of PPE shall be recognised as an asset 
if it is probable that future economic benefits associated with the item will flow to the 
entity and the cost of the item can be measured reliably. Nevertheless WildCat Inc. has 
assessed the accounting policy that it is not capitalising expenditure below CAD 0.02 
million. The company implies that it will not have a material effect on the current-period 
financial statements or on future financial statements, because information reflecting the 
capitalisation and amortisation of such expenditure could not reasonably be expected to 
influence decisions made by the primary users of the entity’s financial statements. 
Provided that such a policy does not have a material effect on the financial statements 
and was not set to intentionally achieve a particular presentation of the entity’s financial 
position, financial performance or cash flows, the entity’s financial statements comply 
with IAS 16. This policy has to be reassessed each reporting period to ensure that its 
effect on the entity’s financial statements remains immaterial (International Accounting 
Standards Board (IASB), 2017b, Example A).  
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Note 20 – Other Provisions: 
Information that has no financial impact, since its value is zero, should not be reported. 
This leads to confusion of primary addressees and does not represent any additional 
benefits. For this reason, the information about non-current assets (“With regard to 
provisions for early retirement, claims for reimbursement in an amount of CAD 0 
million (2016: CAD 0 million) are shown under other non-current assets.”) can be seen 
as immaterial and does not have to be disclosed. 
Furthermore, the individual claim with Canine Inc. has to be assessed whether it 
is material information or not. At December 31st, 2017 most uncertainties have been 
resolved. Though the liability has not been settled, a court announcement confirmed the 
amount already recognised in the financial statements by the entity. Additionally, 
WildCat Inc. considered the relevant local laws, regulations and other reporting 
requirements and concluded that there were no local obligations relating to the inclusion 
of prior-period information in the current-period financial statements based on the legal 
dispute with Canine Inc. On the basis of the requirements of IFRS, WildCat Inc. may 
not have to reproduce in the current-period financial statement all of the information 
about the legal dispute provided in the prior-period financial statements (International 
Accounting Standards Board (IASB), 2017b, Example M). Because most of the 
uncertainties have been resolved, users of the financial statements for the current period 
may no longer need detailed information about those uncertainties. Instead, information 
about those uncertainties might be summarised and updated to reflect the current-period 
events and circumstances and the resolution of previously reported uncertainties. 
Note 39 – Related Party Transactions: 
According to IAS 24 ‘Related Party Disclosure’, an entity is required to disclose for 
each related party transaction that occurred during the period information on the nature 
of the related party relationship as well as information about the transaction and 
outstanding balances, including commitments that is necessary for users to understand 
the potential effect of the relationship on the financial statements. Consequently, the 
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disclosed information about the Genesis Pension Trust Corporation as well as about 
TechnologySmart Inc. should be assessed from a materiality perspective. When 
assessing whether the disclosed information is material or not, students should consider 
quantitative and qualitative aspects of the transaction. Due to the fact, that disclosure 
about the Genesis Pension Trust Corporation is solely informative, discussion about 
materiality appears unnecessary. On the other hand, disclosure about TechnologySmart 
Inc. includes concrete information about contracts and purchases, creating a need to 
assess its materiality. 
There are two different aspects of the disclosure concerning TechnologySmart Inc. 
where the materiality aspect has to be considered: (1) the contract about IT service and 
(2) the purchase of IT Hardware. In both cases, the financial value of the transaction is 
relatively low and therefore can be considered immaterial from a quantitative 
perspective. However, qualitative factors also have to be evaluated. Therefore, we 
analyzed the two situations: 
1. Situation – Contract about IT Service: 
As the IASB noted in developing IAS 24, related parties may conduct transactions that 
unrelated parties would usually not, which may additionally be priced differently than 
transactions between unrelated parties (International Accounting Standards Board 
(IASB), 2017b Example I). As WildCat Inc. got a special offer from TechnologySmart 
Inc., which may not have been possible with an unrelated third party, this could 
influence the decision of the primary user of the financial statement. Because the 
transaction was with a related party, students should conclude that the impact was large 
enough to reasonably be expected to influence primary users’ decisions. The presence 
of this qualitative factor lowers the quantitative threshold. Hence, WildCat Inc. assesses 
information about the transaction with TechnologySmart Inc. as material and discloses 
that information in its financial statements accordingly. 
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2. Situation – Purchase of IT Hardware: 
WildCat Inc. transferred the IT Hardware for a total consideration consistent with its 
market value and its carrying amount. However, the fact that the IT Hardware was sold 
to a related party can be a characteristic that makes information about the transaction 
more likely to influence the decision of the primary user of the financial statement. As 
already noted, the purchase of IT Hardware to TechnologySmart Inc. was immaterial 
from a quantitative perspective. Even when considered that the transaction was with a 
related party, there is no indication that this purchase would have been different or not 
achieved under any other conditions with an unrelated third party, especially as the 
purchase price equals the market value of the IT Hardware. Information about this 
transaction with TechnologySmart Inc. could be considered immaterial and be erased 
from the entity’s financial statements (International Accounting Standards Board 
(IASB), 2017b, Example J,). 
Task 3: 
Evaluate, from the perspective of a preparer of the financial statement, how helpful 
current guidelines on materiality are; especially with regard to the Materiality Practice 
Statement 2 (IASB, 2017b). 
Solution to Task 3:  
The guidelines of the Materiality Practice Statement 2 (IASB, 2017b) can be used by 
preparers of financial statements for a systematic assessment process of materiality. But 
the high discretionary leeway creates difficulties in implementing the concept. The 
following advantages and disadvantages discuss some positive and negative aspects of 
the materiality concept in context of financial reporting. This list is not exhaustive and 
can be seen as starting point for in-class discussions among students and instructors. 
 
 




▪ Some guidance is better than no guidance: The materiality concept of the 
IASB is difficult to apply from the user’s perspective. Nevertheless, it is at 
least some guidance which exists. 
▪ Materiality as solution to the disclosure overload problem: Complexity of 
disclosure requirements as well as the information companies disclose in 
reaction to them have increased. The materiality concept of the IASB 
presents a first step in solving the subsequent trade-off between 
comprehensiveness and relevance. Materiality is the most important decision 
criteria for deciding which information should be reported in the financial 
statement. Investors and addressees of the financial statement could be more 
satisfied with the information provided to them than before.  
 
Disadvantages 
▪ No concrete quantitative benchmark: Companies could profit form basing 
their materiality decisions on (relative) benchmarks of their revenues, 
profitability, financial position ratios and cash flows. However, there are no 
concrete quantitative benchmarks provided in the practice statement that 
could be used for orientation. 
▪ High level of detail in the Practice Statement: The examples in the Materiality 
Practice Statement 2 (IASB, 2017b) have a high level of detail and therefore 
are only partially helpful for many companies. For situations not covered by 
concrete examples, application of materiality judgement may remain 
difficult, effectively limiting the value of the guidance given in the practice 
statement to many companies. 
▪ High degree of judgement and risk of concealment: Due to the fact that the 
examples of the Materiality Practice Statement 2 (IASB, 2017b) are on a high 
level of detail, companies who cannot apply these examples are given a high 
level of leeway in their materiality analysis. This could lead to misstatements 
and increases the risk of concealment. Based on the argumentation of 
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immateriality companies, could tend to decrease their disclosure. This could 
have negative effects on investors’ decisions if they are interested in the 
respective information. 
▪ Cost intensive and time-consuming approach: Due to the need to identify 
common primary users and the material topics for these stakeholders, 
materiality analysis presents a very cost intensive and time-consuming 
process from a preparer’s perspective. Companies may thus be reluctant to 
invest in high quality of their financial reporting.  
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3.2.2 Part II: Materiality in Sustainability Reporting according to GRI  
General Requirement: 
Consider the situation described in the case and put yourself in the situation of Edward 
Milton. You and your team have to conduct a materiality analysis in accordance with 
GRI and present your results in the upcoming board meeting. 
Task 1: 
Explain what the Global Reporting Initiative (GRI) is. 
Solutions to Task 1: 
The purpose of this task is to lead students to proactively inform themselves on the major 
global standard setter of sustainability reporting. Depending on the scope of the course, 
scope of the information gathered by students varies. 
At the most basic level, students should comment that the Global Reporting 
Initiative (GRI) is an international not-for-profit organisation, with a network-based 
structure. To enable all companies and organisations to report their economic, 
environmental, social and governance performance, GRI produces free Sustainability 
Reporting Guidelines. Students should also provide some background on the foundation 
and history of GRI: The organisation was founded in the US in 1997 by CERES (a 
United States non-profit organisation) and the United Nations Environment Program 
(UNEP) and was originally based in Boston, Massachusetts. In 2002, GRI moved its 
central office to Amsterdam, where the Secretariat is currently located. GRI also has 
regional 'Focal Points' in Australia, Brazil, China, India and the USA. Additionally, 
students may comment on GRI providing the most widely recognized global standard 
for sustainability reporting and their status as the ‘de-facto-standard’ of sustainability 
reporting, based on its high application rate among companies and organizations (Willis, 
Campagnoni, & Gee, 2015, p. 7). Even though GRI is mainly used by larger 
V. WILDCAT INC. – A MODULAR CASE ON MATERIALITY CONCEPTIONS AND REPORTING STRATEGIES 
 
207 
companies10, students should mention that the framework formally covers organizations 
of all shapes and sizes and that reporters come from various sectors and industries like 
mineral, energy, banking or consumer products companies. (Boyton, 2011) They should 
also note that the most recent of GRI’s reporting frameworks are the GRI Standards, 
launched in October 2016, that these present the first global standards for sustainability 
reporting and are a free public good and that they have a modular structure, making them 
easier to update and adapt, unlike prior sustainability reporting frameworks. 
In courses that allow for a more in-depth consideration of this task of the case 
study, students may also elaborate and discuss on the benefits of the GRI in more detail 
(potentially with some guidance from the instructor). Further considerations include (but 
are not limited to) the following aspects: 
▪ First, GRI provided the first global sustainability reporting framework and 
therefore benefited from a first-mover advantage11. Conceived in 1997, GRI 
is a longstanding initiative that gained its momentum over almost two 
decades (Boyton, 2011). Due to this long existence, GRI was able to build a 
remarkable user base over the years. In comparison to more recent 
frameworks, GRI offers a ‘proof of concept’ and, as an established option, 
constantly attracts new reporters. Benefiting from the size and history of GRI, 
new reporters have the possibility to use valuable experiences of other 
reporters and their previous reports. 
▪ Second, students may comment on GRI’s iterative approach as an important 
success factor for the organization. Despite being a longstanding initiative, 
former guidelines were constantly redefined and revised through an iterative 
and open process. This process is comparable with software development 
with its version 1.0, 2.0 and so on (Hemmati 2012, p. 143) Thus, the 
 
10  According to the study of Global Reporting Initiative (GRI), 2016f 90 % of the captured reports 
on GRI’s Sustainability Disclosure Database are from larger and multinational companies.  
11 Following Porter, 1985 first-mover advantage is defined as performance gain that a firm attains 
from being first to market in a new product category (p. 476). 
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development of GRI is documented in different generations like G1, G2, G3 
and G4. The first version of GRI guidelines (G1) was launched in 2000, 
“representing the first global framework for comprehensive sustainability 
reporting” (Global Reporting Initiative (GRI), 2016d). In 2002, the second 
generation of guidelines (G2) was released and presented at the World 
Summit on Sustainable Development in Johannesburg. During a multi-
stakeholder process with more than 3,000 experts with various backgrounds 
the third generation of guidelines (G3) was developed. The G3 were releases 
in 2006 and updated in 2011 into G3.1. The G3.1 version expanded the 
guidelines on gender, community and human rights (Global Reporting 
Initiative (GRI), 2016d). In 2013, the fourth generation of guidelines (G4) 
was launched and implemented the materiality assessment as a core feature 
of the guidelines. With the latest launch of the standards in 2016 GRI 
redesigned the format, language and consistency of the former guidelines and 
introduced the world’s first sustainability standard. Due to this continuous 
improvement process GRI stands for state-of-the-art reporting and assures its 
reporters highest quality standards.  
▪ Third, students can comment on GRI’s multi-stakeholder approach. During 
the development of updated guidelines – and, now, standards – 
“representatives of business, accounting, academic, labor and advocacy 
organizations from around the world, as well as from governmental bodies” 
(Hohnen, 2012, p. 5) are involved. All aspects of the standards are “created 
and improved using a consensus-seeking approach, and considering the 
widest possible range of stakeholder interests” (Global Reporting Initiative 
(GRI), 2016c). This approach results in broad support for the standards and 
an outcome that serves reporters and users. Furthermore, this cooperation 
allows numerous ideas to evolve and create more legitimacy by overcoming 
barriers and mistrust (Brown, de Jong, & Lessidrenska, 2007, p. 16).  
▪ Fourth, students may consider the universal application and sector sensitivity 
of GRI. The previous mentioned multi-stakeholder approach enables GRI to 
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develop universally-applicable guidelines adoptable for reporters with 
different backgrounds (Brown et al., 2007, p. 17). In addition to this general 
guidelines, GRI has developed “a number of ‘Sector Supplements’, offering 
sector-specific sustainability guidance and indicators” (Hohnen, 2012, p. 5). 
Furthermore, the guidelines are translated in numerous languages, enabling 
organizations from various nations to apply GRI in their sector-specific 
context in their country. 
▪ Fifth, the universal application is closely related to another important aspect 
of GRI: Compatibility with other frameworks and guidelines. The GRI 
guidelines are designed to complement “the most widely used global 
corporate responsibility guidance frameworks, such as the UN Global 
Compact, the OECD guidelines for Multinational Enterprises, and the ISO 
26000 Guidance standard on Social Responsibility” (Hohnen, 2012, p. 5). 
Instead of putting themselves in competition with other initiatives the GRI 
guidelines complement other. Thus, the guidelines “references dozens of 
protocols that have come before, including the IPCC Working group, Kyoto 
Protocol, Montreal Protocol, International Organization for standardization’s 
(ISO) Energy efficiency standards and testing procedures and World 
Resources Institute/World Business Council on Sustainable Development 
Greenhouse Gas Protocol (WRI/WBCSD GHG Protocol) (2004 edition), 
among hundreds of others” (Boyton, 2011).  
▪ This compatibility or connectivity increases the level of legitimacy of GRI 
and helps to promote the application of these standards. For example, the UN 
Global Compact recommends the use of GRI since 2006 (Tschopp & 
Huefner, 2015, p. 571). 
▪ Sixth, students may wish to discuss the transparency of the GRI standards. 
For example, the organizations strive to be transparent about its whole 
standard setting process, governance structure, funding or members. As an 
example, students can refer to the transition from guidelines to standards: 
Every board meeting was recorded, agendas published and working papers 
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shared.12 Since 1999, GRI has an online Sustainability Disclosure Database 
in which all sustainability reports using the GRI methodology are 
documented and free to download. Overall, GRI uses several digital measures 
to include stakeholders and share information. (Global Reporting Initiative 
(GRI), 2016b; Global Reporting Initiative (GRI), 2016g) 
▪ Seventh, students may wish to discuss GRI’s independence. Through 
governance structure and funding sources GRI tries to decreases the 
likelihood that the standards will be weakened in their objectivity. Thus, GRI 
implemented the Global Sustainability standards Board (GSSB)13 and 
structural governance changes to strengthen its independence in 2014. 
Additionally, GRI is a Dutch-based non-profit-organization which separated 
its funding from certification processes (Global Reporting Initiative (GRI), 
2016c). This separation of certification and payment is introduced help to 
overcome a potential conflict of interest. This conflict is a common issue in 
the world of certification and was observable with rating agencies like 
Moody’s during the housing crisis in 2008 and their generous AAA ratings 
(Boyton, 2011). GRI tries to avoid this potential independence conflict and 
secure its funds from “diverse sources; governments, companies, 
foundations, partner organizations and supporters” (Global Reporting 
Initiative (GRI), 2016c). Like transparency and the multi-stakeholder 
approach independency is a key criterion for the legitimacy of the standards.  
▪ Eighth, students may comment on the scope of the guidelines. Unlike other 
reporting frameworks GRI follows the Tripple Bottom Line (TBL) approach 
and therefore includes environmental, social and economic aspects of 
sustainability in their guidelines. Many other guidelines “focus primarily on 
 
12 For further information on this documentation please visit the following website: 
https://www.globalreporting.org/information/about-gri/governance-bodies/Global-
Sustainability-Standard-Board/Pages/GSSB-meetings-and-documents.aspx. 
13 GSSB is the independent standard-setting body of GRI. Following Global Reporting Initiative 
(GRI), 2016e GSSB consists of 15 members and is responsible for developing, approving and 
disseminating GRI standards.  
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environmental issues because energy consumption and greenhouse gas 
emissions are easier to measure than social issues” (Boyton, 2011). In 
consequence, GRI offers a holistic approach which comprehensively covers 
all important facets of sustainability; however, give room for simplification 
and individual priority-setting.  
▪ In sum, students can identify GRI’s first-mover advantage, iterative 
approach, multi-stakeholder approach, universal application with its sector 
sensitivity, compatibility, transparency, independence. Together with the 
facts that the GRI standards are easily available for everyone through their 
website and offered free of charge these aspects mainly contributed to the 
GRI’s popularity (Brown et al., 2007, p. 31).  
 
Task 2: 
Describe which materiality definition exists under GRI. What are differences to 
traditional financial reporting? 
Solutions to Task 2: 
In sustainability reporting, materiality is the principle that determines which relevant 
topics are sufficiently important that it is essential to report on them. Not all material 
topics are of equal importance and the emphasis within a report is expected to reflect 
their relative priority. 
Students should provide the Definition according to GRI 101: Foundation 2016, 
Section 1: Reporting Principles. Following this definition, a sustainability report shall 
cover topics that reflect the reporting organization’s significant economic, 
environmental, and social impacts or substantively influence the assessments and 
decisions of stakeholders. When comparing sustainability reporting with financial 
reporting, as well as their respective materiality conceptions, students may comment on 
the following aspects as presented in Table V - 6. 
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 Financial Reporting (IFRS) Sustainability Reporting (GRI) 
Materiality 
Definition 
Omissions or misstatements of items 
are material if they could, individually 
or collectively, influence the economic 
decisions that users make on the basis 
of the financial statements. 
The report should cover aspects that 
reflect the organization’s significant 
economic, environmental and social 
impacts or substantively influence the 
assessments and decisions of 
stakeholders. 
Compliance Mandatory for many listed companies 
(depending on jurisdiction) 
Voluntary (depending on jurisdiction) 
Audience Potential investors, lenders and other 
creditors making decision about 
buying, selling or holding equity or 
debt, providing or setting loans or 
credits, exercising voting rights or 
otherwise influencing the company in a 
way that affects entity’s use of 
economic resources 
Multi-Stakeholder, including financial 
stakeholders 
Scope Impact of short-term financial situation 
of the company; 
Assets, Liabilities, Equity, Income, 
Expenses, Cash Flows, Changes in 
Equity 
Impact on the environment, society and 
the economy 
Impact’ refers to the effect an 
organization has on the economy, the 
environment, and/or society (positive or 
negative) 
Period Historical Future outlook 
Inclusion Mainly includes financial statements Includes more detailed information on 
sustainability topics in relation with 
financials 
Data Mainly financial quantitative Mainly non-financial quantitative and 
qualitative 
Criticism Not substantial in terms of disclosing 
different aspects of information on 
business operations 
Impacts on the environment, society and 
the economy are difficult to measure 
Disconnected from financial reports 
Table V - 6: Sustainability Reporting and Financial Reporting 
Source: Own illsutration, based on International Federation of Accountants (IFAC) and International 








Describe how the materiality assessment in accordance with GRI is defined. What are 
the main process steps? 
Solutions to Task 3: 
In solving this task, students may follow elaborations by the GRI, which describes fours 
steps which need to be considered to decide whether an information is material or not. 
They are as follows Global Reporting Initiative (GRI) (2016a): 
(a) Step 1 – Identification: Identification of the Aspects and their Boundaries14 
that might be considered for inclusion based on the impacts related to all of 
the organization’s activities, products, services and relationships, regardless 
of whether these impacts occur within or outside the organization. 
(b) Step 2 – Prioritization: Prioritization of the previously identified Aspects and 
topics to determine those that are material and therefore should be reported 
on. The Materiality Principle is implemented by assessing each Aspect and 
topic according to its influence on stakeholder assessments and decisions, 
and the significance of economic, environmental and social impacts. The 
organization now defines thresholds (criteria) that render an Aspect material. 
(c) Step 3 – Validation: Validation of the identified Aspects and topics as 
material prior to gathering the information to report. The aim is to ensure the 
report provides a reasonable and balanced representation of the 
organization’s sustainability performance and impacts. 
(d) Step 4 – Review: Review of Aspects and topics that were material in the 
previous reporting period and the consideration of stakeholder feedback. It 
 
14  Aspect Boundary refers to the description of where impacts occur for each material Aspect. 
Aspect Boundaries vary depending on the Aspects reported. With regards to drawing the 
reporting Boundary for a material Aspect (relevant for G4-18, G4-20 and G4-21), the phrase 
“where the impacts occur” means which entities inside the organization, or which entities or 
groups of entities outside the organization, cause the impact and are responsible for it.  
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takes place after the report has been published, and the organization is 
preparing for the next reporting cycle. 
 
Task 4: 
Consider the 2017 sustainability reports of WildCat Inc.’s three major competitors, 
Nike, Puma and Adidas as a basis of peer-review. Also, read the article on WildCat 
Inc.’s sustainability performance forwarded to Edward Milton by Christina Chen from 
appendix III - V. Use the cumulated information of these sources to: 
(a) Identify the main stakeholders of WildCat Inc. and list them. 
(b) Prepare a materiality matrix for WildCat Inc.in accordance with the template 
given in appendix III - VI. To this end identify material CSR topics of WildCat 
Inc. and prioritize these topics in your matrix and give arguments for your 
decision.  
Solutions to Task 4: 
In relation to both tasks a. and b., it is important to note that no single correct solutions 
exist. Instead, the purpose of this assignment is to allow students to gain hands-on 
experience of the identification of stakeholders, as well as of the identification, 
prioritization and validation of material topics. When drawing on information from 
competitors’ reports and the further information mentioned within the case materials, 
students may come up with multiple ways to identify and prioritize different stakeholder 
groups as well as the material CSR topics of WildCat Inc. and subsequently represent 
them in different materiality matrixes. An important aspect of this task is that students 
provide a clear description of the approach of their materiality assessment and take 
GRI’s four-step-approach into account. 
As a basic requirement, in a first step students should explain on which 
informational basis they identified potential material CSR topics. They should use at 
least the provided case information (appendix III - V) as well as their findings from the 
peer review conducted with the help of the sustainability reports of WildCat Inc.’s three 
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main competitors Nike, Puma and Adidas. In a next step, students should prioritize the 
identified topics. Ideally, they should develop an evaluation scheme and explain their 
materiality decisions. In a last step, students have to translate their assessment into a 
materiality matrix format. As already mentioned, since there are multiple outcomes of 
this assessment, there is not one single correct materiality matrix. Consequently, a main 
focus of this task should be in illustrating the diversity of approaches applicable. From 
our experience, in settings where different students (or student groups) come up with 
distinct matrices, they profit the most from discussing them in class, as it allows them 
to further practice their professional judgement as well as their argumentative and 
rhetoric abilities when criticizing or defending different approaches and solutions. 
In such a scenario, we found that students mostly focus on discussing aspects of 
prioritization concerned with the question which topics should receive a higher priority 
in relation to others, and consequently need little support from instructors when debating 
these matters. For example, a popular issue prompting opposing views during in-class 
discussions in our application of the case revolved around the relative priority specific 
issues, such as child labor, that are considered material by many of the company’s 
competitors but where a potential violation by WildCat Inc. is not yet identified 
explicitly, and, as such, no ‘public issue’ (and therefore no pressure for the company to 
communicate) exists. In one course in which we employed the case, students discussed 
this question at length, in the process revealing different interpretations of the GRI’s 
materiality definition (i.e. assigning different weight to the dimensions of the actual 
social, environmental or economic impact of the company vs. the general information 
needs of important stakeholder groups to an industry as a whole). In contrast, students 
may struggle somewhat when considering the value of prioritization in itself, i.e. making 
sure that matrices, especially in the upper right corner reserved for the most material 
topics, are not ‘overcrowded’ and filled with too many topics. Consequently, some 
students or student groups may provide matrices in which a majority of topics may be 
considered ‘material’ in the broader sense. In such cases, it may be helpful if instructors 
guide the discussion to towards this aspect and reflect upon it. While in our applications 
of the case students were generally willing and able to start an argument on their 
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materiality assessments more or less by themselves, instructors may also initiate or 
facilitate debate by letting them present their matrices vis á vis one another, point out 
obvious differences among them and ask them to explain (and/or defend) their choices. 
The aforementioned intention of the task notwithstanding, as an aid to instructors, 
we propose that they consider the following set of CSR topics as a minimum benchmark 
when evaluating students’ materiality matrices: Control of chemical use and discharge, 
working conditions and anti-child labor practices, water management, supply chain 
management, material sourcing and use, energy consumption as well as waste and 
recycling management. As a basis for their evaluation of students’ identification of 
important stakeholders, we propose employees, competitors, customers, suppliers, the 
government, media and the press as well as shareholders/investors.   
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3.2.3 Part III: Integrated Reporting and Reporting Strategy  
General Requirement: 
Consider the situation described in the case and put yourself in the situation of Emma 
Jones. You and your team have to prepare a briefing material and decision template on 
the company’s future reporting strategy. 
Task 1: 
Briefly explain the origins of the International Integrated Reporting Council (IIRC). 
What are their mission and vision and how do they define integrated reporting? 
Solutions to Task 1: 
As with Part I, task 1, this task aims to lead students to proactively acquire basic 
background knowledge on integrated reporting and its respective standard setter, the 
International Integrated Reporting Council (IIRC). In their solution, students should 
usually provide some fundamental information on the IIRC, such as its foundation in 
2010 as a global coalition of several organizations involved in the practice of corporate 
reporting, like regulators and standard setters, but also investors, companies and NGOs. 
They should name some major partners of the IIRC; in the context of this case these 
should notably be the IFRS Foundations and the Global Reporting Initiative (GRI). They 
should identify the self-proclaimed goal of the IIRC to promote companies’ reporting 
about their value creation (in a broad sense of the term) as a logical next step in the 
corporate reporting, beyond separate disclosure about financial and non-financial 
performance.  
When explaining in detail what the organization considers as integrated reporting 
on the value creation of a company, students should reference to the publication of the 
Integrated Reporting Framework in 2013 (IIRC, 2013).  
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The main objectives the IIRC intends to achieve through integrated reporting should be 
elaborated upon by the students, roughly as follows: 
▪ improvements of the information quality in corporate reporting in order to 
enable a more effective allocation of capital; 
▪ promotion of a more comprehensive reporting approach that considers 
various forms of (financial and non-financial) capital employed by the 
company in question, and 
▪ support of integrated thinking, and subsequent action with a focus on 
corporate value creation. 
Students should comment that the framework employs a principles-based approach, 
which is accessible to a broad spectrum of companies with very different reporting 
strategies and that an integrated report in accordance with the IIRC’s IR framework may 
present either a standalone report or a distinguishable part within another report or 
communication. When explaining the purpose of an integrated report, students should 
emphasize that it should provide insights into the capitals (financial, and non-financial) 
used and affected by the organization and also explain how the company interacts with 
its external environment and the aforementioned capitals during its process of value 
creation. Additionally, students may go into some depth regarding the criteria for 
reporting quality in integrated reporting, most notably that its preparation should be 
guided by the following principles: First, is should hold a strong strategic focus and 
future orientation; information in the report should be connected and be indicative of the 
company’s stakeholder relationships; concerning the quality of information contained 
in the report, it should be reliable and complete and strike the balance between 
materiality and conciseness. Regarding the structure of an integrated report, students 
should elaborate on its basic content elements, namely that it includes an overview of 
the organization and its external environment, its governance structure, business model, 
risks and opportunities, strategy and resource allocation, its performance, an outlook 
regarding major challenges and uncertainties the organization is likely to encounter and 
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finally a basis of presentation to present how the company determines the report’s 
contents.  
Task 2: 
Compare the individual definitions of materiality for IFRS Financial Statements, GRI 
Sustainability Reporting and integrated reporting according to the IIRC’s IR 
Framework. What are the conceptual differences and similarities of these forms of 
reporting in regard to their intended purpose, their main audience and the intended 
scope of their content? 
Solutions to Task 2: 
This task aims to invite students to reflect on the different materiality conceptions they 
have encountered and applied so far and consider potential overlaps as well as points of 
departure among them. An overview of these can be taken from Table V - 7. 
If the full case is employed, students should be able to integrate the definitions for 
materiality under IFRS and GRI from their solutions of the parts I and II. If only part III 
is used in class, solutions can be drawn from the materials proposed in the assignment 
section. Specifically, in any incarnation of the case, students should be able to gather 
information on the purpose, audience and scope of all three reporting approaches from 
these sources. 
Either when presenting their findings on the above matters or within subsequent 
in-class discussions, students should also be able to identify the following similarities 
and differences between the approaches: As a minor difference, the materiality 
definition of IFRS employs a negative formulation, under which an issue is considered 
material if its omission or misstatement could influence decisions, whereas under 
sustainability reporting and integrated reporting information is considered material if is 
significantly important enough to be disclosed. 
Also, while under IFRS and integrated reporting, an information’s impact on 
decision making is considered the central prerequisite for materiality, under GRI, an 
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information may as well be considered material if it reflect the organization’s significant 
economic, environmental and social impacts, regardless of whether this impact may 
influence stakeholders’ behaviour towards the company. In addition, materiality under 
integrated reporting introduces a strong value creation context not present under 
sustainability reporting according to GRI. Concerning the purpose of each reporting 
approach, students should notice the unifying aspect of integrated reporting that brings 
together the sphere of financial performance (as found in financial reporting) and non-
financial performance (as found in sustainability reporting). While formally open to 
other stakeholder groups, both IFRS financial statements and integrated reporting show 
a focus on financial stakeholders, i.e. providers of equity or credit. Students should 
notice this aspect and reflect upon it, particular in regard to integrated reporting, which 
should include non-financial information and thus be interesting for non-financial 
stakeholders as well. As such, students should consider the conception of the IIRC that 
such providers of financial capital that consider a long-term investment and are thus 
likely to be interested in the company’s long-term performance are also the ones to 
benefit the most from integrated and the to the ones most aligned with the public interest. 
Regarding the scope of all three approaches, students should identify the prospective 
nature of integrated reporting, which highlights aspects such as a company’s strategy 
and outlook, in contrast to traditional financial and non-financial reporting’s (though not 
exclusively) backwards-looking perspective. 
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misstatements of items are 
material if they could, 
individually or 
collectively, influence the 
economic decisions that 
users make on the basis of 
the financial statements 
The report should cover 
aspects that reflect the 
organization’s significant 
economic, environmental 
and social impacts or 
substantively influence 
the assessments and 
decisions of stakeholders 
A matter is material if it is 
of such relevance and 
importance that it could 
substantively influence 
the assessments of 
providers of financial 
capital with regard to the 
organization’s ability to 
create value over the 
short, medium and long 
term 
Purpose Provide information about 
the financial position, 
financial performance, and 
cash flows of an entity 
Communicate the entity's 
broader social and 
environmental impacts, 
strategies and goals 
Explain how value is 
created over time. 
Audience Potential investors, lenders 
and other creditors making 
decision about buying, 
selling or holding equity or 
debt, providing or setting 
loans or credits, exercising 
voting rights or otherwise 
influencing the company in 
a way that affects entity’s 




Providers of financial 
capital. Others interested 
in the organization’s 
ability to create value will 
also benefit 
Scope Impact of short-term 
financial situation of the 
company; 
Assets, Liabilities, Equity, 
Income, Expenses, Cash 
Flows, Changes in Equity 
Impact on the 
environment, society and 
the economy 
Impact’ refers to the 
effect an organization has 
on the economy, the 
environment, and/or 




and external environment, 
Governance, Business 
model, Risks and 
opportunities, Strategy 
and resource allocation, 
Performance, Outlook, 
Basis of preparation and 
presentation 
Table V - 7: Materiality, Purpose, Audience and Scope in different Reporting formats 
Source: Own illsutration, based on International Federation of Accountants (IFAC) and International 
Integrated Reporting Council (IIRC) (2015).




Re-examine the financial and sustainability reporting of WildCat’s competitors (Nike, 
Puma and Adidas). 
(a) What different structures/formats have they chosen to publish their 
sustainability information? To what degree are these aligned to the 
conception of an integrated report in accordance with the IR Framework? 
(b) What advantages and disadvantages do you associate with each approach? 
Solutions to Task 3: 
An overview of the intended solutions for Part III, task 2 can be taken from Table V - 7. 
If the full case, including parts I and II, is employed, students should already be familiar 
with the four major competitors from Part II. 
Concerning their format, re-reading and comparing the reports of the different 
companies, students should realize that they display varying degrees of extensiveness 
and integration of their non-financial disclosure. The US-American company Nike in 
2017 published a stand-alone sustainability report separate from its annual 10 - K report. 
Puma published a combined report, which includes sustainability information in a 
distinct chapter. As a more advanced requirement, students should identify that the 
annual report of Adidas may be viewed as the most integrated, like Puma providing a 
chapter on sustainability but also several interlinkages with other parts of disclosure that 
put the relevant information in a context of value creation. For example, students should 
identify that the company also considers its sustainability performance within its 
corporate strategy as well as its risks and opportunities section (i.e. personnel risks, 
socio-political risks, risks in relation to the company’s value chain etc.). This rising 
degree of integration corresponds to the relative alignment to the objectives of integrated 
reporting in accordance with the integrated reporting framework, as students should 
already have elaborated upon in Task 1 of Part III. Notably, Nike provides a separate 
disclosure, while Puma provides a combined report and Adidas a partially integrated 
one. 
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These varying levels of interconnectivity between financial and non-financial disclosure 
come along with different advantages and disadvantages that students can identify from 
reconsidering the conceptual knowledge they gained in the Parts I and II as well as 
Part III, Task 1: 
First, it can be assumed that at least in its initial implementation, producing an 
integrated report may demand increased efforts and expenses. These expenses not only 
stem from the additional preparation of non-financial information, but also from 
reviewing and (partially) redesigning of existing reporting documents, increased 
overhead for managing the collaboration between different company departments 
involved, etc. Alternatively, preparing an additional integrated report (as also promoted 
as one possibly format by the IIRC) may create additional expense. As such, providing 
a form of separate reporting may be more cost effective and attainable for companies 
new to sustainability reporting. Another disadvantage arising from increased integration 
may be addressee ambivalence: While traditional annual reports clearly aim at financial 
stakeholders primarily interested in a company’s financial performance, companies that 
incorporate sustainability information in their report either assume that it is read by 
other, non-financial stakeholders or that their financial stakeholders consider such 
additional information in their decision making; either way, deduction of what 
information is to be considered relevant enough for inclusion becomes more complex. 
Considering the existence of special-interest addressees, a more integrated report may 
thus mean increased complexity and search costs for specific information, i.e. a higher 
likelihood of encountering ‘information overload’ when reading the report. In contrast, 
from the perspective of a financial stakeholder with a long-term interest in the company, 
as the IIRC considers as the main addressee of an integrated report, a more integrated 
report may also provide more comprehensive or complete offer of information. 
Integration also increases the contextuality of disclosure, specifically of sustainability 
information in relation to statements on the company’s strategy and (economic) outlook. 
From our experience with applying the case, we find that students usually have a 
somewhat easier time identifying advantages of integrated reporting than its 
disadvantages (or, inversely, advantages of separate reports). Consequently, other 
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instructors may find it helpful to anticipate this effect and, in case they encounter a 
similar situation, initiate a more controversial debate by taking up a more critical role in 
the beginning until some students pick up this position. 
 




+ separate sustainability 
report 
Annual Report with 
separate sustainability 
chapter 
Annual Report with 
separate Sustainability 
chapter and connection to 
chapters on strategy, 
global operations, risks 
and opportunities, etc. 
Alignment to 
IR Framework 
Separate disclosure Combined disclosure  Partially integrated 
disclosure 
Advantages Information highly 
concentrated for distinct 
addressees/ stakeholders 








concentrated for distinct 
addressees/ stakeholders 
(i.e. lower search costs of 
individual information). 
Comprehensive 




strategic and prospective 
information. 





No interlinkage with 
strategic and prospective 
and financial information. 
 (Potentially) higher 
search costs for 
individual information 
due to information spread 
across whole document. 
Table V - 8: Reporting Approaches Compared 
Source: Own illustration. 
  




What structure/format to publish its financial and non-financial (sustainability) 
information would you recommend to the board of WildCat Inc. in the future? Explain 
your recommendation briefly. 
Solutions to Task 4: 
As with Part II, Task 4, there is no exclusively right solution to this task. Instead, it aims 
to lead students to apply the knowledge they have acquired in the previous tasks of this 
part and challenge them to take up and defend a position as well as critically evaluate 
the solutions of other students or student groups. 
Specifically, they should reconsider the advantages and disadvantages of each 
reporting approach brought up during the previous task and decide how much weight 
they apply to them. Additionally, students may incorporate arguments brought up during 
the board meeting in the introductory piece of part III that have otherwise not been 
considered in the context of the peer-review of Nike, Puma and Adidas, such as Thomas 
Butler’s concern regarding the acceptance of such a sudden switch in reporting by the 
company’s auditors. Also, students may contrast WildCat Inc.’s position as newcomer 
to sustainability reporting with the company’s aspiration to be ‘always better’. Indeed, 
students in our application of the case often referred to the former when they objected 
to integrated reporting as being too advanced for the company and to the latter when 
arguing that the company should use integrated reporting to jump ahead of its 
competitors (indeed, one student group stressed that being ‘always better’ was no longer 
sufficient – they proposed the company should start striving to be ‘always best’). 
From our application of the case, we also derive two observations that may also be 
considered helpful by other instructors: First, as in the prior task, there can be a certain 
tendency among students to aim for an integrated report, as they may consider it the 
more advanced and therefore preferable option. For instructors that which to mitigate or 
even prevent such a situation, we recommend to again inhibit a strong counter-position 
during in-class discussion or, alternatively, alternate the task in such a way that certain 
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students are tasked specifically with promoting a separate report, while others have to 
argue for the other available options (for example, instructors may ascribe students with 
the roles of the main antagonists from the management board as they appear in the 
introduction to Part III). Second, some students may go beyond (or ‘circumvent’) the 
range of solutions typically considered for this part and instead propose long-term, 
stepwise reporting strategies, which often start with first introducing sustainability 
disclosure through a separate report and aim for a successive integration in the following 
years. Such solutions, when promoted, have the additional charm of eliminating the 
initial juxtaposition of distinct and integrated reporting while also opening up the issue 
of steadiness in reporting and the question of the ‘right’ time frame as additional topics 
of discussion. 
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